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How do levels of confidence in the public service differ across countries?  Are 
these attitudes about the public service determined by similar individual-level attributes 
across countries?  Do country-level correlates explain variation between countries in 
citizen attitudes toward the public service?  Data from the 2005-2009 World Values 
Survey for 21 North American and Eurasian countries, in addition to aggregate-level 
measures of national context, are analyzed using multilevel binary logistic regression.   
The study shows that there is a significant amount of variation in the confidence 
attitudes not only within each country but also across countries.  Citizens of Switzerland, 
Sweden, Norway, and Finland are the most positive about the public service.  On the 
other hand, citizens of Poland, Slovenia, and Moldova are the most critical.  At the 
individual-level, it is reported that age, government employee status, interpersonal trust, 
and confidence towards other government institutions are positively correlated with 
confidence in the public service.  At the aggregate-level, variation in the level of 
confidence in the public service across countries is correlated with the quality of 
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CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION AND GENERAL INFORMATION 
 
Section 1.1:  Research topic 
The political trust literature has grown enormously in recent years, mainly 
because declining trust in government has sparked an interest in this topic.  Survey-based 
studies show that in the mid-1960s, Americans had confidence in their political 
institutions (Putnam 2000).  However, between 1964 and 1999 the percentage of 
Americans who trusted that the government in Washington would do what was right 
“most of the time” or “just about always” fell from 76 to 20 percent (ANES 1958-2008).  
A number of comparative studies examined whether other Western democracies 
experienced a similar reduction in trust of their political institutions (Norris 1999; Pharr 
and Putnam 2000).  These studies revealed that declining trust in government was not 
unique to America.  Indeed, diminishing levels of trust in government were occurring 
simultaneously in countries with different political systems and cultures (Inglehart 1997a, 
1997b; Newton and Norris 2000; Norris 1999; Van de Walle 2007).  Although several 
studies have demonstrated that confidence in the civil service is not as low as in political 
institutions (Suleiman 2003), a lack of trust in the civil service is troubling. 
Declining trust in government is one of the central problems in modern politics 
(Ruscio 1996).  Public trust and confidence in government are important for cooperation 
and collective action, which are the main building blocks for a healthy and functioning 
democracy (Marlowe 2004; Putnam 2000).  The more trustworthy citizens perceive 
government to be, the more likely they are to accept mandates of courts and other 
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government authorities (Tyler 2006).  Ultimately, trust will improve the potential for 
better government performance. 
Citizens experience government through interactions with “street level” 
bureaucrats.  Therefore, government employees play an important role in shaping 
citizens’ trust in government (Lipsky 2010).  Citizens and elected officials who maintain 
high levels of trust in public administrators will be likely to provide them with more 
discretionary authority and less direct oversight (Marlowe 2004).  Successful governance 
requires public support for the implementation of policy programs (Miller 1974; Ruscio 
1996).  Trust has to stay above some minimal level if public policy programs are to 
continue to function (Kim 2005). 
Section 1.2:  Status of the research literature 
The deficit of trust in government has raised concern about the legitimacy of the 
public bureaucracy and its role in governance.  Public administrators across the globe 
have looked to modernization efforts as a means to enhance public attitudes, with the 
reforms of the “new public management” gaining broad international implementation.  
Implicit in these reforms is the idea that public trust can be cultivated by improving the 
performance of the public bureaucracy and the services it delivers (Barnes and Gill 2000; 
Gelders and Van de Walle 2007; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Van de Walle and 
Bouckaert 2003).  However, this approach assumes that public trust in the public service 
has a common set of correlates across nations.  Yet, little research has been conducted to 
empirically test this assumption.   
In light of the New Public Management reforms, public administration scholars 
have turned their attention to studies of citizen attitudes towards the public service and 
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the causes and consequences of these views (Ariely 2011).  Most of the studies have 
examined citizens’ attitude towards the quality and performance of the public service 
(Van de Walle and Bouckaert 2003), and very few have actually focused on citizen trust 
toward the civil service (Marlowe 2004; Van de Walle 2007; Van de Walle, Van 
Roosbroek, and Bouckaert 2008).  The majority of these studies have examined 
individual-level factors such as demographic characteristics and satisfaction with specific 
services (Marlowe 2004).  Most of the studies have been single country analyses.  Very 
few have examined attitudes toward the public sector from a cross-national perspective 
(Anderson and Tverdova 2003).  Most research on public trust has focused on attitudes 
toward government in general or in specific political institutions (Richardson, Houston, 
and Hadjiharalambous 2001) such as the legislative and executive branches, or individual 
political leaders (Marlowe 2004).  In short, there is much to be learned about 
particularized trust in public service.  
Section 1.3:  Research questions 
This study seeks to contribute to a better understanding of public trust in 
government by focusing on trust in the civil service.  The research addresses the 
following questions:  How do levels of trust in the civil service differ across countries?  
Are these attitudes about public service determined by similar individual-level attributes 
across nations?  Do national-level correlates explain variation between nations in citizen 
attitudes toward public service?  In addition to the demographic and attitudinal variables 
included in the country-specific models, national-level correlates are examined. 
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Section 1.4:  Research approach 
The primary source of data used in this analysis is the World Values Survey 
(2009).  The World Values Survey (WVS hereafter) is a global research project that 
explores people’s values, beliefs, and attitudes, and how they change over time.  It is 
carried out by a worldwide network of social scientists who, since 1981, have conducted 
representative national surveys in almost 100 countries (WVS 2014). 
The analysis is conducted in three stages.  First, descriptive statistics are analyzed 
so that different levels of trust in the civil service across countries can be identified.  
Second, binary logistic regression models for each country are performed to examine 
whether attitudes about the civil service are determined by similar individual-level 
attributes across countries.  Third, in addition to the demographic and attitudinal variables 
included in the country-specific models, national-level correlates are examined.  To 
explain variation between countries, multilevel binary logistic regression models are 
estimated by pooling together all the national samples. 
Section 1.5:  Contribution to the literature 
Political trust is essential in the creation and maintenance of strong democracies.  
This study aims to enhance an understanding of political trust and how it is formed.  This 
research seeks to make several contributions.   
The study examines what attitudes citizens have toward the civil service.  It 
explores and determines similar individual attributes and attitudes of trust in the public 
service across the nations.  The main contribution of this study is that it accounts for 
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cross-national variation in attitudes.  It examines whether trust in the civil service is 
influenced by the nature of a nation’s government. 
In methodological terms, the study examines attitudes toward the public sector 
using a cross-national investigation.  It offers explanations beyond a specific national 
context.  Multilevel analyses of cross-national survey data enable to account for 
explanations at the macro-level and to examine their relation to individual-level variables.  
Namely, the multilevel analysis facilitates an investigation of how the specified macro-
level elements influence citizen attitudes toward the public sector.  In other words, the 
study assesses how the characteristics of social structure affect individuals.  Examination 
of the cross-national differences in political science has become a popular tool 
(Steenbergen and Jones 2002), but its adoption with the public administration field is less 
common (Heinrich and Hill 2010).  Thus, this work contributes to the study of 




CHAPTER II  
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Section 2.1:  What is trust? 
To understand the nature and extent of citizen trust in the public service, it is 
necessary, first, to define what trust means and then to define what political trust means.  
Section 2.1.i:  Definition of trust  
 The concept of trust is both simple and complex.  It is simple because it is used in 
daily language.  And, it is complex because it is used to explain a wide variety of social 
concepts.  Houston and Harding (2013) define trust as “a willingness to rely on others to 
act on our behalf based on the belief that they possess the capacity to make effective 
decisions and take our interests into account” (p. 55).  These scholars distinguish two 
dimensions of trust:  competence and care (trustworthiness) (see also Carnevale 1995; 
Citrin and Luks 2001; Keele 2007; Kim 2005; Metlay 1999; Poortinga and Pidgeon 2003; 
Putnam, Pharr, and Dalton 2000).  The competence or cognitive dimension is based on 
rational judgments about the ability of the trustee to accomplish a stated goal and act 
consistently (see also Calnan and Rowe 2006; Ruscio 1996).  On the other hand, 
trustworthiness is an effective dimension.  It is grounded on the belief that the trustee’s 
action is not motivated by self-interest but rather takes into account the interests of the 
trustor.  LaPorte and Metlay (1996) describe it as “the belief that those with whom you 
interact will take your interests into account, even in situations where you are not in a 
position to recognize, evaluate, and/or thwart a potentially negative course of action by 
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‘those trusted’” (p. 342) (see also Calnan and Rowe 2006; Fukuyama 1995; Hardin 1998; 
Ruscio 1997; Taylor-Gooby 2006).  Offe (1999) proposes a somewhat similar definition:  
Trust is the belief concerning the action that is to be expected from others.  The 
belief refers to probabilities that (certain categories of) others will do certain 
things or refrain from doing certain things, which in either case affects the well-
being of the holder of the belief, as well as possibility the well-being of others or 
relevant collectivity.  Trust is the belief that others, through their action or 
inaction, will contribute to my/ our well-being and refrain from inflicting damage 
upon me/us (p.47).  
 
Levi and Stoker (2000) suggest that a definition of trust entails elements described 
below.  Trust is a belief about the future actions or inactions of others and their outcomes 
(see also Gambetta 2000; Hardin 1998, 1999, 2000, 2001; Levi 1998; Luhmann 1988; 
Misztal 1996; Offe 1999; Sztompka 1999).  Trust is relational:  X trusts Y to do A, in 
doing so, X makes him/ herself vulnerable to Y.  Thus, trust involves risk since there is 
no certainty about the future outcomes (Gambetta 2000; Luhmann 1988; Offe 1999; 
Sztompka 1999).  Trust is a judgment.  One can trust or distrust the other, or trust or 
distrust to a certain degree.  Trust judgments inspire a course of action.  Distrust may 
inspire vigilance in and monitoring of a relationship.  Thus, trust judgments reflect belief 
about the trustworthiness of other people, groups, or institutions.  The above definitions 
of trust discuss to some extent interpersonal trust that is trust one person places in another 
individual.  The next section discusses political trust.  
Section 2.1.ii:  Definition of political trust 
Political trust is the trust that people place in political institutions or their leaders.  
It links ordinary citizens to the political system that is intended to represent them 
(Mishler and Rose 2001, p. 30).  Hardin (1998, 2000) argues that trust in government is 
not analogous to personal trust.  Personal trust is much richer and involves a reciprocal 
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relationship.  Therefore, Hardin (1999) suggests that one should speak of confidence in 
government and not of trust in government (p. 31).  Nevertheless, scholars use both 
terminologies in their studies of citizen attitudes towards government.  For example, 
Katzenstein (2000) uses the word “confidence” in defining what political trust means:  
political trust is “the public’s confidence in representative democratic institutions, 
including political parties, parliament, bureaucracies, the legal system, the police, and the 
armed forces” (p. 122).  Citrin and Muste (1999) add to the definition the citizenry’s 
expectations of government:  “Political trust indicates confidence that authorities will 
observe the rules of the game and serve the general interest” (p. 465).   
Thus, political trust can be regarded as an evaluative orientation of citizens 
toward their political system, or some part of it, based upon their normative expectations 
(Hetherington 1998, p. 791; Miller 1974, p. 952).  As Miller and Listhaug state, trust is “a 
summary judgment that the system is responsive, will do what is right, and take into 
account citizens’ interests even in the absence of constant citizens’ scrutiny” (Miller and 
Listhaug 1990, p. 358, see also Gamson 1968).  Blind (2007) suggests that “political trust 
happens when citizens appraise the government and its institutions, policy-making in 
general and/or the individual political leaders as promise-keeping, efficient, fair and 
honest” (pp. 3-4).  When one says that government has lost public trust and confidence, it 
means that the public believes that government neither intends to take the public interests 
into account nor would government have the competence and capacity to act effectively 
even if it tried to do so (LaPorte and Metlay 1996).   
Trust in government is thought to be generally associated with government’s 
ability to deliver services, maintain economic growth, protect citizens, and resolve basic 
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social issues (Nye 1997).  Some policy-makers have generally referred to the 
performance of a specific public service as an explanation for decline of trust in 
government (Van de Walle 2007).  Policy initiatives such as the National Performance 
Review in the United States and New Public Management in Europe were part of 
government reforms that emphasized competitive, customer-driven, and market-based 
solutions to perceived inefficiencies in the delivery of government services.  These 
reforms assumed that public trust can be cultivated by improving the performance of 
public bureaucracy and the services it delivers. 
Section 2.2:  Importance of the trust  
Section 2.2.i:  Why trust is important to governing broadly 
Why is trust so important?  According to Robert Putnam (2000), “Honesty and 
trust lubricate the inevitable frictions of social life” (135).  In many ways, trust acts as a 
facilitator for solving the shared collective problems of a pluralist society.  Trust links 
citizens with the government and institutions that represent them therefore trust enhances 
both the legitimacy and the effectiveness of democratic government (Bianco 1994; Citrin 
and Muste 1999; Inglehart 1997b; Levi and Stoker 2000; Putnam 1993a, 1993b).  No 
government can have the absolute trust of its citizens because the power of any 
government represents a threat to individual freedom and welfare (Mishler and Rose 
1997).  Notwithstanding this affirmation, government should have a minimum level of 
confidence of its citizens to operate effectively.  Trust is fundamentally important for a 
healthy and functioning democracy (Almond and Verba 1963; Mishler and Rose 2005; 
Putnam 1993a, 1993b).  It engenders citizen compliance with public policies, encourages 
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political participation, and contributes to perceptions of governmental legitimacy (Levi 
and Stoker 2000). 
At stake is the efficacy and stability of democratic government, its ability to 
represent interests and solve social and economic problems (Hetherington 2005; Nye, 
Zelikow, and King 1997; Pharr and Putnam 2000).  Institutional trust translates into 
diffuse political support and is critical for “the survival and the effective functioning of 
democratic institutions” (Mishler and Rose 2005, p. 1051; see also Easton 1965, 1975; 
Gibson, Caldeira, and Baird 1998; Gibson and Caldeira 2003).  Trust encourages the 
public’s acceptance of democratic values and ideals (Norris 1999).  To the contrary, 
political distrust undermines government legitimacy, threatens political stability, and 
facilitates support for undemocratic regimes (Muller, Jukam, and Seligson 1982; Rose, 
Mishler, and Haerpfer 1998; but see Mishler and Rose 2005).  Further, trust stimulates 
citizen participation in political life (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Fukuyama 1995; Norris 
1999; Putnam 1993a, 2000; Uslaner 1999, 2002).  Citizens who trust the government are 
more likely “to vote, follow politics, feel a sense of civic duty, and have high levels of 
political knowledge” (Mishler and Rose 2005, p. 1068).  According to Gamson (1968), 
political mobilization and activism are driven by political trust.  In the context of 
government, political trust influences whether or not citizens view the state as being 
politically legitimate, determines to what degree citizens will consent to government 
demands, and impacts the levels of political participation undertaken by citizens (Levi 
and Stoker 2000).  Simply put, political trust is essential for the proper functioning of 
democratic governance.  
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In order for a democratic state to wield its authority in a productive fashion, it 
must be judged by its citizens as being legitimate.  As Tyler (1998) declares, “Beyond 
being able to secure compliance, authorities need to be able to gain voluntary acceptance 
for most of their decisions.  Legal, political, and organizational theorists have long 
recognized that voluntary acceptance of the decisions and rules of organizational 
authorities is important to the ability of those authorities to function effectively” (p. 271).  
As trust in politicians and institutions decline, so too could support for democracy itself 
(Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki 1975; Easton 1965).  Without trust, citizens are less 
likely to pay taxes and support government policy (Yang and Holzer 2006).   
Trust is especially important for generating public support for programs that entail 
some perceived risk or sacrifice (Hetherington 2005).  Specifically, political trust is 
significant for the support of redistributive programs, such as welfare and food stamps, 
and race-targeted policies.  When trust is high, the “haves” are more likely to make the 
sacrifices necessary to assist the “have-nots.”  Hetherington observes that the public 
policy in the United States has become more conservative since the 1960s.  However, the 
American public has not become more conservative.  Hetherington explains this puzzle 
by demonstrating a strong link between political trust, public opinion, and policy 
outcomes.  Generally speaking, when the public is more trustful, the government 
responds with more liberal public policy.  In contrast, when the public is more distrustful, 
the government responds with more conservative public policy.   
At the same time, “a certain amount of rational distrust is necessary for political 
accountability in a participatory democracy” (Barber 1983, p. 166).  In the extreme case, 
one can argue the public choice view of government as a Leviathan.  Citizens should 
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mistrust their government as this would be a natural position for them to defend 
themselves against a Leviathan.  Distrust could be interpreted as a realistic view of 
government.  However, this view fails to explain why the level of confidence was high in 
the past. 
Section 2.2.ii:  Why trust is important for public administration  
For public administration specifically, trust is fundamentally important because it 
addresses a number of central and interrelated concerns:  discretion, accountability, 
oversight, public cooperation and compliance with laws and regulations (Marien and 
Hooghe 2011, Marlowe 2004; Scholz and Lubell 1998; Taylor-Clark, Blendon, 
Zaslavsky, and Benson 2005).  Several examples from the literature emphasize these 
points.  For instance, Murphy (2004) examines the role of trust with regard to individuals 
accused of tax evasion and finds that when these individuals feel poorly treated, it leads 
to a decrease in trust, which in turn affects their willingness to comply.  This suggests 
that actions on the part of public administrators – as simple as acting fairly, treating 
others with respect, and entering into friendly consultation – engender trust.  In this case, 
increasing levels of trust translates into greater citizen compliance.  Scholz and Pinney 
(1995) also find a similar relationship between trust and acquiescence with tax laws.  
Likewise, Tyler (1998) argues that public trust increases citizens’ compliance with 
government regulations based on the premise that trusting citizens are more likely to 
believe that government will treat them fairly.   
Trust is also important to management for reasons other than merely securing 
citizen compliance.  For example, Zand (1972) reveals that the introduction of increased 
levels of trust can dramatically affect problem solving effectiveness.  In an experimental 
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study, he finds that there are highly significant differences in the level of problem-solving 
effectiveness between business executives primed to expect trusting relationships with 
other actors in their environment as opposed to untrusting.  These results suggest that 
trust, when properly nurtured, can positively affect problem-solving effectiveness.  While 
this investigation did not examine trust relationships with regard to the public sector, 
nonetheless, its implications for public management are stark.  Trust, if manifested at 
sufficient levels, has the capacity to break the ice between entities and thus helps to 
enable program implementation and facilitate effective decision making. 
Trust in government may also affect the willingness of a person to enter public 
service (Nye 1997).  In other words, distrust of government may negatively affect the 
ability of government to recruit people to work in the public sector.  The 1998 Pew 
Research Center study finds that those who distrust the federal government are less likely 
to believe the federal government is a good place to work, to recommend to young people 
to start their careers in government, or to say they would personally prefer working for 
the government over business (Pew Research Center 1998). 
Section 2.3:  Public trust in government and civil service 
Section 2.3.i:  Declining public trust in government  
During the last decades, many countries have moved from a non-democratic 
government to a democratic one (Huntington 1991).  However, it seems paradoxical that 
the geographical spread of democracy has been followed by “erosion” of its essential 
elements in old advanced democracies on both sides of the Atlantic (Dogan 1997, 2005).  
Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki (1975) define this phenomenon as a “crisis of 
democracy” in the nations of North America, Europe, and Japan.  The main symptoms of 
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weakening democracy are “erosion” of confidence in political institutions and the leaders 
of those institutions (Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2001; Citrin and Luks 2001; Dalton 
2005; Dogan 2005; Hetherington 2005; Kaase 1999; Klimgemann 1999; Norris 1999; 
Nye, Zelikow, and King 1997; Pharr and Putnam 2000).  Decades of responses to the 
same survey questions show diminished political trust in government in a number of 
advanced industrial democracies (Levi and Stoker 2000).  
United States 
 The longest and clearest downward trend in trust has been observed in the United 
States.  In 1962 the National Election Studies (ANES) introduced trust-in-government 
questions, which were: 
“… designed to tap the basic evaluative orientations towards the national 
government.  The criteria of judgment implicit in these questions were partly 
ethical, that is honesty and other ethical qualities of public officials were part of 
what the sample was asked to judge.  But the criteria extended to other qualities as 
well, including the ability and efficiency of government officials and the 
correctness of their policy decisions” (Stokes 1962, p. 64). 
National survey questions in the U.S. reveal a strong decline in trust among the 
general population starting from 1964.  During the six-year period from 1964 to 1970, 
American responses on trust in government decreased by 17% (Miller 1974).  In 
comparison, during the previous six-year period from 1958 to 1964 the decline in trust 
was only about 2% (Miller 1974).  The strong, secular decline of political confidence 
started in the 1960s with the beginning of the Vietnam War, and was reinforced by the 
Watergate Scandal (Katzenstein 2000).  During the first half of the 1980s there was a 
temporary upswing of political confidence but the decline continued as the Iran-Contra 
scandal burst in 1986.  There was another slight increase in political confidence in 1994.  
 
 15 
In his analysis of surveying data from various sources, Dalton (1999) finds a large and 
significant decline of citizen confidence in the institutions of government between 1952 
and 1994.  Such a rapid degree of change in trusting attitudes has alarmed scholars and 
triggered a number of studies.  A downward trend in confidence in government has been 
observed not only in the United States but also in Europe. 
Western Europe 
A number of surveys conducted in almost all of the European countries have 
shown that a large proportion of citizens, in some cases the majority, have “none” or 
“little” confidence in the main institutions of the political regime:  parties, government, 
parliament, high-level administration, courts, army, and police, as well as in their leaders 
(Dogan 2005).  There seems to be strong evidence that trust in government and its 
officials has declined across Europe.  Studies that examine the World Values Surveys in 
Western Europe have shown considerable decline of citizens’ confidence in public 
authorities and institutions such as the police, the armed forces, and the Parliament 
between 1981 and 1990 (Inglehart 1999; Listhaug and Wiberg 1995).   
Furthermore, Dalton (1999) shows that in the mid-1990s the cross-national 
magnitude of these changes is clearly much greater than the changes that occurred in the 
1980s (see also Nye 1997; Nye and Zelikow 1997).  However, Newton (1999) criticizes 
this assertion because the sources for data are mostly single-country surveys, which are 
not fully comparable.  In addition, the survey questions asked in Western Europe have 
often differed from those posed in the United States (Nye, Zelikow, and King 1997).  
Nevertheless, Newton and Dalton agree that in the 1990s the decline of trust in public 
institutions has been higher than in private ones (Katzenstein 2000).  Dalton writes “there 
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is clear evidence of a general erosion in support for politicians and political institutions in 
most advanced industrial democracies” (1999, p. 63).  Alesina and Wacziarg (2000) 
further argue that the decline in confidence is larger for the United States than for 
Western European democracies. 
Eastern Europe 
The level of mistrust is significantly different between West and East European 
countries (Dogan 2005).  For example, in the 1999-2000 European Values Study the 
proportion of people who expressed a negative opinion (“little” or “no confidence”) on 
parliament, army, police, public administration, courts, and social security is higher in the 
East compared to West.  Mishler and Rose (2001) observe: 
“Across the 10 post-communist societies, public reactions to the new social and 
political institutions range from skepticism (the midpoint on the 7-point trust 
scale) to outright distrust.  The median citizen in post-communist societies 
actively distrusts five of the institutions and is skeptical about the remaining six.  
Distrust is greatest for political institutions, especially parliaments and parties, 
which are actively distrusted by 59% and 69% of citizens, respectively.  The 
least democratic institution of the state, the military, enjoys the highest level of 
popular trust (46% are positive), although the median citizen is still skeptical 
and nearly a third actively distrust the military.  Across all institutions, an 
average of 31% of respondents express positive trust, 22% are skeptical, and 
47% are distrustful” (p. 41). 
The erosion of confidence has common traits across nations (Dogan 2005).  First, 
the erosion of confidence is not a one-time phenomenon that is attached only to a 
particular economic or political event.  The analysis of several surveys conducted since 
1960s has demonstrated that it is rather a persistent phenomenon that has been observed 
over the last three or four decades.  For example, the decline in trust in the U.S. in the 
1960-s and 1970-s was triggered by citizens’ reactions to the war in Vietnam, Watergate, 
and civil rights initiatives;  however, the level of trust did not increase as the politicians 
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associated with these events left the office (Levi and Stoker 2000).  These and other 
findings suggest that declining trust reflect more than incumbent-specific dissatisfactions 
of government (Levi and Stoker 2000). 
Second, the decline of the public trust is an international phenomenon.  It has 
been observed across the North American and European nations.  Third, the decline of 
trust is structural in nature by permeating all political and social strata.  Citizens lost 
confidence not only in political institutions but also in unions, big businesses, churches, 
televisions, and printed mass media as well as a decline in social capital (Dogan 2005; 
Putnam 2000).  Lastly, the disenchantment is rather pragmatic and not of an ideological 
nature which has worsened with the economic difficulties in the nations (Dogan 2005; 
Miller 1974).  
Section 2.3.ii:  Public opinion surveys on citizens’ trust in public service  
A majority of public opinion surveys have focused on citizens’ attitudes towards 
government, its representative institutions and leaders.  In contrast, for many countries 
the time-series data on public trust in the civil service are simply unavailable (Pollitt and 
Bouckaert 2004).  Furthermore, studies show that trust in the public bureaucracy is 
actually higher than in other government institutions (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; 
Suleiman 2003; Van de Walle, Van Roosbroek, and Bouckaert 2008).  However, the low 
and declining trust in the civil service is assumed to be a global phenomenon (Van de 
Walle 2007).  Policy-makers often blame poor bureaucratic performance as a cause of the 
declining public trust (Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004; Van de Walle, Van Roosbroek, and 
Bouckaert 2008).  Thus, the citizenry dissatisfaction with specific public services and its 
possible consequences on public trust warrants further study.  
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Section 2.4:  Studies of trust in public service  
A number of studies find that levels of trust in bureaucrats are not as low as in 
politicians and government institutions.  For example, Pharr’s (1997) analysis of Japan 
shows that citizens’ dissatisfaction is greater toward politicians than bureaucrats.  
Nevertheless, there has been an increase in the number of academic studies about the 
citizens’ trusting attitudes toward the public service (e.g., Bouckaert, Van de Walle, and 
Kampen 2005; Huseby 1995; Newton and Norris 2000; Roller 1995; Van de Walle 
2007).  The following studies are noteworthy for their explicit efforts to model trust in the 
civil service.  The first section below summarizes single-country studies, the second 
section discusses existing multi-nation studies, and the third section concludes the 
overview of these studies with a discussion of their limitations.   
Section 2.4.i:  Single-nation studies 
United States, General Social Survey (1996) 
Marlowe’s (2004) study is one of the first pieces of research that directly 
examines trust in public administration.  He studies the impact of individual 
characteristics and attitudes of citizens on trust in public administrators in the United 
States.  The following 1996 General Social Survey (GSS) question is the main focus of 
his study:  “Most government administrators can be trusted to do what is right for the 
country” (103).  Marlowe concludes that trust in public administrators is a function of the 
citizens’ perception of government performance and their confidence in government 
institutions such as Congress and the executive branch.  He also argues that citizens 
perceive public administrators both as a part of the problem and the solution of declining 
trust.  Public administrators are perceived as “cogs in the government system that citizens 
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view as functionally sound but nonetheless untrustworthy” (p. 96).  Thus, studies of trust 
in public service should control for citizens’ perception of performance of government 
and confidence in government institutions and their leaders. 
United States, General Social Survey (2004) 
 Another important study that directly examines trust in public administration is 
Houston and Harding’s (2013) research.  They examine trusting attitudes of American 
citizens.  Specifically, they explore both dimensions of trust - competence and 
trustworthiness, which are measured with responses to the 2004 General Social Survey 
(GSS).  The scholars conclude that although citizens’ perception of trustworthiness and 
competence in public servants are related, they are determined by different factors.  
External political efficacy and general assessment of government are important correlates 
across both dimensions of trust.  However, perceptions of trustworthiness are explained 
by socio-demographic attributes and interpersonal trust.  Meanwhile, perceptions of 
competence are influenced by political party affiliation.  Thus, competence is linked to 
citizens’ perception of getting what they want from government, while trustworthiness is 
likely influenced by citizens’ perception of how they are treated by bureaucrats.  
Therefore, studies of public administration should account for correlates of trust that 
differ across two dimensions.  
Israel, Nation-wide Surveys (2001-2005) 
Vigoda-Gadot (2007) examines citizens’ perceptions and attitudes toward public 
administration, public services, and public officials on the national and local levels.  He 
studies surveys that were conducted during a five-year period from 2001 to 2005 in 
Israel.  Respondents were asked to indicate their level of trust toward various state 
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agencies and public organizations.  In this study, Vigoda-Gadot develops an index of 
“trust in governance,” which was measured using an 18-item scale.  He finds that positive 
citizens’ perceptions of organizational ethics in the administrative branches of 
democracies and satisfaction with services enhance trust in governance.  At the same 
time, citizens’ perceptions of the existence of internal organizational politics, which is 
defined as “behavior strategically designed to maximize self-interest … in conflict with 
the collective organizational goals” decrease trust in governance (587).  Gender, 
education, and age are the only other variables that were included in the multiple 
regression model.  None of these demographic variables emerge as statistically 
significant.  Therefore, for the studies of trust in public administration, it is important to 
include the attributes of citizens’ satisfaction with government services.  
Norway, Nationwide Survey (2001) 
Christensen and Laegreid (2005) examine trust in government in Norway.  The 
data come from a general mass survey of citizens conducted in 2001.  Responses to the 
following question are used to measure trust in government:  “Below are the names of 
various institutions.  How much trust do you have in each of these institutions?”  
Respondents were asked to rate their level of trust in six different institutions and their 
leaders: the civil service, the parliament, the cabinet, local councils, political parties (in 
general), and politicians (in general).  Citizens’ responses on their level of trust in the 
civil service and the other five government institutions and actors were used to construct 
one additive index of trust in government.  Christensen and Laegreid find that citizens’ 
evaluation of government performance is the most important predictor of variation in the 
respondents’ trust in government.  People who are satisfied with how democracy works 
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in a country are more likely to have a higher level of trust in public sector institutions 
than do other citizens.  Another important attribute that explains variation in people’s 
trust in government is satisfaction with specific public services.  The scholars find that 
citizens who are satisfied with public services are more likely to trust the government.  
Christensen and Laegreid also find that people have difficulties in distinguishing one 
institution or a set of actors from another.  Therefore, citizens’ trust in one institution is 
likely to extend to other government institutions and actors.  In addition, socio-
demographic variables such as age, education, and employment in the public sector 
influence trusting attitudes.  
Section 2.4.ii:  Multi-nation studies 
The following five studies merit attention for their contribution in examining 
public trust cross-nationally.  
14 West European nations, Canada, and United States, European Values Surveys (1981, 
1990) 
Listhaug and Wiberg (1995) examine factors that explain variations in the 
citizens’ levels of confidence in the civil service in 14 Western European nations, 
Canada, and United States.  They analyze the data from the two European Values 
Surveys conducted in 1981 and 1990.  The study examines citizens’ responses to the 
following question:  “Please look at this card and tell me, for each item listed, how much 
confidence you have in them.  Is it a great deal, quite a lot, not very much, or none at 
all?”  The study finds that demographic attributes, interest in politics, political ideology, 
postmaterialist values, and life satisfaction circumstances influence confidence.  Listhaug 
and Wiberg’s study has several limitations.  They treated the 4-point Likert type scale 
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responses as a continuous variable and estimated multivariate regression models.  
Another limitation of this study is that all countries were pooled in one sample with an 
assumption that the impact of the explanatory variables is independent of national 
context.  Not surprisingly, their models have a very weak explanatory power with an 
explained variance of 8% in 1981 and 4% in 1990. 
17 democracies, World Values Surveys (1980-1984 and 1990-1993) 
Newton and Norris (2000) examine data from two waves of the World Values 
Survey (1980-1984 and 1990-1993).  The data for 17 countries are pooled in one sample. 
The following question is used to measure institutional confidence:  “Please look at this 
card and tell me, for each item, how much confidence you have in them.  [The civil 
service]  Is it a great deal (4), quite a lot (3), not very much (2) or none at all (1)?”  They 
find that political ideology is the strongest predictor of trust in civil service with those 
people reporting themselves to be on the left having the highest trust.  They conclude that 
trust in civil service is higher among women, the middle classes, older people, and those 
who are satisfied with life.  Social trust and civic engagement are weak predictors of 
institutional confidence.  However, their ordinary least squares regression model explains 
a limited amount of variance in confidence of the civil service. 
60 nations, World Values Survey (the 1999-2001 wave) 
Van de Walle’s (2007) study is one of the few that directly and systematically 
examine citizens’ attitudes toward public administration.  Van de Walle examines 
confidence in the civil service in 60 nations.  He studies responses to the survey item 
from the 1999-2001 wave of the World Values Survey:  “Could you tell me how much 
confidence you have in the civil service.”  The ordinal logistic regressions for each 60 
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countries individually and the entire sample of all 60 countries have been examined.  Van 
de Walle finds a substantial amount of cross-country variation in confidence.  However, 
in the models he included only socio-demographic and socio-economic variables, which 
turn out not to be the major explanatory factors for differences in confidence in the civil 
service.  Van de Walle also estimates a binary logistic regression model for 48 nations.  
He finds that confidence is higher among younger, lower educated, and the upper income 
level respondents and residents of smaller towns.  However, his model has a very weak 
fit.  Overall, Van de Walle’s models fail to explain the observed variation across nations.  
In addition, by pooling into one sample 60 (and in another model 48) highly diverse 
countries, his models violate the basic parallel slopes assumption of ordinal logistic 
regression analysis.  
16 nations, International Social Survey Program (2004) 
 Although the main focus of Anderson and Tverdova’s (2003) study is not 
citizens’ attitudes toward civil servants but rather the effect of corruption on the attitudes 
of ordinary people toward political institutions, it is worthwhile to discuss their paper 
because one of their dependent variables is trust in civil servants.  Specifically, they 
examine the effect of corruption on trust in civil servants in 16 mature and newly 
established democracies.  The individual-level data come from surveys collected as a part 
of the 1996 International Social Survey Program (ISSP).  To gauge whether people had 
trust in civil servants, respondents were presented with the following statement:  “Most 
civil servants can be trusted to do what is best for the country.”  The main conclusion of 
the study is that citizens in countries with higher levels of corruption have lower levels of 
trust in civil servants.  The study also shows that those who are among the political 
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majority (citizens who had voted for and elected the incumbent government) are more 
trusting of civil servants than those in the minority.  Individuals of higher social status, 
those who have voted in the most recent national elections, who are interested in politics, 
and older respondents are more trusting of civil servants.  This study has made a 
significant contribution in examining citizens’ attitudes from a cross-national perspective 
by employing a multilevel modeling statistical technique.  Multilevel modeling 
techniques help to deal with a number of statistical problems such as nonconstant 
variance and clustering (Snijders and Bosker 2011).  Several current studies have pooled 
together all the national samples and thus violated standard assumptions (Listhaug 1995; 
Newton 2001; Van de Walle 2007).  Therefore, in studying citizens’ attitudes from a 
cross-national perspective it is important to employ multilevel statistical techniques.  
33 countries, International Social Survey Program (2006) 
Van Ryzin (2011) studies public trust in civil servants in 33 countries.  He 
examines responses to the survey item from the 2006 International Social Survey 
Program (ISSP):  “Most civil servants can be trusted to do what is best for the country.”  
Individual-level structural equation and country-level path models were examined to test 
whether trust in the civil servants depends both on process (such as fairness and equity) 
and on outcome (such as citizens’ perception of government success in improving public 
services).  The study demonstrates that the “bureaucratic process appears to matter to 
citizens as much as, if not more than, outcomes of government activity” (759).  Van 
Ryzin also finds in all but one of his models that process has a larger effect on trust of 
civil servants than does outcome.  Therefore, in studies of trust in public administration, 
it is important to control for process and outcome.   
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Section 2.4.iii:  Limitation of current studies 
 The review of empirical studies on citizen trust in public administration reveals 
their several limitations.  First, most public administration scholarship fails to explain 
whether the reported decline in trust in public administration reflects particularized trust 
in the civil service or merely demonstrates the spillover of attitudes towards government 
and its political actors.  Second, the rapid global diffusion of New Public Management 
reforms has created the need to examine attitudes comparatively and not just conduct 
single-nation studies.  Third, the limited amount of cross-national studies focuses on old 
democracies and fails to include newly emerging democratic nations.  Finally, cross-
national variation in the level of public trust in the civil service has garnered little 
attention, and thus studies have failed to explore nation-level factors that may influence 
attitudes. 
Section 2.5:  Competing explanations of trusting attitudes  
The review of the various research of trust in public administration shows that 
there is no one set of factors that would explain variation in people’s trust in the civil 
service.  Furthermore, trust is a multilevel concept that could be studied on individual and 
aggregate levels such as bureaucracies or nations (Weatherford 1992).  Thus, micro-level 
studies examine the individual-level causes and consequences of citizens’ trust in 
government and politicians.  Whereas, macro-level studies focus on attributes of 
governments that make them trustworthy (Levi and Stoker 2000).  To enhance the 
understanding of the variation in citizens’ trust in public administration, it is important to 
take a comparative approach focusing on trusting attitudes among different countries. 
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To construct a model that explains variation in citizens’ trust in the civil service 
within and across nations, this research draws from the broader literature on political 
trust, on trust in specific government institutions, and on trust in public administration.  
The literature has identified three sets of correlates to explain attitudes at an individual or 
micro-level:  socio-cultural, socio-psychological, and attitudes towards other 
governmental institutions.  Furthermore, to account for cross-national variation in 
attitudes, the following nation-level indicators will be included in the model:  government 
performance, social polarization, and culture. 
Section 2.5.i:  Individual-level correlates 
A.  Socio-cultural correlates 
 The socio-cultural approach views public trust as “the product of social 
experiences and socialization” (Newton and Norris 2000, p. 60).  Cultural theories of 
democracy argue that trust is “intergenerationally transmitted and deeply embedded in 
society” (Mishler and Rose 2005, p. 1054).  Erikson (1953) argues that trust is 
established in early infancy, mediated, in a general way, by the mother’s handling of her 
child.  Studies in psychology show that a basic disposition to trust is learnt during early 
childhood and formative years (Bjornskov 2007).  For example, Katz and Rotter (1969) 
find that about 75% of the variation in teenagers’ trust levels could be explained by their 
parents’ level of trusting attitudes toward other people.  Trust is an individual property 
and is associated with individual demographic features, social position, cultural identity, 
and personal life experience (Delhey and Newton 2003; Newton and Norris 2000).  For 
instance, Putnam (2000) argues, “In virtually all societies ‘have-nots’ are less trusting 
than ‘haves,’ probably because haves are treated by others with more honesty and 
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respect” (138).  While the findings generally are mixed, the following correlates tend to 
be examined:  sex, age, education, government employment, political ideology, and civic 
engagement.  
Age 
Studies find that age is one of the socio-demographic variables that systematically 
correlate with political trust and support (Huseby 2000; Rose 1999).  It is expected that 
trust is higher among older respondents.  Older citizens develop a sense of social 
connectedness, tend to be more collectively oriented, and are inclined to be more attached 
to institutions (Christensen and Laegreid 2005; Lipset and Schneider 1987; Listhaug and 
Wiberg 1995).  Furthermore, the older generation has experienced the advance of the 
welfare state, while the younger generation has experienced the public sector that 
increasingly incorporates elements from private and nonprofit sectors (Christensen and 
Laegreid 2005).  As a result, older people are more likely to see themselves as taxpayers, 
whereas younger respondents perceive themselves as consumers (Van de Walle 2007).  
In addition, Inglehart’s (1999) hypothesizes that the younger generation lack respect for 
authority as a result of postmodernization.  However, several studies have reported a 
negative relationship between trust and age (Keele 2005; King 1997; Richardson, 
Houston, and Hadjiharalambous 2001).  
Sex 
Studies typically hypothesize men to be more trusting of government because 
men are more prominent in key positions in government and are less likely to be exposed 
to experiences with inequality in societal institutions (Brewer and Sigelman 2002; Keele 
2005).  Consequently, male dominance may lead women to believe that they will not be 
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treated fairly by government (Richardson, Houston, and Hadjiharalambous 2001).  
Furthermore, women may feel diminished by the presence of a “glass ceiling” that keeps 
them from advancing in their careers because of gender inequality (Lewis 1994; Naff 
1994; Richardson, Houston, and Hadjiharalambous 2001).  Also, the increase in 
government expenditure has generated a higher tax burden for men, which may result in a 
more negative attitude toward the public sector (Huseby 1995).   
On the contrary, others hypothesize that female respondents have a somewhat 
more positive image of civil servants as compared to men (Christensen and Laegreid 
2005; Listhaug and Wiberg 1995; Newton and Norris 2000; Seltzer, Newman, and 
Leighton 1997; Van de Walle 2007).  The explanation is that “women have become more 
dependent on the public sector for their employment, both directly, in that there is 
relatively greater proportion of women employed in the public sector than in the private 
sector, and indirectly, in that public bodies have taken over part of women’s traditional 
care responsibilities” (Christensen and Laegreid 2005, p. 495).  Women benefited from 
government efforts to advance their rights, for example, the 1967 Affirmative Action in 
the United States (Marlowe 2004).  Studies also demonstrate that female voters believe in 
strong and active government (Seltzer, Newman, and Leighton 1997). 
Education 
Most studies find education to be positively related to trust in government 
(Brewer and Sigelman 2002; Christensen and Laegreid 2005; Listhaug and Wiberg 1995; 
Van de Walle 2007).  College-educated respondents are likely to be members of 
professional organizations that would require them to go through a licensing process.  
Therefore, college-educated people are more likely to trust the ability of public 
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administrators to regulate their professional activity and have more trusting attitudes 
toward them (Marlowe 2004).  Respondents with higher education tend to have a more 
realistic view of the civil service and have a greater understanding of the political-
administrative system (Marlowe 2004; Richardson, Houston, and Hadjiharalambous 
2001; Tolbert and Mossberger 2006), and thus, they will be more tolerant of the 
government’s malfunctioning (Van de Walle 2007).   
Conversely, education is assumed to have a negative effect on trust.  Respondents 
with higher education have more heterogeneous needs and higher expectations, and 
therefore, they are less tolerant of the administrative inefficiency and less satisfied with 
certain public services (Roth, Bozinoff, and MacIntosh 1990).  Furthermore, educated 
people may have a more critical attitude toward civil service (Marlowe 2004).  According 
to Doring (1992), this finding holds true for confidence in institutions, except for those 
whose purpose is to safeguard liberal democracy, for which more education leads to 
higher confidence. 
Government employment 
Attitudes toward government are more positive among those employed in 
government because individuals positively predisposed toward government are more 
likely to seek public employment.  Public employees have personal contact with other 
government workers and are therefore less likely to cling to negative stereotypes about 
these workers.  Furthermore, public employees may seek to maintain a positive image of 





In terms of political ideology, studies typically hypothesize that those on the far 
left end of the ideological spectrum are more likely to be trusting of government than 
those on the right because liberals traditionally support the public sector and strong 
government institutions (Huseby 1995; Newton 2001).  In contrast, other studies report 
the opposite pattern, indicating that those on the far left regard political institutions as 
unrepresentative of mass interests, and that those on the far right develop an allegiance to 
political institutions that maintain the status quo (Listhaug and Wiberg 1995; Newton and 
Norris 2000). 
Civic engagement 
Lastly, social capital theory contends that involvement in voluntary associations 
and civic life is essential to democracy and emphasizes the importance of civil society in 
building cooperative social relations and a stable democracy (Newton 1997; Putnam 
1993a, 2000).  Putnam defines social capital as “features of social organization, such as 
trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating 
coordinated actions” (1993b, p. 35).  He further argues that “people who join are people 
who trust … the causation flows mainly from joining to trusting” (Putnam 1995, p. 665).  
According to Putnam, “the more we connect with other people the more we trust them, 
and vice versa … Social trust and civic engagement are strongly correlated” (1995, p. 
665).  Furthermore, Putnam argues that a decline in voluntary association membership is 
a major cause of declining trust in government in the United States.  Scholars commonly 
hypothesize that those who are involved in voluntary association and civic life are more 
likely to be trusting of government than those who are not civically active.  For this 
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reason, civic engagement is thought to lead to greater trust in government and its leaders 
(Cook and Gronke 2005).  
To the contrary, Brehm and Rahn (1997) expect “a negative relationship between 
membership in association and confidence in national institution” (p. 1004).  They argue 
that these organizations create a civic space that is different and opposed to the political 
sphere (Cohen 1999).  Yet other studies have found that increased civic engagement fails 
to translate into greater political trust (Newton and Norris 2000; Van de Walle, 
Roosbroek, and Bouckaert 2008).  For example, Uslaner (2002) shows that trust and 
networks are not related to each other.   
When exploring the influence of civic engagement on trust, it is important to note 
the diversity of voluntary organizations in which a person is involved.  A person 
volunteering in organizations where he meets people of his own social network may not 
translate into high trusting attitudes towards “strangers” and government in general.  
Similarly, the social trust literature distinguishes between generalized trust and 
particularized trust.  The significant difference between these two is that generalized trust 
may be extended to someone on whom the trustor has no direct information (Bjornskov 
2007).  Therefore, a person volunteering in organizations in which he meets people from 
diverse groups is more likely to be trusting of government than someone who does not 
volunteer.   
In addition, Putnam observes that in Italy people in both the most and least civic 
regions belong to a political party.  Thus, membership in organizations that is mandated 
by work or some other affiliation is thought to be different from voluntary organizations 
(Putnam 1993a).  Generally speaking, horizontally organized, or voluntary, organizations 
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are fundamental in building social capital (Pharr 2000).  If social connections and civic 
engagement are related to confidence in government, then people engaged in dense social 
networks through multiple group memberships are more likely have higher levels of trust 
in government (Pharr 2000).  
Several studies have tested the effect of socio-demographic correlates on public 
trust.  Socio-demographic attributes have not been found to be critical determinants of 
political trust, displaying only weak (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Bennett and Bennett 
1990; Christensen and Laegreid 2005; Citrin 1974; Marlowe 2004; Mishler and Rose 
1999; Newton and Norris 2000; Van de Walle 2007) or mixed (Houston and Harding 
2013; Levi and Stoker 2000; Rose and Pettersen 2000) effects on trust levels.  Moreover, 
Newton (1999) argues that political trust is randomly distributed in society and it is 
mostly influenced by political variables.  Citrin and Green (1986) contend that distrust is 
originated in all segments of the population. 
B.  Socio-psychological correlates 
 The second set of correlates is based on a socio-psychological explanation.  It 
argues that political trust is a basic aspect of personality traits.  People either trust or do 
not trust.  Erikson (1950) argues that a “basic trust” personality trait is formed during the 
first stage of psychological development of a child.  If a child is raised in the warm and 
secure environment and his basic needs are met, the child’s view of the world will be one 
of trust.  Basic personality traits are enduring and they influence many aspects of 




Social trust is the attitude toward other people and may be helpful in solving 
collective action problems (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Nye, Zelikow, and King 1997).  
Across a lifetime, individuals learn to trust or distrust by experiencing how others within 
their society treat them and how, in turn, others react to their behavior.  According to 
theories of interpersonal trust, attitudes toward public officials reflect a generalized trust 
in others (Brehm and Rahn 1997; Houston 2008; Orren 1997; Richardson, Houston, and 
Hadjiharalambous 2001).  People who trust each other are more likely to cooperate with 
one another.  Those who are trusting of others are less likely to worry about being treated 
unfairly by the political-administrative system.  Interpersonal trust helps make political 
institutions work because it “spills over” into cooperation with people in local civic 
associations, and then “spills up” to create national networks that are essential if 
democracy is to work (Putnam 1993b, 2000).   
Notwithstanding, some scholars believe that there is no direct relationship 
between social trust and political trust (Newton 1999) or that social trust is related only 
weakly to public trust at the individual level (Newton and Norris 2000).  To support this 
claim, some scholars refer to the divergence between the trends in political confidence 
and social trust in the democracies of Western Europe.  For example, Listhaug and 
Wiberg (1995) show that while political confidence in Europe is either stable or in 
modest decline, social trust is either stable or weakly rising (see also Van Deth and 
Scarbrough 1995).  Newton (1997) argues that political trust is more a product of 
political factors than social ones.  Furthermore, Mishler and Rose (2005) find that 
interpersonal trust has no effect on institutional trust in Russia.  
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C.  Attitudes towards government 
 The third set of correlates explains trusting attitudes as a function of individual 
assessment of government performance.  Contrary to cultural theories, institutional 
theories of democracy argue that citizen trust is the product of citizen evaluations of the 
economic and political performance of the government (Coleman 1990; Dasgupta 1988; 
Hetherington 1998; Jackman and Miller 1996; Mishler and Rose 2001, 2005).  Positive 
assessments of the workings of government should enhance trust towards the civil 
service.  Individual assessment of government performance and attitudes towards 
government actors are used to identify the trusting personality. 
A trusting attitude is a function of satisfaction with the performance of 
government officials and institutions.  Citizens trust government because government is 
working for them.  Citizen trust in government can be increased by improving citizens’ 
perceptions of government performance (Marlowe 2004; Yang and Holzer 2006).  
“Public administrators have to be trustworthy in order to win citizens’ trust, believing in 
local knowledge and action, listening to citizens’ voices, sharing power with citizens, 
displaying trust and respect in the administrative process, and educating and engaging 
citizens” (Yang 2005, p. 283).  The research shows that citizens who perceive 
government as performing well report higher levels of trust in public institutions 
(Christensen and Laegreid 2005; Marlowe 2004; Van Ryzin 2011).  For example, 
Christensen and Laegreid (2005) find that citizens who are satisfied with the treatment 
they receive from the public health, employment, and social services generally have a 
higher level of trust in public institutions than citizens who are not satisfied with their 
treatment.  Furthermore, the study shows that being a consumer of specific public 
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services is less important for people’s level of trust in government than their degree of 
satisfaction with them (Christensen and Laegreid 2005). 
The perceived trustworthiness of administrators also may be influenced by diffuse 
support for government.  Trust in one political institution spills over into attitudes about 
other political institutions (Chanley, Rudolph, and Rahn 2000, 2001; Christensen and 
Laegreid 2005; Hetherington 1998).  For instance, Marlowe (2004) finds that trust in 
public administrators is closely related to respondents’ perceptions of government 
performance as well as their confidence in particular institutions such as Congress and 
the executive branch.  Van de Walle (2007) finds that positive attitudes towards 
municipal services spillover to confidence in public servants.  To the contrary, 
Americans’ increasing dissatisfaction with Congress triggered their distrust of politicians 
and government in general (Feldman 1983; Hetherington 1998; Hibbing and Theiss-
Morse 1995; Williams 1985). 
Section 2.5.ii:  Country-level correlates  
In addition to individual-level attributes, nation-level variables that distinguish 
one nation from another likely influence trusting attitudes.  This section examines the 
nation-level determinants of public trust.  It explores the question of why the citizens of 
some countries are more trusting than others.  For example, several studies show that 
there is considerable variation across contemporary democracies with regard to whether 
people feel that they can trust civil servants to do what is best for the country (Anderson 
and Tverdova 2003; Catterberg and Moreno 2006; Van de Walle 2007; Van de Walle, 
Roosbroek, and Bouckaert 2008; Van Ryzin 2011).  This section draws from comparative 
public opinion literature on public trust and generalized social trust that has identified the 
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following sets of correlates to explain trust variation across countries:  government 
performance, social polarization, and culture. 
A.  Government performance 
Institutional theories of democracy conclude that trust is a rational response to 
government economic and political performance (Jackman and Miller 1996; Mishler and 
Rose 2001, 2005).  In other words, the decline in confidence is the result of governments’ 
inability to deliver outcomes of the same quality as in the past, so called policy quality 
hypothesis (Alesina and Wacziarg 2000).   
Economic performance  
A first set of correlates explains trust variation across countries as the result of 
variation in government performance or system output.  However, this type of 
performance is somewhat different than that which is indicated as an individual-level 
correlate of political trust.  Whereas at the individual level performance is tied to citizen 
perceptions, at the nation-level, the performance variable gauges general economic 
conditions.  However, the logic remains the same.  As it is suggested, higher levels of 
performance lead, in turn, to higher levels of political trust in citizens.  It is widely 
acknowledged that system outputs, or system performance, are key to understanding why 
public support for political systems fluctuates (Easton 1965).  A number of scholars have 
argued that levels of economic development are associated with levels of democracy 
(Alesina and Wacziarg 2000; Anderson 1995; Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Catterberg 
and Moreno 2006; Fukuyama 1995; Newton and Norris 2000).  The higher economic 
development is, the higher is the level of political trust (Catterberg and Moreno 2006).  In 
other words, government is held accountable by its citizens for the state of the economy 
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(Alesina and Wacziarg 2000).  Studies typically hypothesize that individuals in countries 
with a high level of economic growth, a high level of security and safety, low 
unemployment, and low income inequality are more trusting of civil servants (Anderson 
and Tverdova 2003).  A number of studies find that income growth, unemployment, and 
inflation are the best economic predictors of the electorate’s level of satisfaction, 
although in different ways and to a different extent in different countries (on the United 
States see Alesina and Rosenthal 1995; Kramer 1971; Fair 1978; on other OECD 
countries see Alesina, Perotti, and Tavares 1998; Lewis-Beck 1988, Powell and Whitten 
1993). 
On a separate note, it is interesting to mention that some scholars argue that 
dissatisfaction with government performance partly explains variation in political trust 
across levels of government (Levi and Stoker 2000).  Jennings (1998) finds greater 
confidence in government at the local level than at the national level (see also Pharr’s 
1997 analysis of Japan).  Jennings argues that citizens perceive local governments to be 
more responsive to their concerns than the national government.  He suggests that the 
difference could be explained by the fact that the tasks of local governments are easier to 
perform and evaluate.  His argument is in line with Mansbridge’s (1997) findings that 
public distrust of government is, indeed, explained by declining government performance 
which is due to citizens’ rising demands and expectations. 
Another example of using nation-level performance as correlates of trust can be 
found when one considers the work of Mishler and Rose (2001).  Using both individual-
level survey data and nation-level aggregate data on economic and political performance 
in ten former Eastern and Central European nations, the authors determine that 
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institutional explanations (performance) have an impact on political trust.  However, as 
the authors are careful to point out, the effects of political and economic performance on 
political trust measured at the nation-level appear to be mediated by citizens’ perceptions 
of performance at the individual-level.  High performing nations have been able to create 
and sustain a high level of their citizens’ trust.  
Political performance 
The institutional set of variables also explains trust variation across countries as a 
function of the structure or the quality of government institutions.  Studies typically 
hypothesize that individuals in countries with high levels of “good governance” 
indicators are more trusting of civil servants (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Delhey and 
Newton 2005; Mishler and Rose 2001; Van de Walle and Bouckaert 2003). 
Some studies contend that the source of decline in trust in government lie in 
politics itself (Pharr 2000).  Corruption is an important indicator of the performance of a 
political system (Alesina and Wacziarg 2000; Della Porta 2000; Pharr 2000).  A high 
level of corruption reduces citizen support for democratic political institutions (Gibson 
1993; Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 1995, 2001; Rose and Shin 2001).  Corruption is widely 
assumed to have negative consequences for a country’s social, economic, and political 
life.  Corruption also has been found to fundamentally undermine the principles of 
democratic accountability, equality, and openness (Dahl 1971).  When corruption is 
present, democracy’s tenets of procedural and distributive fairness become a myth; this, 
in turn, is likely to diminish the legitimacy of democratic political institutions (Anderson 
and Tverdova 2003).  Lind and Tyler (1988; see also Tyler 2006) find that procedural 
fairness matters more to citizens than actual policy outcomes.  Page and Shapiro (1992) 
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in their study of American public opinion and policy preferences over a 50-year period of 
time find that corruption was one of the triggering factors for dramatic and enduring shift 
in public opinion.  
Political scientists have not systematically examined how corruption affects 
people’s view of the political system and institutions of government (Anderson and 
Tverdova 2003).  Some studies have demonstrated the negative effects of corruption on a 
nation’s social and economic life (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Catterberg and Moreno 
2006; Montinola and Jackman 2002).  Few scholars have systematically examined the 
relationship between trust and corruption from a cross-national perspective (Anderson 
and Tverdova 2003).  Mishler and Rose’s (2001) study of political trust across ten East-
Central European states found that higher levels of corruption were related to lower 
levels of political trust.  It is yet to be determined the effect of corruption on specific 
political actors such as government bureaucrats.  
Studies hypothesize that public trust should be higher in countries with a 
“widespread political rights and civil liberties” (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Norris 
1999, p. 223).  For example, Norris (1999) examines the impact of different institutional 
arrangements on confidence in five major political and civic institutions in 25 major 
democracies in the Americas, Western Europe, and Asia.  She finds that countries with a 
better quality of democracy (measured by the Freedom House ratings on political rights 
and civil liberties) show higher levels of political support.  
Studies hypothesize that the age of a democracy or its democratic history has an 
impact on trusting attitudes (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Torcal and Gibert 2006).  In 
countries that have adopted democracy more recently citizens are less trusting of the 
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government than are citizens in established democracies (Anderson and Tverdova 2003).  
Likewise, individuals in countries with higher levels of democracy are more trusting of 
civil servants (Anderson and Tverdova 2003).  The argument is that people need to be 
free to trust (Dehley and Newton 2005).  
B.  Social polarization 
A second set of national attributes explains different levels of trust across 
countries as the result of variation in the social polarization of their citizens.  Social 
capital literature shows that social polarization in the form of income inequality and 
ethnic diversity reduces generalized trust (Bjornskov 2007).  Thus, public trust is likely to 
decrease when the social distance between the citizens in a nation increases.  In other 
words, the decline in confidence originates from greater polarization among citizens (the 
heterogeneity hypothesis).  
To illustrate the social polarization hypothesis and explain the decline in 
confidence, it is useful in here to discuss the “median voter theorem” of Black (1956) and 
Downs (1957).  According to the median voter theorem, a majority rule voting system 
will lead to the outcome most preferred by the median voter.  The main assumptions of 
this theorem are that two candidates (or parties) are rational actors, they care only about 
wining, and they do not have policy preferences of their own.  The full convergence of 
two candidates’ platforms will ensue regardless of the distribution of voters’ preferences.  
Figure 1 illustrates three different distributions that share the same median voter position 
(adapted from Alesina and Wacziarg 2000, figure 7.1, p. 152).  In other words, for all 





Figure 1. Distribution of voter preferences over a single policy issue 
 
In example A, the distribution of voter preferences is relatively tightly clustered 
around the median.  In example B, the distribution is much more spread out as compared 
to example A.  Thus, two randomly chosen people from distribution B will be further 
from the median voter position, i.e. further from the selected policy.  Therefore, 
dissatisfaction with government among citizens will be higher in example B.  A similar 
argument could be applied to example C.  The distribution in this case is bimodal.  The 
median distance from the policy choice for a randomly chosen person is higher for 
example C as compared to example A.  As the median distance from the policy choice 
increases, the level of trust in government decreases.  Thus, the level of trust in 
government may be different in countries with different voter populations.  In more 
homogeneous countries (example A), the level of trust is higher.  In more heterogeneous 
countries with preferences distributed as in example B and example C, the level of trust is 
lower.  
Delhey and Newton (2005) consider these factors in their examination of 
generalized trust in sixty nations of the world.  Their analysis reveals that countries that 
maintain higher quality governmental institutions and have low levels of ethnic 
A.  Tight Distribution 
 









heterogeneity are more trusting.  Likewise, they find that wealthier nations in terms of 
GDP per capita and those with higher levels of income equality are also more trusting.  
Delhey and Newton find that Nordic nations have a tendency to exhibit higher levels of 
trust.  These nations in particular tend to rank high on each of these measures. 
Ethnic diversity could be detrimental to social cohesion (Knack and Keefer 1997).  
To the contrary, a homogenous society could induce a feeling of solidarity.  Uslaner 
(2002) argues that “what matters is not how rich a country is, but how equitable is the 
dispersion of income” (p. 181; italics in original).  There has been an increase in the 
number of studies on the effects of societal heterogeneity on trust (Delhey and Newton 
2005; Nannestad 2008).  In part, this interest is explained by growing migration flows 
over the past three decades (Nannestad 2008).  Studies typically hypothesize that societal 
heterogeneity has a negative impact on trust (Anderson and Paskeviciute 2006; Delhey 
and Newton 2005).  The explanation is that societal heterogeneity is conducive to the 
development of bonding trust in individuals of the same ethnicity, religion, and language 
at the expense of generalized (or bridging) trust (Nannestad 2008).  The previous research 
demonstrates that diverse societies are often challenged in generating and sharing public 
goods (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999), trusting each other (Alesina and La Ferrara 
2002; Dehley and Newton 2005), and establishing well-functioning public institutions 
(La Porta et al. 1999). 
C.  Culture 
A third approach explains trust variation across countries as the result of variation 
in national culture.  Many scholars have stressed the importance of culture in shaping 
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individual attitudes toward the system in general.  For instance, Anderson and Tverdova 
(2003) assert that “culture provides a lens for how people view the world, motives for 
human behavior, criteria for evaluating actions, and, more generally, orientations to 
action, all of which are learned during cultural socialization” (p. 93).  In this study, 
culture is understood as differences across nations in term of people’s values and belief’s 
(two dimensions of cross-cultural variation developed by Inglehart (1997a) and also in 
terms of a recent communist experience.  
Inglehart’s dimensions of cross-cultural variation 
This section draws primarily from scholarly work introduced by Ronald F. 
Inglehart.  Inglehart (1997a) has examined a number of countries that participated in the 
World Values Surveys in 1981 and 1990 (see also Inglehart and Baker 2000).  He found 
that two main cultural dimensions account for over half of the cross national variance in 
scores of basic human values ranging from politics to economics.  These two cultural 
dimensions are Traditional versus Secular-rational values and Survival versus Self-
expression values.   
The Traditional versus Secular-rational represents the contrast between countries 
based on the degree people emphasize the importance of religion in their lives.  A wide 
range of other values are closely associated with this cultural dimension.  Countries near 
the traditional pole place high importance on such values as parent-child ties, traditional 
family, respect for authority and reject abortion, euthanasia, and suicide.  Citizens of 
these countries also have strong sense of national pride.  Countries with secular-rational 
values have the opposite preferences on all the above-discussed topics.  Inglehart, Norris, 
and Welzel (2003, p. 102) have found that the Traditional versus Secular-rational 
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dimension is linked with the transition from an agrarian country to industrial country:  
countries near the secular-rational pole tend to have a low percentage of their work force 
in the agricultural sector and a high percentage of industrial workers (Also see Inglehart 
and Baker 2000).  
To the contrary, the Survival versus Self-expression dimension is associated with 
the transition from an industrial country to a post industrial country with a high 
percentage of the labor force in the service sector (Inglehart, Norris, and Welzel 2003, p. 
102).  Thus, countries near the Survival pole are likely to emphasize materialist values, 
emphasize hard work, report low tolerance toward out-group, and show low levels of 
interpersonal trust.  On the other hand, countries near the Self-expression pole show the 
opposite preferences on all of these topics.  Postmaterialist values in these countries have 
emerged mainly because citizens of these countries took survival for granted.  So, the 
values have shifted from economic and physical security to self-expression, subjective 
well-being, and quality of life concerns (Inglehart 1997a, 1997b).  
Inglehart, Norris, and Welzel (2003) have found significant differences between 
the basic beliefs of people in rich and poor countries.  They argue that economic 
development have brought changes in people’s values.  Further, they argue that a gradual 
shift in cultural values have influenced the spread of democratic institutions in these 
countries.  Thus, almost all countries that have high scores on the self-expression values 
are stable democracies.  To the contrary, countries that rank low on these values have 
authoritarian governments (p. 107).  Thus, they hypothesize that countries that have high 
scores on self-expression values are more likely to show high levels of political rights and 
civil liberties than countries that emphasize survival values.   
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However, the rise of postmodern values also erodes respect for authority among 
young generation in industrialized nations (Inglehart 1997b).  Furthermore, as material 
well-being increases, trust in political institutions is likely to decrease because the public 
begins to evaluate their leaders and institutions by more demanding standards (Catterberg 
and Moreno 2006; Inglehart 2003).  Thus, some scholars argue that a decline in trust 
reflects a gradual increase in more general anti-authority attitudes that are the product of 
broad socio-economic transformation in the advanced industrial democracies (Dalton 
2000; Inglehart 1997a).  People holding materialists values – those values related to 
personal and national security – should present higher levels of political trust than those 
holding post-materialists values – those values related to self-expression (Inglehart 
1997a).  
Communist legacy 
Studies hypothesize that public trust should be higher in countries with a 
“widespread political rights and civil liberties” (Norris 1999, p. 223; see also Anderson 
and Tverdova 2003).  For example, Norris (1999) examines the impact of different 
institutional arrangements on confidence in five major political and civic institutions in 
25 major democracies in the Americas, Western Europe, and Asia.  She finds a positive 
association between the level of democracy (measured by the Freedom House ratings on 
political rights and civil liberties) and the degree of citizen trust.  Studies hypothesize that 
the age of a democracy or a country’s democratic history has an impact on trusting 
attitudes (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Torcal and Gibert 2006).  Individuals in 
countries with higher levels of democracy are more trusting of civil servants (Anderson 
and Tverdova 2003).  Likewise, individuals in former Soviet Bloc nations, which have 
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adopted democracy more recently, are less trusting of government than those in 
established democracies (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Mishler and Rose 1997).  
Scholars hypothesize that distrust is predicted by the legacy of communist rule (Mishler 
and Rose 1997).  During the communist era, state administration was the servant of the 
ruling political party not citizens or the public interest (Houston 2014).  
Studies show that citizens of post-communist nations are less trusting than 
citizens of otherwise comparable nations.  The extant literature suggests several 
explanations.  First, citizens of Central and Eastern Europe do not trust their respective 
government because of the oppressive behavior of the communist dictatorships 
(Bjornskov 2007).  Communist regimes had internal intelligence agencies (for example, 
the KGB in Soviet Union, the Stasi in East Germany, and the Securitate in Romania) that 
employed citizens as informers.  These agencies are famous for brutal treatment of 
citizens who were accused of political dissident.  Second, the fall of the communist 
regimes in the 1990s and the dismantling of important parts of government institutions 
have had a disruptive effect on their citizens’ attitudes toward government.  
Section 2.6:  Summary  
This chapter starts with a challenging task of defining trust.  Houston and Harding 
(2013) define trust as “a willingness to rely on others to act on our behalf based on the 
belief that they possess the capacity to make effective decisions and take our interests 
into account” (p. 55).  Political trust is the trust that people place in political institutions 
or their leaders.  It links ordinary citizens to the political system that is intended to 
represent them (Mishler and Rose 2001, p. 30).  Generally speaking, political trust 
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belongs to a large family of terms regarding “the subjective level of support citizens give 
their political system” (Citrin and Muste 1999, p. 465).  
It is importance to note that the extant literature has employed two terms in 
describing citizen attitudes towards government institutions and their leaders:  trust and 
confidence.  Hardin (1998) argues that trust in government is not analogous to personal 
trust.  Personal trust is much richer and involves a reciprocal relationship.  Therefore, 
Hardin (1999) suggests that one should speak of confidence in government and not of 
trust in government (p. 31).  Nevertheless, scholars use both terminologies in their studies 
of citizen attitudes towards government.  Also, social surveys use both terms in 
measuring this concept.  
This chapter also shows that studying citizen confidence in the civil service is a 
relatively understudied topic.  Most studies either focuses on citizen perceptions of 
government in a general sense, or else concentrates on trust in other political institutions 
such as courts, legislatures, political parties, or members of executive-level cabinets.  
This study seeks to contribute on the issue of citizen confidence in the civil service.  It 
builds upon exiting empirical research on trust in government in general and limited 
research on trust in public administration that has identified three sets of correlates of 
trust in the civil service at the individual-level:  socio-cultural, socio-psychological, and 
general attitudes toward government.  In addition, this chapter identifies four country-
level correlates, which explain varying levels of trust across nations:  government 
performance, institutional quality, social polarization, and culture. 
By integrating both micro- and macro- levels explanations of system support, this 
study enhances the understanding of how citizens view the institutions of representative 
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democracy in countries with different levels of government performance, government 
institutions, and culture.  The comparative studies of political attitudes are especially 
fruitful when it combines the particular political context in which people form those 
attitudes with critical individual-level variables.  It leads to a more general model and 
comprehensive understanding of the forces that shape citizen political behavior.  
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CHAPTER III  
DATA AND METHODS 
 
 In order to begin an empirical evaluation of the confidence attitudes, it is 
necessary to fully examine the data that are analyzed in this study.  First, the main survey 
data (i.e. WVS) used in this analysis are discussed, examining their origin and the 
sampling procedure utilized in their collection.  Then, countries included in this study are 
presented.  After that, the dependent and individual-level independent variables that are 
included in the binary logistic and multilevel analyses are described.  Furthermore, the 
sources of the country-level variables are examined (all data sources are also summarized 
in Appendix A).  Finally, the estimation methods employed in the statistical analyses of 
data are explained. 
Section 3.1:  Data sources 
The individual-level data used in this analysis come from the World Values 
Survey (WVS).  The World Values Survey examines standardized cross-cultural 
measures of human values and goals such as politics, economics, family values, 
communal identities, civic engagement, and so on.  The WVS started in 1981 as a part of 
the European Values Study.  Nowadays, it is one of the most widely-used cross-national 
and time-series surveys.  The WVS provides data from representative national samples of 
the public of almost 100 countries containing 90 percent of the world’s population (The 
World Values Survey 2014).   
According to the WVS official website, fieldwork for the sixth wave will be 
completed by May 1, 2014.  The WVS will make the data available after that date.  
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Therefore, this study employs the most recent wave, fifth wave, available as of date of 
this writing (March 2014).  The fifth wave contains data from surveys administered 
across 54 nations.  Representative multi-stage or stratified random samples of the adult 
population were drawn.  The sample represents people aged 15 or over.  Data were 
collected with face-to-face interviews using a standardized questionnaire.  The standard 
sample size is at least 1,000 respondents for every country.  Interviews were conducted 
between 2005 and 2009 (see Appendix B) (The World Values Survey 2014). 
Section 3.2:  Countries included 
Most of the comparative public administration studies to date have focused on 
Western countries.  Jreisat (2002) observes that the limitation of the current comparative 
studies is “the unwillingness (or lack of professional qualifications) to cross over the 
cultural boundaries of North America and Europe and to carry out genuine comparative 
investigations.  A truly cross-cultural comparison usually requires knowledge of the 
cultures being examined, of their language, history, norms, and values as well as their 
administrative institutions and processes” (p. 56).  One of the main challenges of 
comparative studies is to have a sufficient level of agreement on the main concepts 
examined in the analysis.  
Administrative reform has been a central activity of governments for the past 
several decades.  These reforms have assumed different forms across countries.  These 
differences are especially pronounced between Western democracies and the emerging 
democracies of post-Soviet Union countries.  While there are crucial differences in the 
interpretations of reform ideas in these administrative systems, there are also significant 
similarities in the reforms themselves.  For the most part, the goals of these reforms have 
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been similar across countries:  to make government more efficient and effective in the 
process of making and implementing public policy.  Many of the same changes are being 
implemented in almost all post-Soviet countries because the reforms have been financed 
and directed for the most part by the same international organizations such as the World 
Bank, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID), and the Technical Assistance to the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS).   
 
Table 1. List of countries included in the study 
# Country Geographical region 
1 Bulgaria Eastern Europe 
2 Canada Northern America 
3 Finland Northern Europe 
4 France Western Europe 
5 Georgia Western Asia 
6 Germany Western Europe 
7 Great Britain Northern Europe 
8 Hungary Eastern Europe 
9 Italy Southern Europe 
10 Moldova Eastern Europe 
11 Netherlands Western Europe 
12 Norway Northern Europe 
13 Poland Eastern Europe 
14 Romania Eastern Europe 
15 Russia Eastern Europe 
16 Slovenia Southern Europe 
17 Spain Southern Europe 
18 Sweden Northern Europe 
19 Switzerland Western Europe 
20 Ukraine Eastern Europe 




Thus, these recent administrative reforms have created an opportunity for cross-
national studies because administrative systems in post-Soviet countries have been 
“modeled” after Western countries.  Therefore, there is to some extent a sufficient level 
of the agreement on the main concepts explored in this research.  This study examines all 
21 North American and Eurasian countries available in the fifth wave of the World 
Values Survey (see table 1).  These countries widely vary in terms of economic 
conditions, forms of government, cultural zones, and political histories.  
Section 3.3:  Individual-level variables 
 As discussed in the previous section, the source of all individual-level variables is 
the World Values Survey.  In this section, the survey questions used to create the 
dependent and independent variables are identified.  
Dependent variable 
Citizens’ attitude towards the civil service is a focal point of interest of this 
research.  A question that asks about the citizens’ confidence in the civil service is used 
to measure confidence in the civil service.  Responses to the following survey question 
comprise the key variable of interest:  “I am going to name a number of organizations.  
For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them:  The Civil 
service?”  Response options are:  “a great deal of confidence,” “quite a lot of 
confidence,” “not very much confidence” and “none at all.”   
A binary dependent variable is created by assigning “a great deal of confidence” 
and “quite a lot of confidence” a value ‘1’ and “not very much confidence,” and “none at 
all” a value of ‘0.’  Collapsing two responses to one loses information but is necessary for 
three reasons.  First, the frequency distribution of the responses is heavily skewed:  about 
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3.7 percent of citizens responded that they have “a great deal of confidence” in the civil 
service compared to about 39.6 percent who responded that they have “quite a lot of 
confidence” in the civil service (a detailed descriptive analysis of the dependent variable 
is provided in Chapter 4).  Dichotomization generates categories with appropriate sample 
sizes.   
Second, it is theoretically possible to treat the dependent variable as an ordered 
categorical outcome.  The appropriate statistical method for this 4-point scale dependent 
variable could be the multilevel ordered logistic regression model or multilevel ordered 
probit model (Snijders and Bosker 2011).  A critical assumption of the ordered logit 
regression model is that of parallel slopes (also called proportional odds assumption) 
(Long 1997).  The parallel slopes assumption means that an independent variable (for 
example, male) will have the same coefficient across all confidence attitudes (“a great 
deal of confidence,” “quite a lot of confidence,” “not very much confidence,” and “none 
at all”).  In other words, ordered logit regression model implicitly assumes that a person’s 
sex will affect the likelihood of a person having “a great deal of confidence” in the civil 
service as it will affect the different likelihood of that person having “quite a lot of 
confidence,” “not very much confidence,” or “none at all” confidence in the civil service.  
However, it is difficult to construct a single model that satisfies the parallel slope 
assumptions across all countries.  Binary logistic regression does not rely on such an 
assumption, making it more appropriate to apply to samples across different countries 
(Snijders and Bosker 2011).  In addition, models for an ordered categorical outcome are 
not only more complicated to fit but also to interpret than models for dichotomous 
outcomes (Snijders and Bosker 2011).  Third, dichotomization offers parsimonious 
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representation of the concept that this study examines, i.e. the correlates that explain 
citizen confidence in civil service.  
Independent variables 
 Below is an explanation of important independent variables used in this research.  
The detailed World Values Survey’s questions and wordings are presented in Appendix 
C.  As discussed in Chapter 4, the extant literature identifies three sets of individual-
levels variables that explain confidence attitudes:  socio-cultural, socio-psychological, 
and attitudes towards government correlates.  
Socio-cultural correlates 
 The following socio-cultural variables are included in the analysis:  age, male, 
high education, government employee, left political ideology, civic engagement, people 
can be trusted, and confidence in government institutions.  The continuous age variable is 
created based on responses to the question:  “This means you are _ _ years old.”  The 
binary male variable is created based on responses to the question:  “What is your sex?”  
The responses “male” coded ‘1’ and the responses “female” coded ‘0.’  Education is 
measured by the following survey question:  “What is the highest educational level that 
you have attained?”  This is a 9-point scale question ranging from 1 “no formal 
education” to 9 “university-level education, with degree.”  The binary high education 
variable is created by assigning a value of ‘1’ to the following responses:  “some 
university-level education, without degree” and “university-level education, with 
degree,” and a value of ‘0’ to the other seven responses.  The binary government 
employee variable is created based on responses to the question:  “Are you working for 
the government or public institution, for private business or industry, or for a private non-
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profit organization?  If you do not work currently, characterize your major work in the 
past.  Do you or did you work for?”  A value ‘1’ is assigned to those respondents who 
worked or has worked for the government or public institution and other responses are 
coded ‘0.’  To measure a citizen’s political ideology, the responses to the following 
questions are used:  “In political matters, people talk of “the left” and “the right.”  How 
would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking?”  The continuous left 
political ideology variable, which ranges from ‘1’ for “right” and ‘10’ for “left,” is 
included to represent a respondent’s political ideology.   
A battery of items in the WVS asked respondents:  “Now I am going to read out a 
list of voluntary organizations;  for each one, could you tell me whether you are a 
member, an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of 
organization?...”  Ten of these organizations have been used to represent civic 
engagement (as measured as being an active member of the following voluntary 
organizations:  church, sport, art, labor union, political party, environmental organization, 
professional organization, charitable organization, consumer organization, and any other 
organizations).  The civic engagement variable is created by counting the number of 
voluntary organizations in which a respondent is an active member (see Newton and 
Norris 2000; Brewer 2003).  The variable does not include “an inactive member” 
response.  There is an important difference between “active” and “inactive” membership.  
As Newton and Norris (2000) suggest “those citizens who are most active in voluntary 
organizations and community associations would develop the social trust and cooperative 
habits that lead to confidence in public institutions” (p. 63; italics added).  Since the 
number of organizations equals 10, then, theoretically, the civic engagement variable 
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should range from 0 to 10.  However, the variable ranges from 0 to 9 in the sample (see 
Chapter 4 for a detailed description).  
Socio-psychological correlate 
Responses to the following question are used to operationalize interpersonal 
trusting attitudes:  “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or 
that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?”  A value of ‘1’ is assigned to the 
responses “most people can be trusted,” and a value of ‘0’ is assigned to the responses 
“need to be very careful.”   
Attitudes towards government  
To control for the spillover of attitudes about other governmental actors onto 
attitudes about the public service, responses to survey items about confidence in 
government institutions are used to gauge how well the political system is actually 
performing.  A battery of items in the WVS asked respondents:  “I am going to name a 
number of organizations.  For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you 
have in them:  is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much 
confidence or none at all?  1) the armed forces, 2) the police, 3) parliament, and 4) the 
courts.”  All four questions have a four-point Likert-type response scale ranging from “a 
great deal” to “none at all.”  First, the variables are re-coded so that the highest value 
would correspond to the most positive – “a great deal” – response.  Then, all four re-
coded variables are used to create a factor score with values ranging from -1.93 to 2.50.  
Confirmatory factor analysis indicates that responses strongly load on a single dimension:  
eigenvalue equals 2.10.  Cronbach’s alpha for the four questions is 0.72, which is slightly 
above the common standard of 0.70 for inter-item reliability. 
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Section 3.4:  Country-level variables 
Country-level variables are entered in the models to represent national context.  
The sources of data for the country-level correlates are the World Bank, the Transparency 
International, the Fractionalization dataset compiled by Alberto Alesina and associates, 
the Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) complied by Solt, and the 
Inglehart–Welzel Cultural Map of the World.  The World Bank is a United Nations 
international financial institution.  It is not a bank in the common sense.  It provides 
financial and technical assistance to developing countries around the world.  Its main 
mission is to fight poverty.  The World Bank offers free access to a number of 
development indicators that are compiled from officially-recognized international sources 
(The World Bank 2012).   
Transparency International (TI) is an international non-governmental 
organization.  Its main vision is “a world in which government, business, civil society 
and the daily lives of people are free of corruption” (Transparency International 2012).  
TI fulfills its mission by monitoring and publicizing corporate and political corruption 
around the globe.  The Fractionalization dataset was compiled by Alberto Alesina and 
associates.  The dataset measures the degree of ethnic, linguistic, and religious 
heterogeneity in various countries (Alesina et al. 2003).   
The Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) complied by Solt 
(2009) provides comparable GINI indices of gross and net income inequality for 173 
countries from 1960 to the present.  Solt employed a custom missing-data algorithm to 
standardize the United Nations University’s World Income Inequality Database and data 
from other sources to generate those comparable GINI indices.  The Cultural Map of the 
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World was developed by Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel.  The source of the data 
for this map is the World Values Survey. 
Government performance 
Government performance is most commonly operationalized in terms of 
prevailing economic conditions.  Three variables are included to measure economic 
conditions:  GDP per capita, unemployment, and inflation.  Level of development is 
operationalized as gross domestic product (GDP) per capita.  GDP is “the sum of gross 
value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus 
any subsidies not included in the value of the products” (World Bank 2012).  GDP per 
capita are in constant 2005 US dollars.  Unemployment refers to the percentage of the 
labor force that is without work but available for and seeking employment (World Bank 
2012).  The inflation rate is the percentage change in price in the economy as a whole 
(World Bank 2012).  GDP per capita, unemployment, and inflation for 2006 are used to 
match the WVS data.  
The quality of government institutions is measured with two variables:  the World 
Bank Government Effectiveness indicator and the corruption perception index (CPI).  
The World Bank Government Effectiveness indicator combines into a single grouping 
responses on the quality of public service provision, the quality of the bureaucracy, the 
competence of civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political 
pressures, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to policies (Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2010; World Bank 2012).  The Government effectiveness indicator 
is measured in standard normal units.  It is normally distributed with a mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of 1.  Theoretically, it ranges from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 
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(strong) governance performance.  The World Bank Government Effectiveness indicator 
for 2006 is used to match the WVS survey data. 
The CPI ranks countries based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to 
be (Transparency International 2012).  It is a composite index, a combination of polls, 
drawing on corruption-related data collected by a variety of reputable institutions.  The 
CPI reflects the views of observers from around the world, including experts living and 
working in the countries evaluated (Transparency International 2012).  The corruption 
perception index for 2006 is used to match the WVS data.  The measure runs from 0 
(highly corrupt) to 10 (absolutely clean from corruption).   
Social polarization  
Social polarization is another contextual explanation of trust.  Two contextual 
factors that affect the social distance between citizens are the level of economic 
inequality in a country and societal heterogeneity.  The Gini inequality index is used to 
measure income inequality.  The Gini index measures the extent to which the distribution 
of income or consumption expenditure among individuals or households within an 
economy deviates from a perfectly equal distribution.  It can range from 0 (perfect 
equality) to 100 (perfect inequality).  The Gini index for 2006 is used to match the WVS 
data.  Societal heterogeneity is operationalized by the ethnic fractionalization index 
developed by Alesina et al. (2003).  The ethnic fractionalization index reflects the 
probability that two randomly selected people from a given country will not belong to the 





The WVS Cultural Map of the World developed by Ronald Inglehart and 
Christian Welzel (2005) is used to operationalize culture.  “Each country is positioned 
according to its people’s values and not its geographical location, i.e. the map measures 
cultural proximity, not geographical proximity” (Inglehart and Welzel 2010).  They 
distinguish between two different dimensions of value differences across nations.  The 
Traditional versus Secular-Rational value dimension reflects the differences between 
cultures with regard to religion, the role of the family, as well as deference to authority.  
Theoretically, it ranges from approximately -2.0 to 2.0.  Countries near the Traditional 
pole stress the importance of religion, deference to authority, traditional family values, 
condemn divorce, and reject euthanasia and suicide.  These countries also have high 
levels of national pride.  Countries near the Secular-Rational pole emphasize the opposite 
values on all of these issues. 
The Survival vs. Self-Expression dimension signals divergences between cultures 
pertaining to well-being, self-expression, and quality of life concerns.  Theoretically, it 
ranges from approximately -2.0 to 2.5.  As standards of living increase, and a transition 
from industrial society to post-industrial society occurs, a country tends to shift an 
emphasis from Survival values toward Self-Expression values.  In other words, countries 
shift their priority from economic and physical security to subjective well-being, self-
expression, and the quality of life.  
To account for countries of the former Soviet Bloc, a binary communist legacy 
variable is employed by assigning a value of ‘1’ to Bulgaria, Georgia, Hungary, 
Moldova, Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, and Ukraine.  All other countries are coded 
 
 61 
as ‘0.’  While the former Soviet Bloc nations share a similar type of state administration 
(Houston 2014), recent scholarship in public administration highlights the diversity that 
existed across countries in these institutions during the communist era due to differing 
pre-communist histories and societies (Goran 2009; Kopecký and Spirova 2011; 
Kotchegura 1999; Meyer-Sahling 2004, 2009).  For instance, Kitschelt (2003) 
distinguishes between three types of communist bureaucratic regimes among the Soviet 
Bloc nations:  patrimonial, bureaucratic-authoritarian, and national-accommodative.  
However, only nine countries are in the present sample, which is insufficient to 
distinguish among the types of communist state administration in the estimated models.  
Therefore, a binary communist legacy variable is employed in the final model.   
Section 3.5:  Estimation methods 
This research is conducted in three stages.  The first stage is a descriptive analysis 
of the dependent and independent variables.  Specifically, frequency and percentage 
distributions are provided to report the distribution of responses to specific items.  
Furthermore, it examines what attitudes citizens across nations have about confidence in 
the civil service.  At the second stage, binary logistic regression for each country is 
performed to examine whether attitudes about the civil service are determined by similar 
attributes across nations.  Specifically, this stage explores whether individual nations 
reveal a degree of consistency of the socio-demographic and attitudinal determinants 
across each of these countries.  The detailed analyses of the first two stages are examined 
in Chapter 4.   
Chapter 5 discusses the third stage of the analyses.  This final stage examines the 
extent to which confidence in the civil service varies across nations and the extent to 
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which these different levels of national confidence are a function of differences in 
country-level attributes.  In addition to the demographic and attitudinal variables included 
in the country specific models, country-level correlates are examined.  Multilevel binary 
logistic regression models are estimated by pooling together all the national samples.   
Importance of the multilevel models 
Multilevel models (also known as hierarchical models or mixed models) refer to 
models with a nested data structure (Hox 2010).  Generally speaking, the individuals and 
the groups to which they belong are conceptualized as a hierarchical system of these 
individuals and groups, with individuals and groups each defined as a separate level of 
this hierarchical system.  Thus, the sample data are viewed as a mutlistage sample from 
this hierarchical population.  For example, in educational research, the population is 
schools and students nested within each school.  Other examples include cross-national 
studies where the respondents are nested within their countries, or organizational research 
with workers nested within their firms.  
Traditional regression methods only allow analyzing data on one level.  
Therefore, historically, multilevel data were either aggregated or disaggregated to one 
single level and then, analyzed using either an ordinary multiple regression routine or any 
other “standard” statistical method.  Aggregation involves moving variables at a lower 
level to a higher level, for example, by assigning to the countries the country mean of the 
respondents’ income levels.  Disaggregation refers to moving variables to a lower level, 
for example, by assigning to all respondents in the countries an unemployment rate of the 
country they belong. 
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However, analyzing variables from different levels at one common level is 
inappropriate for two reasons.  The first problem is statistical.  First, aggregation leads to 
the loss of information and as a result to a loss of the statistical analysis power.  On the 
other hand, disaggregation generates from a small number of country-level variables a lot 
of individual-level variables leading to an increase of the sample size of the data.  
However, the proper sample size for these data is a number of higher-level units, i.e. the 
number of countries.  Ordinary statistical methods treat all these disaggregated data 
values as if all observations are independent from each other.  As a result, statistical 
analyses produce “significant” results that are simply spurious (Hox 2010).   
The second problem is conceptual.  If researchers analyze data at one level but 
formulate conclusions at another level, they commit the fallacy of the wrong level.  The 
ecological fallacy refers to interpreting aggregated data at the individual level.  For 
example, Robinson (1950) finds that states with larger immigrant populations tend to 
have higher literacy.  It is invalid to draw a conclusion that immigrants tend to mere more 
literate than those born in the United States.  In contrast, using relationships between 
variables on the level of the individuals to make conclusions about groups leads to the 
atomistic fallacy.  For example, a study of individuals may find that an increase in 
income leads to an increase in trust.  If it is inferred from this data that countries with 
higher gross domestic products have higher trust, then the atomistic fallacy is committed.  
In the past, multilevel data were analyzed using conventional multiple regression 
analysis with one dependent variable at the lowest level and a set of independent 
variables from all available levels (e.g. Boyd and Iversen 1979; Van den Eeden and 
Huttner 1982).  However, this approach leads to all statistical and conceptual problems 
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discussed above.  Standard statistical tests assume the independence of the observations.  
However, pooling hierarchically structured data into one sample violates this assumption.  
It is expected that two randomly selected individuals from the same group tend to be 
more alike than individuals selected from different groups.  For instance, if a country 
experienced a major breach of public trust shortly prior to the administration of the 
survey, respondents in this country are likely to be watching the same news reports, 
reading the same newspaper account, reading the same editorials, and even talking with 
one another about the event.  Thus, these respondent attitudes are not independent of one 
another as is assumed by OLS.  Failing to account for this effect among respondents in 
distinct clusters (i.e., groups) results in OLS standard errors that are smaller than they 
should be and making it more likely that the null hypothesis of no relationship will be 
rejected.  Hence, it increases the likelihood that a Type I error is made.  In the extant 
literature, this effect of cluster sampling is known as a “design effect” (e.g. Kish 1987, 
1995).   
There are two ways to correct this lack of independence among respondents in a 
cluster (i.e., group unit).  One is to report clustered standard errors.  Cluster-adjustment 
assumes that observations within groups are correlated but observations across groups are 
independent.  These standard errors allow for a general form of heteroscedasticity but do 
not allow for errors to be correlated across or within groups (Huber 1967; White 1982).  
Thus, clustered standard errors account for both a general form of heteroscedasticity as 
well as for any intra-cluster correlation.   
However, combining variables from different levels in one statistical model 
requires more complicated technique than estimating and correcting for the design effect.  
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Multilevel models are designed to analyze variables from different levels simultaneously.  
It is the more sophisticated approach to addressing the issue caused by clustered cases.  
Multilevel models allow for simultaneous estimation of relationships at individual and 
country levels.  They also allow for the relationships at the individual level to vary across 
countries.  Furthermore, multilevel models permit the inclusion of cross-level interactions 
– i.e., examining how country-level factors influence individual-level relationships.  In 
sum, multilevel modeling enables measuring the effect of different variables and 
explaining variation both within and across countries (Gelman and Hill 2007; Goldstein 
2011; Raudenbush and Bryk 2010; Steenbergen and Jones 2002).  In this study, the 
multilevel models are estimated using a restricted penalized quasi-likelihood (PQL) 
routine in HLM 6.06. 
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CHAPTER IV  
EXPLANING CONFIDENCE IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE. 
THE INDIVIDUAL-LEVEL CORRELATES OF CONFIDENCE  
 
 This chapter presents a descriptive analysis of the dependent and independent 
variables for all 21 countries of North America and Eurasia covered in this study.  
Descriptive analysis includes an examination of the missing values, the mean, the 
standard deviation, the range, the minimum and maximum values, and the sample size by 
country.  Frequency and percentage distributions are provided to report the distribution of 
responses to specific items by country.  First, the chapter presents descriptive statistics of 
the dependent variable.  Next, it examines a descriptive analysis of the independent 
variables.  After that, the chapter discusses the individual-level correlates that explain 
variation in the confidence attitudes.  Logistic regression models for each country 
separately are used for multivariate analysis of a dichotomous dependent variable.   
Section 4.1:  Descriptive analysis of the dependent variable 
 This section presents a descriptive analysis of the levels of citizens’ confidence in 
the civil service in 21 democracies of North America and Western Europe and emerging 
democracies in Eurasia.  First, it examines missing values of the dependent variable.  
Then, it examines the question:  How do levels of confidence in the civil service vary 
across countries.   
Section 4.1.i:  Valid and invalid responses 
 It is important to know the distribution of valid and invalid responses.  The lack of 
valid responses may jeopardize the validity of any statistical analysis.  In other words, 
there should be a sufficient amount of valid responses for further statistical analysis.  
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Figure 2 presents the distribution of the valid and invalid responses of the dependent 
variable by country.  The full distribution of the missing values by country is presented in 
Appendix D. 
 
Figure 2. Invalid responses of the dependent variable by country, % 
 
 Figure 2 and Appendix D show that 1,690 or about 6.4% of the responses are 
ether “missing, not asked by the interviewer,” “no answer,” or “don’t know.”  The invalid 
responses have decreased the sample size from 26,464 to 24,774.  Countries with the 

















































have more than 10% of missing values (14.7%, 13.6%, and 13.3%, correspondingly).  It 
is interesting to note that France has no invalid responses.  
Section 4.1.ii:  Confidence in the civil service across countries 
The first research question of this study is:  What attitudes do citizens hold about 
confidence in the civil service across countries?  Table 2 reports the responses separately 
for each of the 21 North American and Eurasian countries.   
 













a lot or A 
great 
deal 
Switzerland 2.3 29.8 62.4 5.5 1,204 67.9 
Sweden 4.0 30.3 62.5 3.3 856 65.8 
Norway 2.4 36.3 59.2 2.2 1,016 61.3 
Finland 5.5 34.4 54.6 5.5 1,001 60.1 
Canada 7.6 36.1 50.5 5.9 1,995 56.3 
France 14.0 32.3 48.1 5.7 1,001 53.7 
Russia 13.8 33.3 47.0 5.9 1,833 52.9 
Ukraine 16.8 34.4 44.9 3.9 864 48.8 
Great Britain 11.6 42.2 40.4 5.7 947 46.1 
Hungary 17.6 37.6 41.5 3.3 976 44.8 
United States 7.2 50.0 39.3 3.4 1,203 42.7 
Bulgaria 20.5 36.9 37.6 5.1 929 42.6 
Spain 10.3 48.7 36.9 4.0 1,143 40.9 
Italy 13.1 46.0 39.0 1.9 983 40.9 
Georgia 14.5 45.0 36.2 4.3 1,300 40.5 
Germany 15.0 53.5 29.4 2.1 1,984 31.5 
Netherlands 15.9 53.4 29.1 1.6 1,001 30.7 
Romania 24.3 45.7 27.7 2.3 1,653 30.0 
Poland 19.5 62.1 16.6 1.9 917 18.4 
Slovenia 23.2 60.0 15.4 1.3 968 16.7 
Moldova 31.6 54.3 12.8 1.3 1,000 14.1 
Total 13.7 42.9 39.6 3.7 24,774 43.4 
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 One observation that emerges from this table is that overall respondents do not 
express extreme opinions about the civil service.  On average, only 3.7% of respondents 
have a great deal of confidence in civil service, while 13.5% have no confidence at all in 
the civil service.  One can find somewhat extreme values among the negative response 
“none at all.”  Notably, all countries that have at least 16% of the “none at all” response 
are former Soviet Bloc countries.  Also, responses are somewhat negatively skewed with 
56.6% responses “not very much” or “none at all,” as opposed to 43.4% indicating that 
they have “quite a lot” or “a great deal” of confidence.  
 
 
Figure 3. Responses about confidence in the civil service (“Quite a lot” or  













































Confidence in the civil service ("Quite a lot" or "A great deal," %)
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More importantly, there is a significant amount of variation in these attitudes not 
only within each nation, but across nations.  The last column of this table combines the 
percent of respondents that have higher confidence in the civil service (i.e. “quite a lot” 
or “a great deal”) and orders the nations from high-to-low on this value (see also figure 
3).  Citizens of Switzerland, Sweden, Norway, and Finland are the most positive about 
the civil service as at least 60% of respondents in each country offered one of the two 
more confident responses.  The previous research also reports that citizens from the 
Scandinavian region tend to have higher levels of trust than citizens of Central-western 
and the Southern Europe (Katzenstein 2000).  To the contrary, citizens in Poland, 
Slovenia, and Moldova are the most critical, as less than 19% of respondents in these 
countries offered one of the 2 positive responses, with Moldova being the lowest at 
14.1%.  Thus, the lowest levels of confidence in the civil service are among citizens of 
the former Soviet Bloc countries.  These results are consistent with an argument that the 
new democratic regimes in Central and East Europe face the challenge of low levels of 
public trust in political institutions (Mishler and Rose 1997, 2001, 2002).   
Section 4.2:  Descriptive analysis of the independent variables 
This section summarizes and describes the characteristics of independent 
variables.  Specifically, it examines the distribution of valid and invalid responses by 
country.  Then, it presents descriptive statistics with measures of central tendency that 
indicate the typical value in a distribution of responses to a variable.  Also, it discusses 
the variation for each independent variable by country.   
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Section 4.2.i:  Age  
Appendix E shows that 21 respondents or about 0.1% offered “no answer” when 
asked about their age.  These were citizens of Canada.  All other counties have no invalid 
responses.  These missing values have decreased the number of observations in Canada 
from 2,164 to 2,143 or by 1%.  The total number of valid responses for the age variable is 
26,443 or 99%.  The minimum number of respondents is 1,000 in Ukraine and Poland, 
and maximum is 2,143 in Canada. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics: Age 
Country Mean Std. Dev Min Max N 
Bulgaria 47.36 16.5098 18 84 1,001 
Canada 48.21 17.8010 16 94 2,143 
Finland 47.52 17.4871 17 87 1,014 
France 47.14 18.1961 18 92 1,001 
Georgia 45.41 17.1923 18 91 1,500 
Germany 50.44 17.4872 18 93 2,064 
Great Britain 45.69 18.5432 15 94 1,041 
Hungary 45.55 16.8194 18 91 1,007 
Italy 45.62 15.6179 18 74 1,012 
Moldova 42.78 16.8535 18 86 1,046 
Netherlands 44.56 17.7989 15 89 1,050 
Norway 45.78 16.0640 18 79 1,025 
Poland 45.96 17.8231 18 92 1,000 
Romania 48.68 17.3832 18 97 1,776 
Russia 41.25 16.5355 16 80 2,033 
Slovenia 46.19 17.8415 18 94 1,037 
Spain 46.21 18.4847 18 98 1,200 
Sweden 47.73 16.9883 18 85 1,003 
Switzerland 52.45 16.1382 18 86 1,241 
Ukraine 42.38 16.7666 18 90 1,000 
United States 47.96 17.0255 18 91 1,249 
Total 46.56 17.4432 15 98 26,443 
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Table 3 presents descriptive statistics of age.  Respondents’ age ranges from 15 to 
98 years.  It is noteworthy that only 5 countries have respondents younger than 18:  Great 
Britain (15), Netherlands, (15), Russia (16), Canada (16), and Finland (17).  The 
respondents’ age varies not only between countries but also within countries.  The 
average age of respondents varies from 41.2 years old in Russia to 52.5 years old in 
Switzerland.  Although there are some differences in the average age, the standard 
deviations do not differ much.  The minimum standard deviation is 15.62, and the 
maximum standard deviation is 18.54.  Overall, the distribution of respondents’ age is 
somewhat positively skewed. 
Section 4.2.ii:  Male 
Appendix F shows that all countries except Canada have valid responses for the 
male variable.  There are 9 missing cases in Canada.  The missing responses have slightly 
decreased the sample size from 26,464 to 26,455 observations or by 0.03%.  As for the 
sample size by country, the lowest number of valid observations is in Russia and Poland 
(1,000 in each country), and the highest number is in Canada (2,155). 
Examination of figure 4 reveals that there are slightly more women than men 
among the respondents.  The lowest proportion of men is among the respondents in 
Ukraine, 34.3%.  There is an equal distribution of men and women among the 
respondents in Spain and the United States.  And, there are slightly more men than 
women among respondents in Norway, Sweden, and Poland (50.1%, 50.1%, and 51.2%, 





Figure 4. Percentage distribution for male by country, % 
 
Section 4.2.iii:  High education 
There are 194 or 0.7% invalid responses in the high education variable (see 
Appendix G).  These missing responses have decreased the sample size from 26,464 to 
26,270.  Across countries, the percentage of invalid responses is less than 2%.  The only 
exception is Romania where 2.4% respondents offered “no answer” when asked about 
their “highest education level attained.”  There are no invalid responses in Bulgaria, 
Georgia, Hungary, Moldova, Poland, and the United States.  As for the sample size by 
country, Ukraine has the lowest number of observations (991 respondents), while Canada 















































 It is important to remember that the high education variable is created by 
assigning a value of ‘1’ to the following responses:  “some university-level education, 
without degree” and “university-level education, with degree” and a value of ‘0’ to the 
other seven responses.  Also, the high education variable reflects the percentage of 
respondents with high education in the entire country’s sample.  In other words, the 
percentage distribution for the high education variable includes those who are younger 
than 25 years old.  Therefore, the percentage of the population with high education may 
look somewhat surprisingly lower than it is expected.   
 
 















































Across countries, the percentage of respondents with high education varies 
considerably (see figure 5).  Less than 16% of the respondents have a high education in 
Germany, Spain, Poland, and the United States (15.4%, 15.1%, 13.2%, and 10.2%, 
correspondingly).  Meanwhile, the highest percentage of respondents with high education 
is among citizens of Norway (47.1%) and Sweden (49%).   
Section 4.2.iv:  Government employee 
Appendix H reveals that there are 102 invalid responses that have decreased the 
sample size for the government employee variable from 26,464 to 26,362 or by 0.4%.  
Overall, invalid responses do not exceed 2% of observations in the countries with missing 
values.  Eight of 21 countries do not have invalid responses at all.  
 Figure 6 shows that the percentage of respondents who worked or work for 
government or public institutions varies from 10.1% in the United States to 45.3% in 
Moldova.  Less than 15% of respondents who worked or work for government are 
citizens of the United States, Spain, Bulgaria, Romania, and Canada.  More than 40% of 
respondents who worked or work for government are citizens of Norway, Sweden, 
Russia, Georgia, and Moldova.  
 It is interesting to note that the lowest percentage of those who worked or work 
for government (10.1%) is observed in the United States.  There are at least two 
explanations for such a phenomenon.  First, general government spending as a share of 
GDP in the United States is much lower as compared to many European countries.  For 
example, in 2007 government expenditures represented about 51% of GDP in Sweden, 





Figure 6. Percentage distribution of government employees by country, % 
 
Second, in the United States “in 2002 … contract employees comprised 62% of 
the combined contracting, civil service, and military positions – the true size of the 
federal government” (Durant, Girth, and Johnston 2009, p. 208).  And, nonmilitary civil 
service positions continued to be reduced because contract positions keep growing 
significantly (Durant, Girth, and Johnston 2009).  
Section 4.2.v:  Left political ideology 
 Figure 7 and Appendix I show that there are 7,173 invalid responses in the left 
political ideology variable, which have decreased the total sample size from 26,464 to 















































such a significant reduction of the sample size.  Russia has no observations at all.  A 
closer examination of the dataset and the codebook shows that the political ideology 
question has not been asked in Russia.  At least 40% of respondents in Romania, Georgia, 
and Ukraine offered either “don’ know” or “no answer.”  The other three post-Soviet 
countries – Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Poland – each have at least 29% invalid responses.  
The United States, Sweden, and Norway each have less than 4% invalid 
responses.  As for the sample size by country, Ukraine is the second country with the 
lowest sample size, which is 597.  Only five countries, Spain, Switzerland, the United 
States, Canada, and Germany have the sample size more than 1,000.  The other 14 
countries have the sample size less than 1,000.  
 
 

















































The left political ideology variable varies from 1 ‘right’ to 10 ‘left’ along the 
political ideology spectrum.  The mean of this variable by country varies from 5.0 
(Georgia) to 6.4 (Spain) with an average standard deviation of 2.1 (see Table 4).  Overall, 
the distribution of respondents’ political ideology is slightly negatively skewed.  
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics: Left political ideology  
Country Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N 
Bulgaria 6.3 2.1828 1 10 712 
Canada 5.6 1.8765 1 10 1,624 
Finland 5.4 1.9677 1 10 903 
France 6.2 2.1202 1 10 931 
Georgia 5.0 2.1971 1 10 872 
Germany 6.2 1.8306 1 10 1,824 
Great Britain 5.7 1.8543 1 10 880 
Hungary 5.3 1.9221 1 10 867 
Italy 5.9 2.2037 1 10 742 
Moldova 5.0 2.2479 1 10 814 
Netherlands 5.8 1.9738 1 10 913 
Norway 5.4 1.8923 1 10 997 
Poland 5.1 2.2154 1 10 718 
Romania 5.0 2.3615 1 10 911 
Russia - - - - - 
Slovenia 5.7 2.2400 1 10 652 
Spain 6.4 1.9660 1 10 1,045 
Sweden 5.4 2.2024 1 10 975 
Switzerland 5.8 2.0113 1 10 1,111 
Ukraine 5.4 1.9423 1 10 597 
United States 5.3 1.8275 1 10 1,203 





Section 4.2.vi:  Civic engagement  
 Appendix J shows that there are 35 invalid responses in the civic engagement 
variable.  These missing values have decreased the sample size from 26,464 to 26,429 or 
by 13.2%.  As for the sample size by country, Poland and Russia each have the lowest 
number of valid responses, which is 1,000.  Canada has the largest sample size (2,164). 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics: Civic engagement  
Country Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N 
Bulgaria 0.13 0.4908 0 4 1,001 
Canada 1.43 1.5291 0 9 2,164 
Finland 0.79 1.0358 0 8 1,014 
France 0.72 1.1652 0 8 1,001 
Georgia 0.06 0.2673 0 4 1,500 
Germany 0.63 0.9060 0 6 2,061 
Great Britain 1.24 1.3559 0 6 1,041 
Hungary 0.23 0.5353 0 4 1,006 
Italy 0.65 0.9899 0 8 1,007 
Moldova 0.51 0.8973 0 6 1,046 
Netherlands 1.00 1.1716 0 7 1,050 
Norway 1.02 1.2432 0 8 1,025 
Poland 0.39 0.7839 0 6 1,000 
Romania 0.16 0.4891 0 4 1,773 
Russia 0.21 0.5546 0 6 2,022 
Slovenia 0.72 0.9899 0 5 1,037 
Spain 0.40 0.8436 0 7 1,199 
Sweden 1.01 1.0543 0 7 1,003 
Switzerland 1.24 1.2479 0 7 1,240 
Ukraine 0.25 0.6582 0 8 998 
United States 1.34 1.4224 0 8 1,241 




Civic engagement is a count variable for the number of organizations in which an 
individual is an active member.  Since the respondents were given a choice of 10 
different types of voluntary organizations, the civic engagement variable should range 
from 0 to 10.  Examination of table 5 shows that the variable varies from 0 to 9.  Georgia 
has the lowest mean of 0.06 with a standard deviation of 0.27.  Canada has the highest 
mean of 1.43 with a standard deviation of 1.52.  Thus, the distribution of the variable is 
positively skewed suggesting that most of the respondents are not actively engaged in 
voluntary organizations.  
Section 4.2.vii:  People can be trusted  
It is important to remember that the interpersonal trust item is measured by the 
following question:  “Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted 
or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?”  The responses “most people 
can be trusted” are coded ‘1’ and the responses “need to be very careful” are coded ‘0.’ 
There are 1,109 or 4.2% invalid responses for the survey item “people can be 
trusted” (see figure 8 and Appendix K).  These missing responses have decreased the 
sample size from 26,464 to 25,355.  Only France has no missing values.  For most 
countries, the percentage of invalid responses does not exceed 10%.  Only Ukraine and 





Figure 8. Invalid responses of people can be trusted by country, % 
 
Figure 9 shows that there is a significant amount of variation across countries in 
the interpersonal trust item.  Citizens of Switzerland, Finland, Sweden, and Norway are 
the most trusting respondents, as at least 51% of them in each country reported that “most 
people can be trusted.”  To the contrary, citizens in Moldova, Slovenia, Georgia, and 
France are the least trusting, as less than 18.7% of the respondents in these countries 

















































Figure 9. Percentage distribution of people can be trusted by country, % 
 
Section 4.2.viii:  Confidence in government institutions  
Figure 10 and Appendix L show that there are about 10.9% invalid responses in 
the confidence in government institutions variable, which have reduced the sample size 
from 26,464 to 23,573.  Ukraine and Georgia have the highest numbers of missing values 
(24% and 22%, correspondingly).  Norway has the least number of missing observations 
(1.3%).  As for the sample size by country, Ukraine has the least number of valid 
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Figure 10. Invalid responses of confidence in government institutions by country, % 
 
 Confidence in government institutions is a factor score that ranges from -1.8 to 
2.5 (see Table 6).  The mean ranges from -0.47 with a standard deviation of 0.87 


















































Table 6. Descriptive statistics: Confidence in government institutions 
Country Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N 
Bulgaria -0.24 1.0147 -1.93 2.50 882 
Canada 0.35 0.8135 -1.93 2.50 1,931 
Finland 0.65 0.7163 -1.82 2.50 989 
France -0.08 0.8578 -1.93 2.50 964 
Georgia -0.26 0.8838 -1.93 2.50 1,167 
Germany -0.05 0.8130 -1.93 2.50 1,818 
Great Britain 0.21 0.8331 -1.93 2.50 907 
Hungary -0.35 0.8762 -1.93 2.50 907 
Italy 0.09 0.7518 -1.93 2.50 938 
Moldova -0.47 0.8677 -1.93 2.11 997 
Netherlands -0.05 0.8026 -1.93 2.50 922 
Norway 0.61 0.6435 -1.93 2.40 1,012 
Poland -0.37 0.7756 -1.93 2.50 850 
Romania -0.39 0.8666 -1.93 2.50 1,549 
Russia -0.27 0.9583 -1.93 2.50 1,717 
Slovenia -0.38 0.7784 -1.93 2.50 928 
Spain 0.22 0.8037 -1.93 2.50 1,107 
Sweden 0.45 0.7026 -1.93 2.50 942 
Switzerland 0.46 0.6792 -1.93 2.50 1,117 
Ukraine -0.40 0.9356 -1.93 2.50 760 
United States 0.16 0.7257 -1.93 2.50 1,169 
Total 0.00 0.8908 -1.93 2.50 23,573 
 
 
Section 4.2.ix:  Summary 
 Several key points arise in the descriptive statistics of the dependent and 
independent variables examined in this study.  First, the levels of confidence in the civil 
service vary both between and within countries.  High levels of confidence in the civil 
service are common among Scandinavian countries.  Lower levels of confidence in the 
civil service are observed among post-Soviet countries.   
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 Second, descriptive statistics show that the values of independent variables vary 
across 21 countries.  The average respondents’ age is 46.6 with a standard deviation of 
17.4.  There are slightly more women than men across 21 countries.  There is high 
variation in the percentage of respondents with high education.  About 10.2% of the 
respondents in the United States have high education, while more than 49% of the 
respondents in Sweden have high education.  The United States also has the lowest 
percentage of respondents who worked or work for government institutions (10.1%).  
Moldova has the highest percentage of respondents who worked or work for government 
(45.3%).  The left political ideology variable has the highest percentage of invalid 
responses (27.1%) as compared to other individual-level variables.  Russia has no valid 
responses because the political ideology question has not been asked in this country.   
On average, respondents in Canada are actively engaged in the highest number of 
voluntary organizations (1.43 with a standard deviation of 1.52).  Meanwhile, 
respondents in Georgia are actively engaged in the least number of voluntary 
organizations (0.06 with the standard deviation of 0.27).  With respect to the variable 
measuring interpersonal trust, citizens of Switzerland, Finland, Sweden, and Norway are 
the most trusting respondents, as at least 51% of them in each country reported that “most 
people can be trusted.”  To the contrary, citizens in Moldova, Slovenia, Georgia, and 
France are the least trusting, as less than 18.7% of the respondents in these countries 




Section 4.3:  Binary logistic regression models 
In order to better assess the citizen confidence in the civil service, this section 
examines binary logistic regression models.  The first part of this section discusses some 
statistics produced by binary logistic regression models.  The second part of the section 
examines substantive results of the models. 
The main research question of this section is:  Are the citizens’ attitudes about the 
civil service determined by similar attributes across countries?  Tables 7-11 report 
separate binary logistic regression models for each of the 21 countries.  The dependent 
variable is a binary variable which is created by assigning “a great deal of confidence” 
and “quite a lot of confidence” a value ‘1’ and “not very much confidence” and “none at 
all” a value of ‘0.’  
The size of the sample by country varies from 419 (Ukraine) to 1,517 (Russia).  
The sample size of most countries has decreased because of invalid responses of the left 
political ideology variable.  For example, Ukraine has lost about 40% of its observations.  
The likelihood ratio chi-square () for all 21 models is statistically significant.  Thus, 
these models as a whole fit significantly better than an empty model (i.e. a model with no 
predictors).   
With respect to measures of fit, there are various pseudo R-squared measures for 
binary variables.  One of them is McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2 (& ).  Hagle and 
Mitchell (1992) and Windmeijer (1995) find that &  most closely approximates the R2 
obtained from regressions on the underlying latent variable.  McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2 
(& ) suggests that post-Soviet countries, Slovenia (0.526) and Georgia (0.531), have 
the highest values.  Meanwhile, the lowest pseudo-squared measures, & , are observed 
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in the following developed democracies:  Spain (0.275), Great Britain (0.280), and 
France (0.288).  Thus, confidence attitudes are more difficult to explain in developed 
democracies as compared to post-Soviet countries.  
As for the substantive findings, consistent with much previous research on 
political trust, most socio-demographic attributes are not particularly useful for 
explaining variation in confidence attitudes (Houston and Harding 2013).  The influence 
of age is not uniform across 21 countries.  In five countries, age is statistically significant 
and has a positive sign.  These countries are France, Germany, Hungary, Moldova, and 
Romania.  This finding supports the hypothesis that trust is higher among older 
respondents, reflecting a sense of social connectedness that individuals develop 
throughout their lives (also see Christensen and Laegreid 2005; Lipset and Schneider 
1987; Listhaug and Wiberg 1995; Van de Walle 2007).  However, age is statistically 
significant and has a negative sign in 2 countries:  Norway and Russia.  This result is in 
line with studies that have reported a negative relationship between trust and age (Keele 
2005; King 1997; Richardson, Houston, and Hadjiharalambous 2001). 
The male variable is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level only in 
Slovenia.  Men have odds of having confidence in the civil service that are higher than 
women by a factor of 2.89, which is consistent with the assumption that men are more 
prominent in key positions in government and are less likely than women to be exposed 
to experiences with inequality in societal institutions (Brewer and Sigelman, 2002). 
In 5 of 21 countries examined, high education has a statistically significant 
influence on having confidence in the civil service.  However, in 4 countries (Canada, 
Finland, Georgia, and Slovenia) the sign is positive, while in Germany the sign for high 
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education is negative.  Prior research has also offered mixed findings.  For example, 
Marlowe (2004) hypothesizes that high education and trust are positively related.  He 
argues college-educated citizens are more likely to be members of a professional 
organization.  Therefore, most professionals are more likely to trust public administrators 
to regulate their professional activities (see also Richardson, Houston, and 
Hadjiharalambous 2001; Tolbert and Mossberger 2006; Van de Walle 2007).  Marlowe 
(2004) also acknowledges that educated people may have a more critical attitude towards 
the civil service (see also Roth, Bozinoff, and MacIntosh 1990).   
The government employee variable is statistically significant in 4 countries:  
Georgia, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland.  The result is consistent with the argument 
that government employees have a positive image of the group of which they are a part 
(Brewer and Sigelman, 2002).  The effect of political ideology is mixed.  The hypothesis 
that liberals support the public sector and its government institutions (Huseby 2000; 
Newton 2001) has found empirical support in 4 countries:  Norway, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and Great Britain.  Although left political ideology is a statistically 
significant variable in Germany and Spain, it has a negative sign.  Such inconsistent 
results may be caused by a significant amount of missing values in the left political 
ideology variable in most of the countries.  Since Russia has no valid responses, this 
variable was omitted from the regression model for this country.  
Contrary to the proclaimed importance of civic engagement for building social 
capital, participation in a voluntary organization generally is not related to the confidence 
attitude.  Civic engagement is statistically significant in only three countries:  Norway, 
Poland, and Spain.  This findings support the notion that involvement in voluntary 
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associations and civic life lead to greater trust in government and its leaders (Cook and 
Gronke 2005).  However, the fact that it is not statistically significant in the other models 
reduces its importance. 
Individual attitudes are more important for explaining citizen perceptions about 
the civil service than are socio-demographic attributes.  In 6 of the 21 models, the 
interpersonal trust variable is statistically significant:  Those who are more trusting of 
others are more likely to have confidence in the civil service.  It is interesting to note that 
the civic engagement variable is statistically significant only in developed democracies:  
Canada, Finland, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, and Great Britain.  
The most pronounced individual-level correlate is the confidence in government 
institutions index.  This variable is statistically significant in all 21 countries.  Confidence 
in the civil service is influenced by diffuse support for government.  Confidence in one 
political institution spills over into attitudes about other political institutions (Chanley, 
Rudolph, and Rahn 2000, 2001; Christensen and Laegreid 2005; Hetherington 1998).  
When taken together, these models suggest there are general similarities in the correlates 
of confidence attitudes across countries.   
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Table 7. Binary logistic regression: Have “a great deal of confidence” 
or “quite a lot of confidence” in the civil service 
(Bulgaria, Canada, Finland, France, Georgia) 
 
  




Age  0.0102 
  (1.01) 
 0.0026 
  (1.00) 
 0.0084 
  (1.01) 
 0.0108** 
  (1.01) 
-0.0084 
  (0.99) 
Male -0.0658 
  (0.94) 
 0.1174 
  (1.12) 
-0.0889 
  (0.91) 
 0.1349 
  (1.14) 
-0.0281 
  (0.97) 
High education   0.3270 
  (1.39) 
 0.2900** 
  (1.34) 
 0.3651* 
  (1.44) 
-0.0854 
  (0.92) 
 0.6583*** 
  (1.93) 
Government employee  0.4056 
  (1.50) 
 0.2350 
  (1.26) 
 0.1230 
  (1.13) 
 0.1713 
  (1.19) 
 0.7860*** 
  (2.19) 
Left political ideology  0.0087 
  (1.01) 
 0.0468 
  (1.05) 
 0.0458 
  (1.05) 
 0.0502 
  (1.05) 
-0.0202 
  (0.98) 
Civic engagement -0.0106 
  (0.99) 
-0.0165 
  (0.98) 
 0.0764 
  (1.08) 
-0.0566 
  (0.94) 
-0.5348 




People can be trusted  0.0462 
  (1.05) 
 0.2215* 
  (1.25) 
 0.7089*** 
  (2.03) 
 0.2417 
  (1.27) 
 0.1695 
  (1.18) 
 






  (3.17) 
 1.5640*** 
  (4.78) 
 2.2627*** 
  (9.61) 
 1.3311*** 
  (3.79) 
 2.0164*** 
  (7.51) 
      
Constant -0.7502* 
  (0.47) 
-0.8923*** 
  (0.41) 
-2.0593*** 
  (0.13) 
-0.6261* 
  (0.53) 
-0.1782*** 
  (0.84) 
N  548  1,429  873  903  659 
Model χ  138.22***  391.23***  322.13***  209.76***  284.08*** 
Log likelihood -305.4 -785.3 -417.3 -518.2 -306.0 
McKelvey and 
Zavoina’s R2  0.308  0.348  0.472  0.288  0.531 
* p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01  (Odds ratios are reported in parentheses.)  
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Table 8. Binary logistic regression: Have “a great deal of confidence” 
or “quite a lot of confidence” in the civil service 
(Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Italy) 
 
  




Age  0.0106*** 
  (1.01) 
-0.0048 
  (0.99) 
 0.0105* 
  (1.01) 
 0.0026 
  (1.00) 
Male -0.0273 
  (0.97) 
 0.0377 
  (1.04) 
-0.1361 
  (0.87) 
 0.2211 
  (1.25) 
High education  -0.3437* 
  (0.71) 
-0.1282 
  (0.88) 
 0.3641 
  (1.44) 
-0.2028 
  (0.82) 
Government employee  0.1749 
  (1.19) 
 0.0908 
  (1.10) 
 0.1763 
  (1.19) 
 0.1690 
  (1.18) 
Left political ideology -0.0979*** 
  (0.91) 
 0.0836* 
  (1.09) 
 0.0200 
  (1.02) 
 0.0125 
  (1.01) 
Civic engagement  0.0225 
  (1.02) 
 0.0561 
  (1.06) 
 0.1222 
  (1.13) 
 0.0970 




People can be trusted  0.3925*** 
  (1.48) 
0.3328* 
  (1.39) 
0.2468 
  (1.28) 
0.1443 
  (1.16) 
 
Attitude towards government: 
 
Confidence in government 
institutions 
 1.6117*** 
  (5.01) 
 1.3239*** 
  (3.76) 
 1.5175*** 
  (4.56) 
 1.6318*** 
  (5.11) 
  
Constant -1.1094*** 
  (0.33) 
-0.8056** 
  (0.45) 
-0.5441 
  (0.58) 
-1.0470** 
  (0.35) 
  
N  1,498  741  762  661 
Model   395.79***  165.54***  239.50***  165.28*** 
Log likelihood -721.9 -430.7 -403.8 -369.2 
McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2  0.374  0.280  0.381  0.322 






Table 9. Binary logistic regression: Have “a great deal of confidence” 
or “quite a lot of confidence” in the civil service 
(Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland) 
 
  




Age  0.0166** 
  (1.02) 
 0.0061 
  (1.01) 
-0.0139*** 
  (0.99) 
 0.0016 
  (1.00) 
Male  0.2713 
  (1.31) 
 0.0620 
  (1.06) 
 0.0978 
  (1.10) 
-0.0107 
  (0.99) 
High education  0.3919 
  (1.48) 
 0.0986 
  (1.10) 
-0.0015 
  (0.99) 
 0.2770 
  (1.32) 
Government employee -0.3277 
  (0.72) 
 0.2924 
  (1.34) 
 0.3367** 
  (1.40) 
 0.0397 
  (1.04) 
Left political ideology -0.0618 
  (0.94) 
 0.0004 
  (1.00) 
 0.0841** 
  (1.09) 
-0.0644 
  (0.94) 
Civic engagement -0.1275 
  (0.88) 
 0.0211 
  (1.02) 
 0.1471** 
  (1.16) 
 0.3957*** 




People can be trusted -0.0157 
  (0.98) 
0.4963*** 
  (1.64) 
0.5591*** 
  (1.75) 
0.1289 
  (1.14) 
 
Attitude towards government: 
 
Confidence in government 
institutions 
 1.5206*** 
  (4.57) 
 1.7325*** 
  (5.65) 
 1.7451*** 
  (5.73) 
 2.0259*** 
  (7.58) 
    
Constant -1.9930*** 
  (1.14) 
-1.7247*** 
  (0.18) 
-1.0675*** 
  (0.34) 
-1.3264*** 
  (0.27) 
    
N  762  761  985  614 
Model   128.91***  210.10***  255.21***  159.99*** 
Log likelihood -251.9 -368.5 -528.8 -219.0 
McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2  0.348  0.393  0.338  0.440 
* p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01  (Odds ratios are reported in parentheses.)  
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Table 10. Binary logistic regression: Have “a great deal of confidence” 
or “quite a lot of confidence” in the civil service 
(Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Spain) 




Age  0.0132** 
  (1.01) 
-0.0074* 
  (0.99) 
 0.0083 
  (1.01) 
 0.0030 
  (1.00) 
Male  0.7114 
  (1.07) 
-0.1212 
  (0.89) 
 1.0629*** 
  (2.89) 
-0.1190 
  (0.89) 
High education  0.0956 
  (1.10) 
-0.1038 
  (0.90) 
 0.5339* 
  (1.71) 
-0.2472 
  (0.78) 
Government employee  0.3078 
  (1.36) 
 0.1910 
  (1.21) 
 0.4225 
  (1.53) 
 0.0987 
  (1.10) 
Left political ideology  0.0034 
  (1.00) 
      -- 
 
-0.0429 
  (0.96) 
-0.0671* 
  (0.94) 
Civic engagement  0.2316 
  (1.26) 
 0.1298 
  (1.14) 
-0.1211 
  (0.89) 
 0.1810** 




People can be trusted -0.3396 
  (0.71) 
0.1283 
  (1.14) 
0.0523 
  (1.05) 
0.0303 
  (1.03) 
 
Attitude towards government: 
 
Confidence in government 
institutions  
 1.4368*** 
  (4.21) 
 1.1746*** 
  (3.24) 
 2.3653*** 
  (10.64) 
 1.3185*** 
  (3.74) 
    
Constant -1.3207*** 
  (0.27) 
 0.7151*** 
  (2.04) 
-2.4893*** 
  (0.08) 
-0.5134 
  (0.60) 
    
N  797  1,517  586  932 
Model   194.23***  357.54***  183.55***  190.00*** 
Log likelihood -386.2 -869.5 -186.8 -535.4 
McKelvey & Zavoina’s R2  0.338  0.285  0.526  0.275 
* p ≤ 0.10; ** p ≤ 0.05; *** p ≤ 0.01  (Odds ratios are reported in parentheses.)  
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Table 11. Binary logistic regression: Have “a great deal of confidence” 
or “quite a lot of confidence” in the civil service 
(Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, United States) 
  Sweden Switzerland Ukraine United States 
Socio-cultural correlates: 
 
Age  0.0088 
  (1.01) 
 0.0035 
  (1.00) 
 0.0020 
  (1.00) 
 0.0064 
  (1.01) 
Male  0.2965 
  (1.35) 
 0.0301 
  (1.03) 
-0.0680 
  (0.93) 
 0.0249 
  (1.03) 
High education  0.1566 
  (1.17) 
 0.0529 
  (1.05) 
-0.3145 
  (0.73) 
-0.1664 
  (0.85) 
Government employee  0.3754* 
  (1.46) 
 0.4587** 
  (1.58) 
 0.1406 
  (1.15) 
 0.3498 
  (1.42) 
Left political ideology  0.0789* 
  (1.08) 
 0.0935** 
  (1.10) 
 0.0243 
  (1.02) 
 0.0483 
  (1.05) 
Civic engagement -0.0428 
  (0.96) 
-0.0728 
  (0.93) 
-0.1232 
  (0.88) 
-0.0247 




People can be trusted 0.2743 
  (1.32) 
0.0619 
  (1.06) 
0.1908 
  (1.21) 
 0.2032 
  (1.23) 
 
Attitude towards government: 
 
Confidence in government 
institutions 
 1.7007*** 
  (5.48) 
 1.8666*** 
  (6.47) 
 1.5412*** 
  (4.67) 
 2.0615*** 
  (7.86) 
   
Constant -1.3193*** 
  (0.27) 
-0.7748* 
  (0.46) 
 0.0172 
  (1.02) 
-1.4141*** 
  (0.24) 
   
N  780  969  419  1,147 
Model   190.17***  228.79***  129.48***  352.18*** 
Log likelihood -400.0 -495.2 -220.0 -605.2 
McKelvey & Zavoina’s R2  0.327  0.327  0.401  0.408 






Section 4.4:  Summary  
The descriptive analysis of the dependent variable indicates that there is variation 
both within and across countries in the level of confidence in the civil service.  
Confidence is higher among citizens of the Scandinavian countries, while those in 
Poland, Slovenia, and Moldova are the most critical.   
The average age of respondents by country varies from 41 in Russia to 52.5 in 
Switzerland.  Overall, there are slightly more respondents who are women than men 
across nations with the exception of five countries.  There is an equal distribution of men 
and women in Spain and the United States.  Norway, Sweden, and Poland have slightly 
more men than women (50.1%, 50.1%, and 51.2%, correspondingly).  There is a broad 
percentage distribution of respondents with high education across countries.  Norway and 
Sweden have the highest proportion of respondents with a college degree (47.1% and 
49.0%, correspondingly).  Meanwhile, the United States and Poland have the least 
percentage of respondents with high education (10.2% and 13.2%, correspondingly).  
The percentage of government employees varies from 10.1% in the United States 
to 45.3% in Moldova.  It is important to note that the left political ideology variable has 
the largest amount of missing values across countries.  Russia has no valid responses at 
all because the political ideology question has not been asked in this country.  
On average, respondents in Canada are actively engaged in the highest number of 
voluntary organizations (1.43 with a standard deviation of 1.52).  Meanwhile, 
respondents in Georgia are actively engaged in the least number of voluntary 
organizations (0.06 with a standard deviation of 0.27).  The highest levels of trust in 
others are among citizens of Switzerland, Finland, and Norway, as at least 51% of them 
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in each country reported that “most people can be trusted.”  To the contrary, citizens of 
Moldova, Slovenia, and Georgia, and France are the least trusting, as less than 18.7% of 
them suggested that people “need to be careful.”  Confidence in government institutions 
is a factor score that ranges from -1.8 to 2.5.   
Binary logistic regression models reveal that there are some general similarities in 
the correlates of confidence attitudes across countries.  The most prominent one is the 
attitudes towards other government institutions.  Those citizens who have confidence in 
other government institutions are more likely to have confidence in the civil service as 
well.  Also, confidence in the civil service is higher in those countries where trust in 
others is widespread.  However, socio-demographic variables are less useful in 
explaining variation in these attitudes, which is consistent with previous research.  The 
next chapter examines both individual- and country-level correlates of the attitudes 




CHAPTER V  
EXPLANING CONFIDENCE IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE. 




 The previous chapter has examined the individual-level correlates of citizen 
confidence in the civil service.  This chapter presents models that include both levels of 
analysis:  individual-level and country-level correlates of confidence in the civil service.  
The chapter starts by presenting a descriptive analysis of the country-level variables 
employed in this study.  Next, scatter plots of confidence in the civil service and the 
country-level variables are examined.  These figures allow for an exploration of some of 
the possible explanations for variation in confidence in the civil service at the country-
level.  The main research question examined in this chapter is:  Do country-level 
correlates explain variation between countries in citizen confidence in the civil service?  
To answer this research question, multilevel (or hierarchical linear) models are examined.  
One of the important contributions of this study is that it includes a larger number of 
countries than what has been examined in the previous research of attitudes towards the 
civil service.  Furthermore, this study examines not only developed democracies in North 
America but emerging democracies of Eurasia. 
Section 5.1:  Descriptive analysis of country-level correlates  
 This section examines each country-level correlate separately by presenting basic 
descriptive statistics.  Among others, this section seeks to answer the following questions:  
What is the general level of economic conditions in the countries?  What is the general 
level of institutional quality in the countries?  What is the general level of income 
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inequality in the countries?  How widely dispersed are the values of these and other 
country-level variables?  At the very minimum, the country-level variables should vary.  
The magnitude of the variation, or lack of it, may affect the multivariate analysis 
performed in this chapter.  Also, the goal of this section is to establish an initial picture of 
the nature of that variation, which forms the basis of further analysis.  This section 
separately summarizes each particular variable by presenting mean, standard deviation, 
and minimum and maximum values.  Also, the distribution of countries over the values of 
these variables is examined.   
This study examines 21 countries of North America and Eurasia.  Among them, 
12 countries are developed democracies, and 9 countries are emerging democracies that 
were part of the post-Soviet or communist Bloc (see Table 13 for a complete list of 
countries).  Table 12 presents descriptive statistics of country-level correlates employed 
in this analysis.  
 
Table 12. Descriptive statistics: Country-level variables 
Country-level variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max N 
GDP per capita, thousand USD 24.9 13.50 2.5 48.4 21 
Unemployment, % 7.4 2.73 3.4 13.8 21 
Inflation, % 5.2 4.78 0.3 15.2 21 
Government effectiveness 0.9 0.98 -0.8 2.1 21 
Corruption perception index 6.2 2.53 2.5 9.6 21 
Gini index 31.1 5.49 23.2 42.8 21 
Ethnic fractionalization index 0.3 0.20 0.1 0.7 21 
Traditional vs. Secular-rational 
values 0.4 0.68 -0.8 1.9 21 
Survival vs. Self-expression 




The first three country-level variables — GDP per capita, unemployment, and 
inflation — capture economic conditions in the countries.  Generally speaking, GDP per 
capita gauges a country’s average economic wealth (World Bank 2012).  Examination of 
Table 12 and figure 11 reveal that countries’ GDP per capita widely varies from 2.5 
thousand USD to 48.4 thousand USD.  The average GDP per capita equals 24.9 thousand 
USD and the standard deviation equals 13.5.   
 
 













































GDP per capita, thousand USD
 
 100 
 Figure 11 presents countries’ GDP per capita and orders the countries from low-
to-high on this variable.  The former Soviet Bloc countries have the lowest values of 
GDP per capita, with Moldova being the poorest country in the sample.  To the contrary, 
the developed democracies of North America and Western Europe have the highest GDP 
per capita, with Norway being the richest country in the sample.  
 Unemployment is the second variable that measures economic condition of a 
country.  In this study, unemployment refers to “the share of labor force that is without 
work but available for and seeking employment” (World Bank 2012).   
 















































Unemployment varies from the lowest value of 3.4% to the highest value of 
13.8% (see figure 12).  The lowest unemployment rates are observed in two Scandinavian 
countries — Norway and Netherlands — and Switzerland.  Their unemployment rates do 
not exceed 4%.  Although the highest unemployment rates are observed in the former 
Soviet Bloc countries (Georgia and Poland), there is no clear division of countries into 
two groups based on unemployment as it has been observed with GDP per capita.  For 
example, Germany has the third highest unemployment rate (10.3%).   
Because Russia and Poland have somewhat high unemployment rates (13.6% and 
13.8%, correspondingly) as compared to other countries, the unemployment variable is 
slightly positively skewed.  Another important observation is that the unemployment rate 
for most countries varies between 5% and 9%.  The average unemployment rate equals 
7.4% and the standard deviation equals 2.73. 
The last economic indicator employed in this study is inflation.  Inflation reflects 
“the rate of price change in the economy as a whole” (World Bank 2012).   
Overall, countries widely vary in terms of their inflation rate (see figure 13).  The 
lowest inflation rate is 0.3% and the highest one is 15.2%.  The lowest inflation rate is 
observed in developed democracies.  Thus, an inflation rate in Finland and Germany is 
less than 0.9%.  To the contrary, inflation exceeds 13% in Moldova, Ukraine, and Russia.  
The average rate of inflation is 5.2%, and the standard deviation is 4.8.  The distribution 
is positively skewed, which means there are several countries with high inflation rates.  It 
is interesting to note that although Germany has the lowest inflation rate, it has the third 




Figure 13. Inflation by country, %  
 
The second set of country-level variables examined in this study is the 
institutional quality correlates.  Two indicators are used to gauge institutional quality of a 
country:  government effectiveness and corruption.  The Government effectiveness 
indicator is measured in standard normal units.  Theoretically, it ranges from 
approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong) governance performance (Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Mastruzzi 2010).  A higher score corresponds to a higher quality of government 
institution (World Bank 2012).  In this sample, government effectiveness ranges from -
0.8 to 2.1 (see figure 14).  Negative scores of the government effectiveness indicators are 















































Georgia, and Bulgaria.  The highest positive scores of the government effectiveness are 
associated with Scandinavian countries — Norway, Sweden, and Finland — and 
Switzerland.  The average score is 0.9, and the standard deviation equals 0.98.   
 
 
Figure 14. Government effectiveness by country 
 
The second indicator of the quality of government institutions is the level of 
corruption.  Theoretically, the corruption perception index (CPI) ranges between 10 
(highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt) (Transparency International 2012).  In this sample, 


























the distribution of countries across this variable.  The most corrupt countries are the 
former Soviet Bloc countries:  Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia.  The least corrupt countries 
are Switzerland and the Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden, and Finland).  The 
mean equals 6.2, and the standard deviation equals 2.5.   
 
 
Figure 15. Corruption Perception Index by country  
 
The next set of correlates captures social polarization in countries.  Two indices 
are examined:  the Gini index and the ethnic fractionalization index.  The Gini index 
gauges the income inequality for the sample in a country.  It varies theoretically from 0 
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(Solt 2009).  The Gini index of this sample varies from 23.2 to 42.8 (see figure 16).  
There is somewhat of a general pattern in the distribution of countries along the Gini 
index.  Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Norway, and Finland) have the lowest Gini 
index.  Their Gini indices do not exceed 25.4.  However, Slovenia – one of the former 
Soviet Bloc countries – is also among the values of the Scandinavian countries.  The most 
unequal distribution of income is observed in the post-Soviet Bloc countries:  Georgia, 
Moldova, and Russia.  Their Gini indices exceed 39.5.  However, among these countries, 
one can find the United States as well.  The Gini mean equals 31.1 and the standard 
deviation equals 5.5.  
 
 















































The ethnic fractionalization index is the second indicator that captures social 
polarization in a country.  The index varies theoretically from 0 and 1.  The higher the 
number, the more fractionalized is a society.  Figure 17 and Table 12 show that the ethnic 
fractionalization index in this sample varies between 0.06 and 0.71.  The most 
homogenous countries are Norway and Sweden.  Their indices do not exceed 0.06.  
Canada is the most fractionalized society.  Its index equals 0.71.  The mean is equal to 
0.3, and the standard deviation equals 0.2.  
 
 
















































The last set of country-level correlates gauges two major dimensions of cross- 
cultural variation in these countries:  Traditional values versus Secular-Rational values 
and Survival values versus Self-Expression values (Inglehart and Welzel 2005).  Figure 
18 locates countries along these two dimensions.  Moving upward on this figure 
corresponds to the shift from Traditional values to Secular-Rational values.  At the same, 
moving rightward on this figure corresponds to the shift from Survival values to Self-
Expression values.   
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 108 
Following Inglehart and Welzel’s (2005) methodology, 4 country typologies 
emerges from the 21 countries examined in this study (see Table 13).   
 
Table 13. Traditional values versus Secular-Rational values by country 
Communist 













Sweden 1.86 2.35 
Norway 1.39 2.17 
Germany 1.17 0.44 
Finland 0.82 1.12 
Switzerland 0.74 1.90 
Netherlands 0.71 1.39 
France 0.63 1.13 
English 
Speaking 
Great Britain 0.06 1.68 
Canada -0.26 1.91 
United States -0.81 1.76 
Catholic 
Europe 
Italy 0.13 0.60 




Slovenia 0.73 0.36 
Hungary 0.40 -1.22 
Poland -0.78 -0.14 
Orthodox 
Europe 
Bulgaria 1.13 -1.01 
Russia 0.49 -1.42 
Moldova 0.47 -1.28 
Ukraine 0.30 -0.83 
Georgia -0.04 -1.31 
Romania -0.39 -1.55 
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The first group is countries that have high scores in Secular-Rational and high 
scores in Self-Expression values.  These are the so-called countries of Protestant Europe 
— Sweden, Norway, Germany, Netherlands, Finland, Switzerland, France — and one 
country of Catholic Europe, Slovenia.  These countries are located at the top right corner 
of figure 18. 
The second group of countries has high scores in Self-expression values and high 
scores in Traditional values.  These are the so-called English speaking countries — Great 
Britain, Canada, the United States — and two countries of Catholic Europe:  Italy and 
Spain.  These countries are located at the bottom right corner of figure 18.   
The third group of countries has high scores in Secular-Rational values and high 
scores in Survival values.  These are the so-called countries of Orthodox Europe — 
Bulgaria, Russia, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine — and one country of Catholic Europe, 
Hungary.  These countries are located at the top left corner of figure 18.   
 The fourth group of countries has high score in Survival values and high scores in 
Traditional values:  Georgia, Romania (Orthodox Eurasia) and Poland (Catholic Europe).  
These countries are located at the bottom left corner of figure 18.   
Examination of figure 18 suggests the following pattern.  As standards of living 
increase and a transition from industrial society to post-industrial society occurs, a 
country tends to move from the bottom-left corner (high scores in both Survival and 
Traditional values) in the direction of the upper-right corner (high score in both Self-




Section 5.2:  Cross-country differences in the level of confidence in the 
civil service:  Scatter plots 
 What explains country-level differences in confidence attitudes?  To explore the 
answer to this quesiton, this section presents scatter plots of the percent of respondents 
that have higher confidence in the civil service (i.e., “quite a lot” or “a great deal”) and 
the country-level correlates.  This bivariate analysis sets the stage for the next section that 
provides multilevel analysis of both individual- and country-level correlates of the 
confidence attitudes.   
As discussed in Chapter 2, the extant literature has identified four sets of country-
level correlates that explain trust variation across countries:  government performance, 
institutional quality, social polarization, and culture.  The scatter plots are examined for 
these four sets of correlates.  To discern a possible relationship between the dependent 
variable and these country-level correlates, this section discusses the direction and 
strength of their relationship and whether the observed relationship is in line with 
proposed hypotheses.  A regression line is superimposed on the scatter plots to aid 
interpretation of the nature of the relationships in the plots.  
Section 5.2.i:  Government performance 
 Confidence in the civil service is expected to be related to economic conditions in 
the country.  In this study, three variables are used to operationalize the economic 
conditions of the country:  gross domestic product (GDP) per capita (in thousand USD), 
unemployment rate (%), and inflation rate (%).  Figures 19-21 show how these economic 




Figure 19. Confidence in the civil service and GDP per capita (thousand USD) 
 
 Figure 19 is a scatter plot showing how GDP per capita and the level of 
confidence in the civil service co-vary for the sample of 21 countries.  The product-
moment correlation coefficient (Pearson’s r) equals 0.47 (see Appendix M).  There seems 
to be a strong positive relationship between GDP per capita and confidence in the civil 
service.   
The post-Soviet countries are located at the left bottom corner of figure 19.  To 
the contrary, developed democracies are found at the right upper corner of the figure.  
This empirical observation provides some support for the proposed hypothesis that the 
higher the level of economic growth a country experiences, the more likely citizens in a 
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The second indicator of economic condition used in this study is unemployment.  
Figure 20 plots unemployment and the level of confidence in the civil service.   
 
 
Figure 20. Confidence in the civil service and unemployment (%) 
 
Appendix M shows that Pearson’s r equals -0.35.  Both the figure and Pearson’s r 
suggest a negative moderate relationship between inflation and the confidence variable:  
The higher the inflation rate, the lower is the confidence.  Once again, this finding 
supports the economic hypothesis:  the higher the unemployment rate a country 
experiences, the lower is the level of confidence citizens have in the civil service. 
Also, the figure clearly shows that Georgia and Poland have higher 
unemployment rates than the other 19 countries.  When these two sizeable countries are 











































































from moderate to weak.  It is probable that Georgia and Poland influence the relationship 
between the confidence and unemployment.   
 Inflation is the third indicator of countries’ economic condition.  Figure 21 is a 
scatter plot of inflation and the level of confidence in the civil service.   
 
 
Figure 21. Confidence in the civil service and inflation (%) 
 
Pearson’s r between these two variables equals -0.08.  So, it is likely due to the 
fact that post-Soviet Bloc countries do not universally have high rates of inflation.  The 
figure and Pearson’s r suggest a very weak negative relationship between inflation and 
confidence in the civil service.  As hypothesized, the lower the inflation rate a country 










































































The strength of the relationship between inflation and confidence is not nearly as 
strong as between GDP per capita and the confidence.  There is also no clear division 
between developed democracies and post-Soviet Bloc countries based on the inflation 
variable, as it has been observed with the GDP per capita variable.  Although post-Soviet 
Bloc countries – Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova – have the highest inflation rates in this 
sample, the level of inflation in Poland, Slovenia, and Hungary is as low as in the 
Netherlands and Italy.  
Section 5.2.ii:  Institutional quality 
The second set of factors that is employed to explain citizens’ confidence in the 
civil service is the quality of government institutions.  This study examines two 
indicators:  the World Bank government effectiveness indicator and the corruption 
perception index (CPI).  Figures 22 and 23 examine the relationship between the level of 
confidence in the civil service and these two variables.  
In this sample, the government effectiveness indicator varies from -0.79 to 2.12:  
the higher the number, the higher is governance performance.  As figure 22 suggests, 
post-Soviet countries tend to have lower scores on the government performance indicator 
as compared to developed democracies.  Overall, the data points fall closer to a 
regression line suggesting a strong relationship.  Pearson’s r for this relationship equals 
0.48.  The figure and Pearson’s r show that there is a strong positive relationship between 
the government effectiveness indicator and the level of confidence in the civil service.  
This finding supports the proposed hypothesis:  the higher the level of good governance 





Figure 22. Confidence in the civil service and government effectiveness 
 
The other indicator of the institutional quality of a country is the level of 
corruption.  Figure 23 displays countries according to their values on the corruption 
perception index and the level of confidence in the civil service.  The corruption 
perception index (CPI) scores countries based on a level of perceived corruption.   
Theoretically, the corruption perception index varies between 0 indicating high 
levels of perceived corruption and 10 indicating low levels of perceived corruption 
(Transparency International 2012).  In this sample, figure 23 shows that post-Soviet 
countries tend to have a higher level of perceived corruption as compared to developed 











































































Figure 23. Confidence in the civil service and corruption 
 
The scatter plot also suggests that there is a strong positive relationship between 
corruption and the confidence.  Pearson’s r for this relationship is 0.49.  Consistent with 
the explanation that corruption affects people’s views of the government, this finding 
supports the hypothesis that the lower levels of perceived corruption a country 
experiences, the higher is the level of confidence citizens have in the civil service. 
Section 5.2.iii:  Social polarization 
 The third set of country-level correlates gauges social polarization in a country.  
Two indicators are examined in this study:  income inequality and ethic fractionalization.  
It is expected that citizens in socially polarized countries are less likely to have 









































































and 25 examine the relationship between these two variables and citizens’ confidence in 
the civil service.  
Figure 24 illustrates a relationship between the Gini coefficient and the level of 
confidence in the civil service.  The Gini coefficient is used to represent a measure of 
income inequality in a country.   
 
 
Figure 24. Confidence in the civil service and the Gini coefficient  
 
Theoretically, it varies from 0 indicating perfect equality to 1 indicating 
maximum income inequality in a country.  Pearson’s r for these two variables is -0.22.  
Figure 24 also suggests that there is a weak negative relationship between the Gini index 
and confidence.  As hypothesized, the high levels of economic inequality in a country 










































































The second social polarization variable utilized in this study is the ethnic 
fractionalization index.  The index reflects the probability that two randomly selected 
individuals from a country belonged to different ethnic groups (Alesina et al. 2003).  
Pearson’s r for this relationship is -0.02.  A visual inspection of figure 25 reveals no 
discernible pattern.  The relationship between ethnic diversity and confidence in the civil 
service appears negligible.   
 
 
































































































Section 5.2.iv:  Culture  
 The last set of country-level correlates that are examined in this study is the 
cultural factors, i.e. “deeply-instilled attitudes among the public of a society” (Inglehart 
and Welzel 2010, p. 551).  Two dimensions of cross-cultural variation in the world 
developed by Inglehart and Welzel are examined in figures 26 and 27.  
Figure 26 shows that there is a relationship between the level of confidence in the 
civil service and Traditional values versus Secular-Rational values.  The shift from 
Traditional values to Secular-Rational values in a country is associated with a higher 
level of confidence in the civil service.   
 
 








































































































Traditional values                  versus               Secular-Rational values
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Pearson’s r for this relationship is 0.37 suggesting a moderate positive 
relationship between these two variables.  As hypothesized, figure 26 suggests that the 
less the country places emphasis on religion, traditional family values and authority, the 
more likely citizens in a country are to have confidence in the civil service. 
Figure 27 shows the relationship between the Survival values versus Self-
Expression values and the level of confidence in the civil service.  As suggested by 
Inglehart and Welzel (2005), the Survival values versus Self-Expression values reflect the 
transition from industrial countries to post-industrial countries.  Individuals in post-Soviet 
countries tend to emphasize the importance of Survival values.   
 
 










































































Survival values                    versus                    Self-Expression values
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To the contrary, individuals in developed democracies place the priority on Self-
Expression values.  Pearson’s r between Survival versus Self-Expression values and trust 
equals 0.50.  The scatter plot also suggests a strong positive relationship between this 
cultural dimension and confidence.  As hypothesized, figure 27 suggests the more a 
country places emphasis on economic and physical security, the less likely citizens in that 
country are to have confidence in the civil service.   
Section 5.2.v:  Summary  
This section has started to explore the question of country-level differences in 
confidence attitudes.  The descriptive statistics reveals that the values of country-level 
variables vary across 21 countries.  One of the obvious patterns is that post-Soviet 
countries tend to have low levels of economic indicators, low levels of government 
performance indicators, and high scores on Survival values.   
The scatter plots of the dependent variable and country-level variables suggest 
that government performance, institutional quality, and culture are strongly related to the 
level of confidence in the civil service.  Thus, citizens of the countries with high GDP per 
capita, low levels of unemployment, high quality of public service, low levels of 
corruption, high scores in Secular-Rational values, and high scores in Self-Expression 
values are more likely to have confidence in the civil service.  There are very weak or 
negligible relationships between the level of confidence and income inequality, inflation, 
and ethnic diversity.  The next section examines both individual- and country-level 
correlates of confidence in the civil service using multilevel models.  
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Section 5.3:  The two-level models of confidence 
The main research question of this chapter is:  What individual-level and country-
level attributes correlate with the level of confidence in the civil service across countries?  
The data used in this analysis are hierarchical in nature.  Specifically, a two-level model 
is employed to examine the citizens’ attitudes towards the civil service.  As the name 
implies, a two-level model consists of two sub-models at level-1 and level-2.  This study 
examines data on individuals nested within countries, the level-1 model represents the 
relationship among the individual-level variables and the level-2 model captures the 
influence of country-level factors.  Formally, there are   
  	 1, … ,    level-1 units (i.e. individuals) nested within 
  	 1, … ,    level-2 units (i.e. J= 21 countries).  
The dependent variable,  	 , is a binary variable:  a value of 
‘1’ is assigned to “a great deal of confidence” and “quite a lot of confidence” responses, 
and a value of ‘0’ is assigned to “not very much confidence” and “none at all” responses.  
When the dependent variable is a binary outcome, the OLS assumptions of linearity and 
normality are not met.  Hierarchical generalized linear models (HGLMs) (also known as 
generalized linear models or generalized linear models with random effect) offer a 
modeling framework for multilevel data with non-normally distributed errors (Breslow 
and Layton 1993; Schall 1991).   
The level-1 model 
The level-1 model in HGLM consists of three parts:  a sampling model, a link 
function, and a structural model (Raudenbush and Bryk 2010). 
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Level-1 sampling model 
Since the dependent variable in this study is a binary variable that takes on a value 
of ‘1’ or ‘0,’ then the sampling model is the Bernoulli distribution (which is a special 
case of the binomial distribution).  The model is written as follows: 
 	 1| ! 	 " 
This equation states that the predicted value of the binary variable () is 
equal to the probability of a success, ". 
Level-1 link function 
Linear regression methods cannot be used for binary variables for two reasons.  
The first reason is that the range of a binary dependent variable is restricted between 0 
and 1.  The usual regression model might take its value outside this allowed range.  For 
example, a fitted value of -0.25 or 1.08 has no meaning.  In other words, a meaningful 
model for a binary outcome should not allow fitted values that are negative or greater 
than 1.  Second, for binary dependent variables there is a relationship between the mean 
and the variance.  Specifically, for a binary variable  that has a probability " for 
outcome ‘1’ and probability (1 # ") for outcome ‘0,’ the expected value is 
 %&"' 	 " and the variance is () %|"' 	 "1 # "! . 
Thus, the variance is not a free parameter but is determined by the mean.  Since 
the variance is not constant, there is heteroscedasticity.  Therefore, the “standard” 
multiple regression model is not adequate to model a binary dependent variable.  One of 
the methods used is logistic regression.  Thus, HGLM uses the logit link function in 
modeling binary outcomes, which is written as: 
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Log - "1 # ". 	 / 
 
where / is the log odds of success.  Thus, while " is constrained to be in the interval 
(0,1), / can take on any real value.   
 
Level-1 structural model 
In the level-1 model, the outcome for case  within unit  is written as: 
/ 	  0 1  2345! 1  6)78! 1  9:;< 8=>?)@! 1
1  ABC8D8@ 8DE7F88!  1  GH5IJ KLMNJOPM NQ5LML4R! 1
1    STNUNO 5V4P45W5VJ! 1  X8E78 ?) 8 @>Y@8=! 1
1  ZTLVINQ5VO5 NV 4LU5[VW5VJ NV\JNJ]JNLV\!   
where 
 ^ (_ 	 0, 1, … , a) are level-1 coefficients.   
Thus, in the multilevel models, the same three sets of individual-level variables are used 
as in Chapter 4:  socio-cultural explanations, socio-psychological correlate, and 
confidence in other government institutions.   
 
The level-2 model 
Beyond differences of opinion within countries, there is likely to be variation in 
the level of confidence between countries.  Thus, confidence in the civil service is 
expected to be conditioned by national context.  Taken together, the political and social 
trust literatures suggest three explanations for cross-national variation in trust in 
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government that can be applied to attitudes about the public service:  government 
performance (economic performance and institutional quality), social polarization, and 
culture.  Each of the level-1 coefficients,  ^, defined in the level-1 structural model 
becomes an outcome variable in the level-2 model: 
 ^ 	 b^0 1 b^2c!2 1 b^c! 1 d 1  b^efc!ef 1 >^ 
where 
 b̂ g (_ 	 0,1, … , h^) are level-2 coefficinets; 
 c!g is a level-2 predictor; and  
 >!^ is a level-2 random effect. 
 
Fixed and random coefficients in multilevel regression 
The fixed versus random distinction for variables and effects is important in 
multilevel regression.  In multilevel regression models, both level-1 and level-2 
predictors are assumed to be fixed (Snijders and Bosker 2012).  However, the intercept 
and slopes in the level-1 equations could be fixed or random.  The random slope and 
random coefficients are assumed to vary randomly across groups and are therefore 
referred to as “random coefficients.”   
The variance of of the intercepts is represented by i00 	 C)>j!. 
And, the variance of the (first) predictor is represented by i02 	 C)>2!. 
Thus, a fixed level-1 coefficient is written as:   ^ 	 b^0 
And, a randomly varying level-1 coefficient is written as:   2 	 b20 1 >2. 
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 What are some strategies to decide whether a level-1 coefficient should be 
specified as fixed or randomly varying?  Based on Snijders and Bosker (2012, pp. 44-49 
and 106-107), the following model development strategy was utilized.  First, a model 
with random intercept and slopes using only all eight level-1 variables was estimated.  In 
other words, the intercept and all eight slopes were specified as random.  Then, the slope 
variance of all 8 level-1 variables was evaluated (see Table 14).   
 
Table 14. Variance components table for the random coefficient regression model: 
all slopes random  
 








Intercept U0 0.58513 0.34237 19 222.12028 0.000 
Age slope U1 0.00518 0.00003 19 36.07067 0.010 
Male slope U2 0.11222 0.01259 19 21.34850 0.317 
High education slope U3 0.18118 0.03283     19 32.22909    0.029 
Government employee 
slope 
U4 0.13677 0.01871     19 16.21697    >.500 
Left political ideology 
slope 
U5 0.04614 0.00213     19 33.99266    0.018 
Civic engagement 
slope 
U6 0.06008       0.00361     19 30.44947    0.046 
People can be trusted 
slope 




U8 0.27902       0.07785     19 82.44611    0.000 
 
Table 14 shows that variances for the male, government, and trust in people are 
not statistically significant.  In other words, there is no between-country variablity in the 
slopes for these three individual-level variables (E k 0.50 for i0, i0A, and i0X).  Thus, 
slopes for male, government employee, and people can be trusted in the level-1 equation 
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should be fixed.  The slopes for the intercept and the other five level-1 variables should 
be random.   
The above-described model was estimated once more to examine the residual 
variance components of the second random coefficent regression models.  Evaluation of 
Table 15 shows that there is between-country variablity in the slopes for the following 
individual-level variables:  age, high education, left political ideology, civic engagement, 
and confidence in other government institutions (E n 0.50 for i02, i09, for i0G, i0S, and 
i0Z).  Thus, model diagnostics indicate that random effects should be included for the 
following individual-level variables:  age, high education, left political ideology, civic 
engagement, and confidence in other government institutions.   
 
Table 15. Variance components table for the random coefficient regression model: 
age, high education, left political ideology, civic engagement, and people can be 
trusted – random 
 








Intercept U0 0.53586 0.28715 19 405.92136 0.000 
Age slope U1 0.00452 0.00002 19 31.19378 0.038 
High education slope U3 0.19160 0.03671  19 37.54862 0.007 
Left political ideology 
slope 
U5 0.04573 0.00209 19 36.03900 0.011 
Civic engagement 
slope 
U6 0.05861 0.00343 19 30.82938 0.042 
People can be trusted 
slope 
U7 0.27229 0.07414 19 87.28522 0.000 
 
As is common in multilevel analysis, continuous predictors are grand-mean 
centered, specifically, age, left political ideology, civic engagement, and confidence in 
other government institutions, as well as all country-level-variables.  These variables are 
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shown in bold in the following equations.  The models are estimated using a restricted 
penalized quasi-likelihood (PQL) routine in HLM 6.06.   
To summarize, two-level models estimated in this study are written as: 
Level-1 model 
o=8?8 	 1| ! 	 " 
Log - "1 # ". 	 / 
/ 	  0 1  2345! 1  6)78! 1  9:;< 8=>?)@! 1
1  ABC8D8@ 8DE7F88!  1  GH5IJ KLMNJOPM NQ5LML4R! 1
1    STNUNO 5V4P45W5VJ! 1  X8E78 ?) 8 @>Y@8=! 1
1  ZTLVINQ5VO5 NV 4LU5[VW5VJ NV\JNJ]JNLV\!   
Level-2 model 
For government performance model: 
 0 	 b00 1 b02pqr K5[ OPKNJP!2 1 b0sV5WKMLRW5VJ! 1
1  b09tVIMPJNLV!9 1 >0  
For institutional quality model: 
 0 	 b00 1 b02pLU5[VW5VJ 5II5OJNUV5\\!2 1 b0Trt! 1 >0 
For social polarizattion model: 
 0 	 b00 1 b02ptut!2 1 b0vJwVNO I[POJNLVPMNxPJNLV! 1 >0  
For culture model: 
 0 	 b00 1 b02y[PQNJNLVPM U\ z5O]MP[ # {PJNLVPM UPM]5\!2 1
1 b0z][UNUPM U\ z5MI # v|K[5\\NLV UPM]5\! 1 >0 
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For communist legacy model: 
 0 	 b00 1 b02TLWW]VN\J M54POR!2 1 >0 
For all models: 
 2 	 b20 1 >2 
  	 b0 
 9 	 b90 1 >9 
 A 	 bA0 
 G 	 bG0 1 >G 
 S 	 bS0 1 >S 
 X 	 bX0 
 Z 	 bZ0 + >Z 
Null model 
When conducting multilevel analysis it is necessary to initially assess the need to 
consider whether there is sufficient variation between countries, as opposed to within 
countries, to justify the inclusion of country-level effects when estimating models 
(Raudenbush and Bryk 2010).  To make this determination, a null model (also known as 
an unconditional model) is estimated that excludes any individual-level or country-level 
variables.  Thus, the level-1 model is written as: 
/ 	  0, 
where the level-2 model is: 
 0 	 b00 1 >0,               >0 } 0, i00! 
b00 is the average log-odds of confidence in the civil service across 21 countries, 
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i00 is the variance between countries in country-average log-odds of trust.  
The intraclass correlation (ICC), or the proportion of variance explained, allows 
determining whether there is significant variation in confidence attitudes at the individual 
and country levels (Snijders and Bosker 2011, pp. 224-227).  
 	 i00i00 1 ~ 	
0.49517
0.49517 1  3
	 0.1308 
 The intraclass correlation has a value of 0.1308 which means that about 13% of 
the residual variation in the confidence attitude variable is attributable to unobserved 
country characteristics, indicating the need to employ multilevel analysis for model 
estimation.  
Section 5.4:  Empirical findings 
Tables 16-20 report the results of multilevel binary logistic regression models that 
are estimated using 21 national samples.  Multilevel models permit simultaneously 
testing hypotheses about the effect of individual-level characteristics and national context 
on confidence attitudes.  The individual-level variables perform similarly across each of 
the models indicating the robustness of these findings.  Due to the high collinearity 
among the nation-level variables (see Appendix M), the relatively large number of 
country-level correlates, and given the small number of country samples, separate models 
are estimated to test hypotheses about each category of the country-level correlates.   
The descriptive analysis of individual-level variables presented in Chapter 4 
shows that the political ideology question had not been asked in Russia.  In fact, all 
countries have invalid responses which resulted in decreasing the dataset by 27.1% of the 
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total number of cases.  Therefore, for each multilevel model, an alternative model is 
estimated in which the left political ideology variable has been excluded.  
The multilevel regression models reported in Tables 16-20 report a series of 
models that consider the correlates of citizen confidence in the civil service.  The 
individual-level variables perform similarly across each of the models indicating the 
robustness of these findings.  Looking at the coefficients reported in the models from 1 to 
10, it is clear that socio-cultural factors condition the level of confidence in the civil 
service.  The analysis reveals that the age variable is significant either at the 95% or 99% 
confidence levels in models with the left political ideology variable and at the 90% 
confidence level in models without the left political ideology variable.  Age is positively 
related to confidence in the civil service, reflecting a sense of social connectedness that 
individuals develop throughout their lives (Huseby 2000; Lipset and Schneider 1987).  
However, the odds ratio of the age variable equals about 1.0045.  Therefore, age has a 
small effect on confidence attitudes.  
The government employee variable is significant at the 99% confidence level in 
all 10 models.  Government employees have odds of having “quite a lot” or “a great deal” 
of confidence in the civil service that are higher by a factor of 1.3 as compared to 
nongovernment employees.  The result is consistent with the argument that government 
workers have a positive image of the group of which they are a part (Brewer and 
Sigelman 2002). 
The results also show that the socio-cultural variables male, high education, left 
political ideology, and civic engagement do not impact confidence attitudes.  These 
findings are consistent with other studies of trust in government, which suggest that 
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socio-cultural variables do not significantly influence confidence attitudes (Anderson and 
Tverdova 2003; Bennett and Bennett 1990; Christensen and Laegreid 2005; Citrin 1974; 
Houston and Harding 2013; Marlowe 2004; Mishler and Rose 1999; Newton and Norris 
2000; Van de Walle 2007).  
The influence of socio-cultural correlates on confidence attitudes is not uniform in 
the binary logistic models estimated separately for 21 countries (see Chapter 4).  Age has 
a positive impact on confidence attitudes in 5 countries and a negative impact in 2 
countries.  The government employee variable is statistically significant in 4 countries.  
The male, high education, and left political ideology variables also have mixed influence 
on confidence attitudes.   
To the contrary, the age and government employee variables have consistent 
impact on confidence attitudes in all 10 multilevel models.  Why?  The first explanation 
is that the increase in the sample size influences the results.  The sample size in 
multilevel models is a few tens (from 11 to 40 times) more than the sample size of a 
binary logistic model.  The ability of a statistical test to detect correctly the strength of a 
relationship between two variables depends on both the size of the effect that has been 
measured and the sample size (O’Sullivan, Rassel, and Berner 2008).  Thus, the power of 
a statistical test has increased in the multilevel models with the increase of the sample 
size.  Another explanation is that the inclusion of country-level variables in the model has 
improved model specification.  Indeed, the interclass correlation shows that about 13% of 
the residual variation in the confidence attitudes is attributable to unobserved country 
characteristics.   
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Beyond socio-cultural correlates, the models indicate that confidence attitudes 
towards the civil service are influenced by socio-psychological attributes.  As 
hypothesized, individuals who are more trusting of others similarly have more confidence 
in the civil service.  This finding is consistent with social capital theory (Brehm and Rahn 
1997; Richardson, Houston, and Hadjiharalambous 2001) as those who are trusting of 
others are less likely to worry about being treated unfairly by the political-administrative 
system.  
The influence of a socio-psychological correlate on confidence attitudes is 
statistically significant in only 6 binary logistic regression models estimated in Chapter 4.  
The civic engagement variable is significant only in developed democracies.  Once again, 
the increase in the sample size and improvement in model specification are likely reasons 
in the enhanced findings in multilevel models.   
The last individual-level variable gauges citizens’ confidence in other government 
institutions and is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level in all 10 models.  
The more confident citizens are in other government institutions, the more likely they are 
to have “a great deal” or “quite a lot of confidence” in the civil service.  The large odds 
ratio of 5.21 indicates that this variable has a very strong effect on attitudes towards the 
civil service.   
The influence of the confidence in government institutions index on the level of 
confidence in the civil service is also the most pronounced correlate in the binary logistic 
regression models estimated in Chapter 4.  This variable is statistically significant at the 
99% confidence level in all 21 countries.  This finding provides strong support for the 
hypothesis that confidence in the civil service is influenced by diffused support for 
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government.  This result is consistent with the previous research that indicates trust in 
one political institution spills over into attitudes about other political institutions 
(Christensen and Laegreid 2005; Marlowe 2004). 
In addition to the individual-level analysis, the utility of multilevel analysis is that 
it provides an opportunity to account for cross-country variation in attitudes.  Models 1 
and 2 reported in table 16 consider the effect of macroeconomic conditions.  None of the 
three economic condition indicators are statistically significant.  This finding indicates 
that neither national wealth nor the level of unemployment nor inflation is an important 
correlate of citizens’ attitudes towards the civil service.  It should also be pointed out that 
GDP per capita is highly collinear with unemployment (r=-0.59) and inflation (r=-0.64).  
A Pearson’s r for unemployment and inflation equals -0.18.  Therefore, additional three 
models with each of these variables entered individually are estimated.  However, these 
correlates are consistently insignificant in all these models. 
The second set of models in table 17 examines the effect of institutional quality 
on confidence attitudes.  It is hypothesized that confidence in the civil service reflects the 
quality of public sector institutions charged with formulating and implementing public 
policy.  Both of the country-level variables have coefficients with the hypothesized sign 
and are statistically significant at the 99% confidence level.  It should be also pointed out 
that the government effectiveness measure and the corruption perception index are highly 
collinear with a Pearson’s r of 0.90.  Yet, they are both statistically significant in these 
two models. 
The World Bank’s government effectiveness index measures the quality of the 
civil service, the quality of public policy formation and implementation, and the 
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credibility of the government’s commitment to its stated policies.  Thus, the higher the 
quality of governance institutions is, the more likely citizens are to have confidence in the 
civil service.  This result is consistent with previous research on the positive effect of 
good governance on citizens’ attitudes (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Delhey and 
Newton 2005; Mishler and Rose 2001; Van de Walle and Bouckaert 2003). 
The CPI ranks countries based on how corrupt their public sector is perceived to 
be (Transparency International 2006).  The measure runs from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 
(absolutely clean from corruption).  The result indicates that the corruption perception 
index is negative and statistically significant at the 99% level of confidence.  It means 
that the higher the perception of corruption is, the lower confidence attitudes towards the 
civil service will be, a finding consistent with the previous research (Anderson and 
Tverdova 2003; Mishler and Rose 2001).  Thus, whether measured with the World 
Bank’s government effectiveness index or the Transparency International’s corruption 
perception index, institutional quality accounts for variation in the level of confidence in 
the civil service across countries. 
The influence of social polarization on confidence attitudes is examined in models 
5 and 6 and reported in table 18.  It was hypothesized that the level of economic 
inequality is negatively correlated with citizen perceptions.  Also, ethnic diversity 
depresses confidence in the civil service.  Neither the Gini index nor the ethnic 
fractionalization index is statistically significant.  Two other measures of societal 
heterogeneity developed by Alesina et al. (2003) (religious fractionalization and 
linguistic fractionalization) were tested but not included in the reported models because 
neither approached statistical significance at any standard level.  These findings suggest 
 
 136 
that both income inequality and ethnic diversity are not significant correlates of 
confidence attitudes.  
The influence of culture, as measured by the Inglehart and Welzel (2005) 
dimensions of political culture, is examined in models 7 and 8 of table 19.  The Inglehart 
and Welzel’s Cultural Map of the World has two dimensions:  first, Traditional versus 
Secular-Rational values, and second, Survival versus Self-Expression values (Inglehart 
and Welzel 2005, 2010).  Neither of the cultural variables is statistically significant.  The 
cultural variables are not important correlates of confidence attitudes.  
Models 9 and 10 examine the influence of a communist legacy on confidence 
attitudes.  It is hypothesized that citizens of post-Soviet countries are less trusting than 
those in established democracies (Mishler and Rose 1997).  The communist legacy 
variable is statistically insignificant.  The finding suggests that recent experience under a 
communist regime does not influence citizens’ confidence attitudes.   
A comparison of each country-level model with and without the left political 
ideology variable shows that removal of the left political ideology variable has no 
substantial effect on the results.  The left political ideology variable is not statistically 
significant in the multilevel models.   
In sum, confidence in the civil service is explained in part by socio-cultural and 
socio-psychological attributes.  Even more pronounced is the observation that attitudes 
about other government institutions as a whole spillover onto attitudes about the civil 
service.  This finding echoes Marlowe’s (2004) observation that government 
administrators are “cogs in the system.”  It is also apparent that the level of confidence in 
the civil service varies across national context.  The quality of government institutions 
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and the level of corruption are important country attributes that condition citizen attitudes 
towards the civil service.  An important finding is the application of multilevel analysis to 
comparative studies of citizens’ attitudes:  In addition to who people are, a country in 




Table 16. Multilevel binary logistic regression models: Have “a great deal of 
confidence” or “quite a lot of confidence” in the civil service. 










Individual-level variables   
Constant  
-0.6784*** 
   (0.51) 
-0.7385*** 
   (0.48) 
Age  
 0.0031* 
   (1.00) 
 0.0045** 
   (1.00) 
Male  
 0.0375 
   (1.04) 
 0.0523 
   (1.05) 
High education 
 0.0681 
   (1.07) 
 0.0965 
   (1.10) 
Government employee  
 0.2257*** 
   (1.25) 
 0.2399*** 
   (1.27) 
Left political ideology -- 
 0.0145 
   (1.01) 
Civic engagement 
 0.0335 
   (1.03) 
 0.0204 
   (1.02) 
People can be trusted 
 0.2537*** 
   (1.29) 
 0.2435*** 
   (1.28) 
Confidence in government institutions 
 1.6287*** 
   (5.10) 
 1.6538*** 
   (5.23) 
Country-level variables   
GDP per capita, thousand USD 
 0.0166 
   (1.02) 
 0.0059 
   (1.01) 
Unemployment  
 0.0482 
   (1.05) 
 0.0924 
   (1.10) 
Inflation 
 0.0229 
   (1.02) 
 0.0012 
   (1.00) 
 
  
Level-2 variance    0.41569***    0.38640*** 
Likelihood function -32,041.1 -24,450.3 
Level-1 N   21,951   16,826 
Level-2 N      21      20 




Table 17. Multilevel binary logistic regression models: Have “a great deal of 
confidence” or “quite a lot of confidence” in the civil service. 










Individual-level variables   
Constant  
-0.6767*** 
   (0.51) 
-0.7364*** 
   (0.48) 
Age  
 0.0031* 
   (1.00) 
 0.0045** 
   (1.00) 
Male  
 0.0375 
   (1.04) 
 0.0513 
   (1.05) 
High education 
 0.0716 
   (1.07) 
 0.0996 
   (1.10) 
Government employee  
 0.2264*** 
   (1.25) 
 0.2415*** 
   (1.27) 
Left political ideology -- 
 0.0150 
   (1.02) 
Civic engagement 
 0.0344 
   (1.04) 
 0.0143 
   (1.01) 
People can be trusted 
 0.2544*** 
   (1.29) 
 0.2432*** 
   (1.28) 
Confidence in government institutions 
 1.6296*** 
   (5.10) 
 1.6539*** 
   (5.23) 
Country-level variables   
Government effectiveness  
 1.0899** 
   (2.97) 
 0.8431** 
   (2.32) 
Corruption perception index 
-0.3959** 
   (0.67) 
-0.3262** 
   (0.72) 
 
  
Level-2 variance    0.4068***    0.3071*** 
Likelihood function -32,028.2 -24,453.4 
Level-1 N   21,951   16,826 
Level-2 N      21      20 




Table 18. Multilevel binary logistic regression models: Have “a great deal of 











Individual-level variables   
Constant  
-0.6757*** 
   (0.51) 
-0.7480*** 
   (0.48) 
Age  
 0.0032* 
   (1.00) 
 0.0046*** 
   (1.00) 
Male  
 0.0370 
   (1.04) 
 0.0519 
   (1.05) 
High education 
 0.0666 
   (1.07) 
 0.0921 
   (1.10) 
Government employee  
 0.2250*** 
   (1.25) 
 0.2413*** 
   (1.27) 
Left political ideology -- 
 0.0142 
   (1.01) 
Civic engagement 
 0.0357 
   (1.04) 
 0.0142 
   (1.01) 
People can be trusted 
 0.2541*** 
   (1.29) 
 0.2415*** 
   (1.27) 
Confidence in government institutions 
 1.6312*** 
   (5.11) 
 1.6528*** 
   (5.22) 
Country-level variables   
GINI index 
-0.0140 
   (0.99) 
-0.0202 
   (0.98) 
Ethnic fractionalization 
-0.0430 
   (0.96) 
 0.1379 
   (1.15) 
 
  
Level-2 variance    0.4122***    0.30926*** 
Likelihood function -32,063.6 -24,461.4 
Level-1 N   21,951   16,826 
Level-2 N      21      20 




Table 19. Multilevel binary logistic regression models: Have “a great deal of 











Individual-level variables   
Constant  
-0.6770*** 
   (0.51) 
-0.7245*** 
   (0.48) 
Age  
 0.0031* 
   (1.00) 
 0.0046*** 
   (1.00) 
Male  
 0.0372 
   (1.04) 
 0.0521 
   (1.05) 
High education 
 0.0673 
   (1.07) 
 0.0951 
   (1.10) 
Government employee  
 0.2251*** 
   (1.25) 
 0.2390*** 
   (1.27) 
Left political ideology -- 
 0.0135 
   (1.01) 
Civic engagement 
 0.0345 
   (1.04) 
 0.0208 
   (1.02) 
People can be trusted 
 0.2542*** 
   (1.29) 
 0.2426*** 
   (1.27) 
Confidence in government institutions 
 1.6302*** 
   (5.10) 
 1.6550*** 
   (5.23) 
Country-level variables   
Traditional vs. Secular-Rational values 
 0.0116 
   (1.01) 
0.0236 
   (1.02) 
Survival vs. Self-Expression values 
 0.0371 
   (1.04) 
-0.0835 
   (0.92) 
 
  
Level-2 variance    0.40224***    0.30926*** 
Likelihood function -32,060.9 -24,461.4 
Level-1 N   21,951   16,826 
Level-2 N      21      20 





Table 20. Multilevel binary logistic regression models: Have “a great deal of 











Individual-level variables   
Constant  
-0.6447*** 
   (0.53) 
-0.7344*** 
   (0.48) 
Age  
 0.0032* 
   (1.00) 
 0.0046*** 
   (1.00) 
Male  
 0.0374 
   (1.04) 
 0.0522 
   (1.05) 
High education 
 0.0668 
   (1.07) 
 0.0940 
   (1.10) 
Government employee  
 0.2251*** 
   (1.25) 
 0.2403*** 
   (1.27) 
Left political ideology -- 
 0.0141 
   (1.01) 
Civic engagement 
 0.0349 
   (1.04) 
 0.0161 
   (1.02) 
People can be trusted 
 0.2544*** 
   (1.29) 
 0.2428*** 
   (1.27) 
Confidence in government institutions 
 1.6300*** 
   (5.10) 
 1.6536*** 
   (5.23) 
Country-level variables   
Communist legacy 
-0.0753 
   (0.93) 
 0.0469 
   (1.05) 
 
  
Level-2 variance    0.38575***    0.31602** 
Likelihood function -32,060.7 -24,465.4 
Level-1 N   21,951   16,826 
Level-2 N      21      20 




CHAPTER VI  
CONCLUDING REMARKS:  
CROSS-NATIONAL EXAMINATION OF CITIZEN CONFIDENCE 
IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE 
 
Section 6.1:  Overview 
Political trust is an evaluative orientation of citizens toward their political system, 
or some part of it, based upon their normative expectation (Miller 1974).  A minimum 
level of political trust is necessary for the stability of government institutions and 
effective implementation of public policies.  Trust in political institutions and their actors 
enhance citizens’ willingness to comply voluntarily with government laws, regulations, 
and policies.  Citizens experience government through interactions with “street level” 
bureaucrats.  Therefore, government employees play an important role in shaping 
citizens’ trust in government (Lipsky 2010).  Citizens and elected officials who maintain 
high levels of trust in public administrators are likely to provide them with more 
discretionary authority and less direct oversight (Marlowe 2004).  Successful governance 
requires public support for the implementation of policy programs (Miller 1974; Ruscio 
1996).  Trust has to stay above some minimal level if public policy programs are to 
continue to function (Kim 2005). 
This research contributes to the extant literature by examining confidence in the 
civil service across 21 countries of North America and Eurasia.  The research questions 
addressed by this study are:  First, how do levels of confidence in the civil service differ 
across countries?  Second, what individual-level attributes and attitudes correlate with 
citizen confidence in the civil service?  Third, does national context account for variation 
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between countries in citizen confidence towards the civil service?  Data from national 
samples across 21 North American and Eurasian countries are taken from the fifth wave 
of the World Values Survey.  Multilevel regression models are utilized to investigate the 
correlation of citizen attitudes with individual-level and country-level attributes.  This 
chapter summarizes the results, presents implications, and discusses the limitations of this 
research.  
Section 6.2:  Summary 
This study suggests that the levels of confidence in the civil service vary not only 
within countries, but also across countries.  The examination of confidence attitudes 
across countries shows that citizens in Scandinavian countries have a relatively high level 
of confidence in the civil service.  In contrast, citizens in post-Soviet countries express 
low levels of confidence in the civil service.  Since trust is a building block of a healthy 
and functioning democracy (Almond and Verba 1963; Mishler and Rose 2005; Putnam 
1993), the latter finding is an alarming one for these emerging democracies.  
Binary logistic regression models for each country have been performed to 
examine whether attitudes about the civil service are determined by similar individual-
level attributes across countries.  These models show that there are some general 
similarities in the correlates of confidence across countries.  However, the influence of 
these correlates is not uniform across countries.  The most prominent one is the 
confidence in other government institutions.  Also, confidence in the civil service is 
higher in those countries where trust in others is widespread.  However, socio-
demographic variables are less useful in explaining variation in these attitudes.   
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In addition, multilevel models have been performed to test hypotheses about the 
effect of individual-level characteristics and national context on confidence attitudes.  
The individual-level variables perform similarly across each of the models, indicating the 
robustness of these findings.  The study finds that confidence in the civil service is higher 
among older respondents, reflecting a sense of social connectedness that individuals 
develop throughout their lives (Huseby, 2000; Lipset and Schneider, 1987).  Also, 
government employees are more likely to have confidence in the civil service.  This 
result is consistent with the argument that government workers have a positive image of 
the group of which they are a part (Brewer and Sigelman, 2002).  
This study also supports the previous finding that interpersonal trust is an 
important component in enhancing citizens’ confidence attitudes.  Putnam (1993) clearly 
points out that the relationship between personal and political trust is a separate matter.  
Consistent with social capital theory (Brehm and Rahn, 1997; Richardson, Houston, and 
Hadjiharalambous, 2001), those who are trusting of others are less likely to worry about 
being treated unfairly by the political-administrative system.   
Another prominent individual attitude is confidence in other government 
institutions.  This study indicates that citizens’ confidence attitudes towards the civil 
service are closely related to confidence in other government institutions.  This result 
supports earlier findings that “public administrators are simply viewed as cogs within the 
system” (Marlowe 2004, p. 107).  Thus, positive attitudes towards government 
institutions and their actors may spillover to confidence in the civil service.  Conversely, 
citizens either trust government institutions, both their leaders and public service, or they 
trust neither (Marlowe 2004).   
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The study shows that the other individual-level variables, male, high education, 
left political ideology, and civic engagement do not impact confidence attitudes.  These 
findings are consistent with other studies of trust in government, which suggest that 
socio-cultural variables do not significantly influence confidence attitudes (Anderson and 
Tverdova 2003; Bennett and Bennett 1990; Christensen and Laegreid 2005; Citrin 1974; 
Houston and Harding 2013; Marlowe 2004; Mishler and Rose 1999; Newton and Norris 
2000; Van de Walle 2007). 
Cross-national differences in confidence attitudes indicate that citizens’ opinions 
are influenced by country-level factors.  Indeed, the intraclass correlation (ICC) shows 
that there is significant variation in confidence attitudes at the country level.  About 13% 
of the residual variation in the confidence variable is attributable to unobserved country 
characteristics, indicating the need to employ multilevel analysis for model estimation.  
In addition, binary regression models estimated for each country separately show that 
confidence attitudes are more difficult to explain for developed countries as their pseudo-
R-squared measures are lower than those for post-Soviet countries.  
Therefore, to advance our understanding of trust, it is important to examine 
attitudes about public administration cross-nationally.  Indeed, this study indicates that 
there appears to be a common set of cross-country correlates that explain confidence 
attitudes.  As expected, the study shows that levels of confidence across countries are 
conditioned by the quality of public sector institutions.  Both the World Bank’s 
government effectiveness index and the Transparency International’s corruption 
perception index explain variation in the level of confidence across countries.  Thus, the 
higher the quality of governance institutions is, the more likely citizens are to have 
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confidence in the civil service.  This result is consistent with previous research on the 
positive effect of good governance on citizens’ attitudes (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; 
Delhey and Newton 2005; Mishler and Rose 2001; Van de Walle and Bouckaert 2003).  
As for the second variable, the higher the perception of corruption is, the lower 
confidence attitudes towards the civil service will be, a finding consistent with the 
previous research (Anderson and Tverdova 2003; Mishler and Rose 2001).  The other 
country-level variables – GDP per capita, unemployment, inflation, the Gini index, CPI, 
cultural variables, and communist legacy – are not important correlates of confidence 
attitudes.  
Section 6.3:  Implications 
This research presents a multilevel model of citizen confidence in the civil 
service.  Several implications can be drawn from the findings of this study.  First, the 
study finds a set of common individual- and country-level correlates of these confidence 
attitudes.  Thus, the study demonstrates the utility of cross-national research in exploring 
confidence in the civil service.  Second, the study demonstrates that general interpersonal 
trust is an important correlate of confidence in the civil service.  It is troubling that 
general trust or “social capital” has been declining during the last several decades 
(Fukuyama 1995; Putnam 1993, 1995).  Thus, restoring “social capital” is also important 
for enhancing confidence in the civil service.  Third, over the last few decades the elected 
leaders in North America and Eurasia have spent an immense amount of energy 
reforming public administration.  For the most part, the main premise of these reforms is 
the belief that if government is to be able to overcome the discontent and distrust of its 
citizens, it must become more efficient and effective in implementing public policies.  
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This research demonstrates that confidence in the civil service is correlated with 
confidence in other government institutions.  Thus, bureaucratic reform is only a part of 
the answer to the overall declining trust in government, its institutions, and their leaders. 
Fourth, Dahl (1947) argues that comparison is what helps public administration 
achieve scientific status.  Cross-national survey research is central to advancing social-
science knowledge.  Countries have become increasingly interdependent and many 
processes are essentially global rather than merely national.  Those limited comparative 
studies in public administration have mainly focused their attention on advanced 
democratic nations.  Indeed, the current study demonstrates not only the relevance of a 
cross-country examination of confidence attitudes, but also the efficacy, or even 
necessity, of incorporating the newly emerged democracies of the former Soviet Bloc in 
this endeavor.  The analysis shows that confidence in the civil service is influenced by the 
institutional quality of government, specifically, government effectiveness and the level 
of corruption.  Building quality social and political institutions and reducing corruption 
should eventually result in higher stores of political trust in countries. 
Interestingly enough, communist legacy is not a significant covariate.  This is an 
optimistic implication because it suggests that confidence attitudes are not so much a 
function of communist legacy, but rather the quality of government institutions.  In other 
words, the transition of post-communist societies is “not doomed by the legacy of 
authoritarian past” (Mishler and Rose 2005, p. 1069).  These nations must not wait for 
generational change to build sufficient institutional trust in their citizens.  Thus, 
governments in emerging democracies should continue to direct their efforts to 
combating corruption and striving to achieve higher quality of public service provision, 
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higher quality of the bureaucracy, greater competence of civil servants, greater 
independence of the civil service from political pressures, and greater credibility of the 
government’s commitment to policies.   
Section 6.4:  Limitations and future research 
 When drawing lessons from this study, it is important to acknowledge and keep in 
mind the main limitations of the study and possible ways to resolve them.  First, the 
questions forming the basis of this study come from the fifth wave of the World Values 
Survey.  All 21 North American and Eurasian countries available in this survey have 
been included in the study.  Therefore, the pattern of trusting attitudes that are reported 
may be characteristic only of countries that are included.   
Second, determining the statistical importance of country-level characteristics is 
restricted by using only 21 national samples.  A broader range of countries would 
increase the variation among the country-level indicators, thereby increasing the 
statistical power of the analysis.  Despite this limitation, this study advances the 
understanding of the correlates of these attitudes by including a larger number of 
countries than what has been studied in the previous research.   
Third, the dependent variable is dichotomized which could potentially lead to a 
loss of information.  Additional research is needed to examine a larger number of 
countries employing multilevel ordinal or multinomial logistic regression models.  The 
sixth wave of the World Values Survey includes a larger number of countries.  Therefore 
future research should utilize the latest wave of the survey to address these limitations. 
Fourth, comparative public opinion research requires translation of survey 
instruments.  The translation of the terms from one language to another may change the 
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meaning of the terms.  According to the World Values Survey, every effort is made to 
ensure the accuracy of translation.  Specifically, the questionnaire is translated into 
different languages and in many cases independently translated back to English.  In most 
countries, the translated questionnaire is pre-tested to detect terms for which the 
translation is problematic (World Values Survey 2014).  Despite all these efforts cultural 
and language differences in countries make the translation of the survey instruments 
challenging.  For example, in Russian the same word “доверие” is used for trust and 
confidence making it impossible to distinguish between these two concepts in the 
questionnaire.  Another challenge arises in translation of the term “civil service.”  In the 
Russian language questionnaire, the term “государственные учреждения” refers rather 
to government institutions or government agencies than to the “civil service.”  However, 
the meaning of the translated terms should be consistent and comparable across nations.  
Thus, any comparative research should recognize that there is a challenge with the 
equivalence of the various translated concepts across countries. 
The fifth limitation is also connected with the challenges of comparative studies.  
Given the way the confidence question is asked in the questionnaire, it is assumed that 
the respondents know what the term “civil service” means.  Thus, in addition to the civil 
service, the World Values Survey asks the respondents about their level of confidence in 
16 other public and private institutions such as the government, the parliament, the 
courts, the political parties, the police, the armed forces, the labor unions, and others.  
However, it is necessary to acknowledge that it is unknown how the respondents exactly 
interpret the meaning of the term “civil service” and if they are aware of the difference 
between elected and unelected government officials.  One way to resolve this issue is to 
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ask the respondents what this term means to them in the future survey.  However, this 
option is not possible in this given study.   
Sixth, Inglehart’s measures of culture have been criticized for being sensitive to 
prevailing economic conditions and whether or not the respondent supports the current 
governing party (Schwartz 2003).  In addition, Inglehart’s scale measures individual 
values only indirectly.  Therefore, scholars should explore other ways to measure culture.  
For example, future public administration comparative studies could utilize the Schwartz 
theory of basic human values (Schwartz 1992, 2012). 
Seventh, in this study the World Bank government effectiveness index and the 
Transparency International corruption perception index are employed to capture the 
quality of government institutions.  However, one may argue that these indices are 
aggregate measures of confidence in the civil service.  In other words, this current study 
may employ aggregate measures of confidence in the civil service to explain the same 
construct at the individual level.  Therefore, future research should develop more 
systematic measures of the quality of the bureaucratic institutions across countries.  Also, 
future studies should examine measures of government institutions, the nature of 
government democracy, and specific characteristics of bureaucratic institutions. 
Eighth, most of the surveys of the fifth wave of the World Values Survey were 
administered in 2005 and 2006, i.e. prior the 2007-2008 global financial crisis.  The 
question to explore is whether or not the findings of this current study will be consistent 
under different economic conditions.  Specifically, it is important to examine whether 
citizens’ confidence attitudes will be still uncorrelated with economic conditions in years 
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after 2008.  Future research should replicate this study using the sixth wave of the World 
Value Survey which covers the period 2010-2014.  
And finally, public administration comparative studies tend to focus on either 
political and administrative elites or political-administrative institutions and have largely 
neglected citizens (Bouckaert, Van de Walle, and Kampen 2005).  As a result, most 
research on citizens’ attitudes is characterized as a collection of hypotheses drawn from a 
variety of explanatory frameworks of public opinion and are not theoretically integrated 
together.  In other words, there is no one general theory of citizens’ attitudes towards the 
civil service.  There is a need to develop an overarching theory that would bring these 
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Appendix A. Variable sources and descriptions 
 
Variable name  Description  Source 
Individual-level 
variables 
See Appendix C World Values Survey 
http://www.worldvaluessurve
y.org/ 
GDP per capita, 
thousand USD 
Gross Domestic Product per 
capita, adjusted for purchasing 
power parity. The methodology 
is described in detail in 





Share of the labor force that is 
without work but available for 
and seeking employment 
World Bank 
http://data.worldbank.org/ 
Inflation, % Annual growth rate of the GDP 
implicit deflator shows the rate 
of price change in the economy 
as a whole. The GDP implicit 
deflator is the ratio of GDP in 
current local currency to GDP in 








Danie Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, 





The CPI ranks countries based 
on how corrupt their public 
sector is perceived to be 
Transparency International 
www.transparency.org 
The Gini index The Gini index is used to 






The probability that two random 
citizens of a given country 
belonged to different groups 
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Appendix B. Countries included and year of survey 
 
# Country Geographical region N 
Year of 
survey 
1 Bulgaria Eastern Europe 1,001 2005 
2 Canada Northern America 2,164 2006 
3 Finland Northern Europe 1,014 2005 
4 France Western Europe 1,001 2006 
5 Georgia Northern Asia 1,500 2009 
6 Germany Western Europe 2,064 2006 
7 Great Britain  Northern Europe 1,041 2005 
8 Hungary Eastern Europe 1,007 2009 
9 Italy Southern Europe 1,012 2005 
10 Moldova Eastern Europe 1,046 2006 
11 Netherlands Western Europe 1,050 2006 
12 Norway Northern Europe 1,025 2007 
13 Poland Eastern Europe 1,000 2005 
14 Romania Eastern Europe 1,776 2005 
15 Russia Eastern Europe 2,033 2006 
16 Slovenia Southern Europe 1,037 2005 
17 Spain Southern Europe 1,200 2007 
18 Sweden Northern Europe 1,003 2006 
19 Switzerland Western Europe 1,241 2007 
20 Ukraine Eastern Europe 1,000 2006 
21 United States Northern America 1,249 2006 




Appendix C. World Values Survey question and wording 
 
Variable name Question wording 
Dependent variable  
Confidence in the civil 
service 
Confidence: The Civil Services 
I am going to name a number of organizations. For each 
one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in 
them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of 
confidence, not very much confidence or none at all?  
The Civil service 
1. A great deal  
2. Quite a lot  
3. Not very much  
4. None at all 
Independent Variables  
Age Age 
This means you are __ __ years old. [ALSO A TWO 
DIGIT VARIABLE] 
Male Sex 
1. Male  
2. Female 
High education Highest educational level attained 
What is the highest educational level that you have 
attained? (NOTE: if respondent indicates to be a student, 
code highest level s/he expects to complete): 
1. No formal education  
2. Incomplete primary school 
3. Completed primary school  
4. Incomplete secondary school: technical/vocational type  
5. Complete secondary school: technical/vocational type  
6. Incomplete secondary: university-preparatory type 
7. Complete secondary: university-preparatory type  
8. Some university-level education, without degree 
9. University-level education, with degree 
Government employee  Institution of occupation 
Are you working for the government or public institution, 
for private business or industry, or for a private non-profit 
organization? If you do not work currently, characterize 
your major work in the past! Do you or did you work for 
1. Government or public institution  
2. Private business or industry 





Variable name Question wording 
Left political ideology Self-positioning in political scale 
In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the 
right." How would you place your views on this scale, 
generally speaking? 
1  Left  
2  2  
3  3  
4  4  
5  5  
6  6  
7  7  
8  8  
9  9  
10  Right 
Civic engagement Active/Inactive membership of charitable/humanitarian 
organization 
Now I am going to read out a list of voluntary 
organizations; for each one, could you tell me whether you 
are a member, an active member, an inactive member or 
not a member of that type of organization?  (0) Not a 




4. labor union 
5. political party 
6. environmental organization 
7. professional organization 
8. charitable organization 
9. consumer organization 
10. any other organizations. 
People can be trusted Most people can be trusted 
Generally speaking, would you say that most people can 
be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing 
with people? 
1. Most people can be trusted  














I am going to name a number of organizations. For each 
one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in 
them: is it a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of 
confidence, not very much confidence or none at all? (1)  
A great deal; (2) Quite a lot; (3) Not very much; (4) None 
at all 
1. the armed forces 
2. the police 
3. parliament 





Appendix D. Valid and invalid responses by country:  
Dependent variable “Confidence in the civil service” 
 
Country 





























Bulgaria 0.0 0.0 7.2 7.2 72 929 1,001 
Canada 0.0 0.4 7.4 7.8 169 1,995 2,164 
Finland 0.0 0.2 1.1 1.3 13 1,001 1,014 
France 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0 1,001 1,001 
Georgia 0.0 1.1 12.3 13.3 200 1,300 1,500 
Germany 0.0 0.6 3.3 3.9 80 1,984 2,064 
Great Britain 0.3 1.0 7.8 9.0 94 947 1,041 
Hungary 0.0 0.1 3.0 3.1 31 976 1,007 
Italy 0.0 1.0 1.9 2.9 29 983 1,012 
Moldova 0.0 0.1 4.3 4.4 46 1,000 1,046 
Netherlands 0.1 1.0 3.5 4.7 49 1,001 1,050 
Norway 0.0 0.6 0.3 0.9 9 1,016 1,025 
Poland 0.0 0.1 8.2 8.3 83 917 1,000 
Romania 0.0 0.8 6.1 6.9 123 1,653 1,776 
Russia 0.0 0.5 9.3 9.8 200 1,833 2,033 
Slovenia 0.0 1.4 5.3 6.7 69 968 1,037 
Spain 0.4 0.4 3.9 4.8 57 1,143 1,200 
Sweden 0.0 14.7 0.0 14.7 147 856 1,003 
Switzerland 0.0 0.9 2.1 3.0 37 1,204 1,241 
Ukraine 0.0 2.0 11.6 13.6 136 864 1,000 
USA 2.0 1.7 0.0 3.7 46 1,203 1,249 
























Bulgaria 0.0 0 1,001 1,001 
Canada 1.0 21 2,143 2,164 
Finland 0.0 0 1,014 1,014 
France 0.0 0 1,001 1,001 
Georgia 0.0 0 1,500 1,500 
Germany 0.0 0 2,064 2,064 
Georgia 0.0 0 1,041 1,041 
Great Britain 0.0 0 1,041 1,041 
Hungary 0.0 0 1,007 1,007 
Italy 0.0 0 1,012 1,012 
Moldova 0.0 0 1,046 1,046 
Netherlands 0.0 0 1,050 1,050 
Norway 0.0 0 1,025 1,025 
Poland 0.0 0 1,000 1,000 
Romania 0.0 0 1,776 1,776 
Russia 0.0 0 2,033 2,033 
Slovenia 0.0 0 1,037 1,037 
Spain 0.0 0 1,200 1,200 
Sweden 0.0 0 1,003 1,003 
Switzerland 0.0 0 1,241 1,241 
Ukraine 0.0 0 1,000 1,000 
USA 0.0 0 1,249 1,249 























Bulgaria 0.00% 0 1,001 1,001 
Canada 0.42% 9 2,155 2,164 
Finland 0.00% 0 1,014 1,014 
France 0.00% 0 1,001 1,001 
Georgia 0.00% 0 1,500 1,500 
Germany 0.00% 0 2,064 2,064 
Great Britain 0.00% 0 1,041 1,041 
Hungary 0.00% 0 1,007 1,007 
Italy 0.00% 0 1,012 1,012 
Moldova 0.00% 0 1,046 1,046 
Netherlands 0.00% 0 1,050 1,050 
Norway 0.00% 0 1,025 1,025 
Poland 0.00% 0 1,000 1,000 
Romania 0.00% 0 1,776 1,776 
Russia 0.00% 0 2,033 2,033 
Slovenia 0.00% 0 1,037 1,037 
Spain 0.00% 0 1,200 1,200 
Sweden 0.00% 0 1,003 1,003 
Switzerland 0.00% 0 1,241 1,241 
Ukraine 0.00% 0 1,000 1,000 
United States 0.00% 0 1,249 1,249 





Appendix G. Valid and invalid responses: High education  
 
Country 

























Bulgaria 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 1,001 1,001 
Canada 0.0% 1.0% 0.0% 1.0% 21 2,143 2,164 
Finland 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 1 1,013 1,014 
France 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 1 1,000 1,001 
Georgia 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 1,500 1,500 
Germany 0.0% 1.2% 0.0% 1.2% 24 2,040 2,064 
Great Britain 0.8% 0.4% 0.4% 1.5% 16 1,025 1,041 
Hungary 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 1,007 1,007 
Italy 0.0% 0.9% 0.3% 1.2% 12 1,000 1,012 
Moldova 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 1,046 1,046 
Netherlands 0.1% 0.3% 0.0% 0.4% 4 1,046 1,050 
Norway 0.0% 0.3% 0.1% 0.4% 4 1,021 1,025 
Poland 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 1,000 1,000 
Romania 0.0% 2.4% 0.0% 2.4% 42 1,734 1,776 
Russia 0.0% 0.3% 0.7% 1.1% 22 2,011 2,033 
Slovenia 0.0% 0.4% 0.0% 0.4% 4 1,033 1,037 
Spain 1.7% 0.0% 0.0% 1.7% 20 1,180 1,200 
Sweden 0.0% 0.7% 0.0% 0.7% 7 996 1,003 
Switzerland 0.0% 0.6% 0.0% 0.6% 7 1,234 1,241 
Ukraine 0.0% 0.9% 0.0% 0.9% 9 991 1,000 
USA 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 1,249 1,249 






















Bulgaria 0.0 0 1,001 1,001 
Canada 0.5 11 2,153 2,164 
Finland 0.0 0 1,014 1,014 
France 0.0 0 1,001 1,001 
Georgia 0.0 0 1,500 1,500 
Germany 1.1 22 2,042 2,064 
Great Britain 0.0 0 1,041 1,041 
Hungary 0.1 1 1,006 1,007 
Italy 0.9 9 1,003 1,012 
Moldova 0.0 0 1,046 1,046 
Netherlands 2.0 21 1,029 1,050 
Norway 0.2 2 1,023 1,025 
Poland 0.0 0 1,000 1,000 
Romania 0.5 8 1,768 1,776 
Russia 0.4 8 2,025 2,033 
Slovenia 0.3 3 1,034 1,037 
Spain 0.3 3 1,197 1,200 
Sweden 0.1 1 1,002 1,003 
Switzerland 0.2 2 1,239 1,241 
Ukraine 1.1 11 989 1,000 
United States 0.0 0 1,249 1,249 





Appendix I. Valid and invalid responses: Left political ideology 
 
Country 




























Bulgaria 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 28.9% 28.9% 289 712 1,001 
Canada 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 24.7% 25.0% 540 1,624 2,164 
Finland 0.5% 0.0% 4.8% 5.6% 10.9% 111 903 1,014 
France 1.3% 0.0% 3.0% 2.7% 7.0% 70 931 1,001 
Georgia 0.0% 0.0% 7.5% 34.3% 41.9% 628 872 1,500 
Germany 0.0% 0.0% 4.9% 6.7% 11.6% 240 1,824 2,064 
Great Britain 1.1% 0.0% 2.7% 11.7% 15.5% 161 880 1,041 
Hungary 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 11.9% 13.9% 140 867 1,007 
Italy 0.0% 0.0% 14.7% 12.0% 26.7% 270 742 1,012 
Moldova 0.0% 0.0% 3.3% 18.8% 22.2% 232 814 1,046 
Netherlands 0.0% 0.0% 3.4% 9.6% 13.0% 137 913 1,050 
Norway 0.0% 0.0% 0.5% 2.2% 2.7% 28 997 1,025 
Poland 0.0% 0.0% 0.3% 27.9% 28.2% 282 718 1,000 
Romania 0.0% 0.0% 8.2% 40.5% 48.7% 865 911 1,776 
Russia 0.0% 100.0% 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 2,033 0 2,033 
Slovenia 0.0% 0.0% 13.6% 23.5% 37.1% 385 652 1,037 
Spain 0.4% 0.0% 5.4% 7.1% 12.9% 155 1,045 1,200 
Sweden 0.0% 0.0% 2.8% 0.0% 2.8% 28 975 1,003 
Switzerland 0.0% 0.0% 5.2% 5.3% 10.5% 130 1,111 1,241 
Ukraine 0.0% 0.0% 7.0% 33.3% 40.3% 403 597 1,000 
USA 1.9% 0.0% 1.8% 0.0% 3.7% 46 1,203 1,249 























Bulgaria 0.0 0 1,001 1,001 
Canada 0.0 0 2,164 2,164 
Finland 0.0 0 1,014 1,014 
France 0.0 0 1,001 1,001 
Georgia 0.0 0 1,500 1,500 
Germany 0.1 3 2,061 2,064 
Great Britain 0.0 0 1,041 1,041 
Hungary 0.1 1 1,006 1,007 
Italy 0.5 5 1,007 1,012 
Moldova 0.0 0 1,046 1,046 
Netherlands 0.0 0 1,050 1,050 
Norway 0.0 0 1,025 1,025 
Poland 0.0 0 1,000 1,000 
Romania 0.2 3 1,773 1,776 
Russia 0.5 11 2,022 2,033 
Slovenia 0.0 0 1,037 1,037 
Spain 0.1 1 1,199 1,200 
Sweden 0.0 0 1,003 1,003 
Switzerland 0.1 1 1,240 1,241 
Ukraine 0.2 2 998 1,000 
USA 0.6 8 1,241 1,249 






Appendix K. Valid and invalid responses: People can be trusted 
 
Country 





























Bulgaria 0.0% 0.3% 11.5% 11.8% 118 883 1,001 
Canada 0.0% 0.2% 2.4% 2.6% 57 2,107 2,164 
Finland 0.0% 0.0% 1.4% 1.4% 14 1,000 1,014 
France 0.0% 0.4% 0.1% 0.5% 5 996 1,001 
Georgia 0.0% 0.3% 2.7% 3.0% 45 1,455 1,500 
Germany 0.0% 1.6% 6.5% 8.0% 166 1,898 2,064 
Great Britain 0.0% 0.3% 1.5% 1.8% 19 1,022 1,041 
Hungary 0.0% 0.8% 1.1% 1.9% 19 988 1,007 
Italy 0.0% 2.8% 3.1% 5.8% 59 953 1,012 
Moldova 0.0% 0.0% 1.5% 1.5% 16 1,030 1,046 
Netherlands 0.1% 1.8% 3.2% 5.1% 54 996 1,050 
Norway 0.0% 0.1% 0.6% 0.7% 7 1,018 1,025 
Poland 0.0% 0.2% 4.3% 4.5% 45 955 1,000 
Romania 0.0% 2.1% 3.0% 5.1% 91 1,685 1,776 
Russia 0.2% 0.6% 5.5% 6.3% 129 1,904 2,033 
Slovenia 0.0% 0.8% 2.9% 3.7% 38 999 1,037 
Spain 0.3% 0.1% 1.0% 1.3% 16 1,184 1,200 
Sweden 0.0% 4.0% 0.0% 4.0% 40 963 1,003 
Switzerland 0.0% 1.2% 3.1% 4.4% 54 1,187 1,241 
Ukraine 0.0% 7.9% 3.0% 10.9% 109 891 1,000 
USA 0.5% 0.2% 0.0% 0.6% 8 1,241 1,249 





Appendix L. Valid and invalid responses: 















Bulgaria 11.9 119 882 1,001 
Canada 10.8 233 1,931 2,164 
Finland 2.5 25 989 1,014 
France 3.7 37 964 1,001 
Georgia 22.2 333 1,167 1,500 
Germany 11.9 246 1,818 2,064 
Great Britain 12.9 134 907 1,041 
Hungary 9.9 100 907 1,007 
Italy 7.3 74 938 1,012 
Moldova 4.7 49 997 1,046 
Netherlands 12.2 128 922 1,050 
Norway 1.3 13 1,012 1,025 
Poland 15.0 150 850 1,000 
Romania 12.8 227 1,549 1,776 
Russia 15.5 316 1,717 2,033 
Slovenia 10.5 109 928 1,037 
Spain 7.8 93 1,107 1,200 
Sweden 6.1 61 942 1,003 
Switzerland 10.0 124 1,117 1,241 
Ukraine 24.0 240 760 1,000 
United States 6.4 80 1,169 1,249 






















































































































GDP per capita 1                 
Unemployment -0.59 1               
Inflation -0.64 -0.18 1             
Government effectiveness 0.92 -0.42 -0.78 1           
Corruption 0.90 -0.50 -0.71 0.97 1         
Gini -0.47 0.23 0.53 -0.59 -0.58 1       
Ethnic fractionalization -0.28 0.01 0.35 -0.30 -0.26 0.48 1     
Survival vs. Self-Expression values 0.23 -0.23 -0.08 0.29 0.39 -0.53 -0.39 1   
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